CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRATEGIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: 

WOMEN ON THE BOARD AND FEMALE LEADERSHIP, 

CEO OVERCONFIDENCE, LAYOFF DECISIONS



Capital Market Perception and Shareholder Wealth Effects by Hinrichsen, Anna Verena
  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRATEGIC PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT:  
WOMEN ON THE BOARD AND FEMALE LEADERSHIP,  
CEO OVERCONFIDENCE, LAYOFF DECISIONS 
 
Capital Market Perception and Shareholder Wealth Effects 
 
vom Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
der Technischen Universität Darmstadt 
 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades  
Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.) 
 
Genehmigte Dissertation 
von Anna Verena Hinrichsen, M.A. 
aus Darmstadt, Deutschland 
 
Erster Prüfer: Prof. Dr. Dirk Schiereck 
Zweite Prüferin: Prof. Dr. Anette von Ahsen 
 
Tag der Einreichung: 14. Oktober 2016 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 26. Januar 2017 
 
Darmstadt 2017 
D17 
 
  
Table of contents 
 
Table of contents 
List of tables ........................................................................................................................... I 
List of figures ......................................................................................................................... II 
List of abbreviations .............................................................................................................. III 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Motivation and Scope .............................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Outline of the dissertation ....................................................................................... 5 
2.  Women on corporate boards and in top  management and firm performance:      .......... 
 A literature review ...................................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 6 
2.2 Theoretical background ..........................................................................................10 
2.2.1 Workforce diversity in organizations ................................................................10 
2.2.2 Gender diversity in the context of business ......................................................13 
2.2.3 The effects of female representation on corporate boards ................................15 
2.3 Gender diversity on corporate boards and in TMTs and firm  performance..............20 
2.3.1 Overview: relevant research to date .................................................................20 
2.3.2 Research methodology and operationalization of variables ..............................35 
2.3.3      The issue of endogeneity ..................................................................................36 
2.3.4 Empirical evidence on the diversity-performance relationship ..........................39 
2.3.5 Intervening variables as moderators of the relationship ...................................43 
2.3.6 Evidence for a curvilinear relationship .............................................................45 
2.4 Summary and conclusion ........................................................................................46 
3. Gender diversity on corporate boards and in TMTs in practice: Evidence from  .................  
       stock-listed companies in German-speaking Europe ........................................................48 
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................48 
3.2 Regulatory background ...........................................................................................50 
3.3 Literature review and hypotheses development .......................................................53 
3.3.1 Diversity and gender diversity in the context of business ..................................53 
3.3.2 Diversity, CSR and the role of investor relations ..............................................54 
3.3.3 Shareholder reactions to women on boards and in TMTs .................................55 
3.4.4 Contributions to literature and hypotheses .......................................................55 
3.4 Research Methodology ............................................................................................56 
3.4.1 Survey methodology and data sources .............................................................56 
3.4.2 Limitations of the survey method .....................................................................59 
3.5 Results ....................................................................................................................60 
3.5.1 Survey sample .................................................................................................60 
3.5.2 Role and importance of diversity for investor relations and  capital markets ....61 
Table of contents 
 
3.5.3 Motivation behind the development of diversity promotion  programs .............65 
3.5.4 Other external stakeholders driving diversity promotion ..................................66 
3.5.5 Women in Leadership ......................................................................................67 
3.5.6 Promotional measures for women in leadership and reconciliation  .................... 
 of career-family life ..........................................................................................73 
3.5.7 Questions of attitude towards diversity and gender diversity............................75 
3.6 Summary and conclusion ........................................................................................78 
4. Too close to the sun: CEO optimism and  overconfidence as drivers for excessive growth.
 The Conergy Case ..........................................................................................................81 
4.1      Introduction ...........................................................................................................81 
4.2 Literature Review ...................................................................................................82 
4.2.1 Irrational managers’ behavior in behavioral corporate finance .........................82 
4.2.2 Managerial (CEO) optimism and overconfidence .............................................84 
4.2.3 Sources of CEO overconfidence ........................................................................84 
4.2.4 Potential effects on acquisition activity ............................................................85 
4.2.5 Potential effects on investment policy ..............................................................87 
4.2.6 Potential effects on risk preferences .................................................................87 
4.2.7 Methods for identification and measurement of CEO  overconfidence ..............88 
4.3 Background: The German Renewable Energies Sector  - a state-funded boom .........89 
4.4 Data and methodology ............................................................................................94 
4.5 Results ....................................................................................................................95 
4.5.1 Portray of CEO Rueter in press coverage ..........................................................95 
4.5.2 Rapid growth and quick successes in early years ..............................................95 
4.5.3 Heightened acquisitiveness and excessive expansion ........................................98 
4.5.4 Abundant internal resources .......................................................................... 102 
4.5.5 High premia paid in acquisitions .................................................................... 104 
4.5.6 Failures in procurement and pressure to fully utilize production  plant .......... 108 
4.5.7 Dramatic increase in working capital ............................................................. 113 
4.5.8 Liquidity Crisis ............................................................................................... 114 
4.6 The aftermath of the crisis .................................................................................... 115 
4.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 117 
5. Layoffs and shareholder wealth effects. Evidence from the banking industry ................ 119 
5.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................... 119 
5.2 Background: the banking sector ............................................................................ 121 
5.2.1 Banking sector characteristics ........................................................................ 121 
5.2.2 Effects of the global financial crisis on the banking sector .............................. 123 
5.2.3 Costs and cost savings potential in the financial services sector ...................... 124 
Table of contents 
 
5.3 Literature review and hypotheses development ..................................................... 125 
5.3.1 Theoretical considerations ............................................................................. 125 
5.3.2 Shareholder wealth effects of reductions-in-workforce  announcements ......... 127 
5.3.3 Explanatory factors for effect variations ......................................................... 133 
5.3.3.1 Reasons for layoffs ..................................................................................... 133 
5.3.3.2   Business cycle/stock market conditions ....................................................... 137 
5.3.3.3   Influence of employment protection legislation ........................................... 138 
5.3.3.4   Absolute and relative layoff size ................................................................. 140 
5.4 Data...................................................................................................................... 141 
5.5 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 145 
5.6 Results .................................................................................................................. 147 
5.6.1 Univariate analysis of the announcement effect ............................................. 147 
5.6.2 Multivariate analysis of the announcement effect ........................................... 155 
5.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 160 
6. Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................... 162 
References .......................................................................................................................... 168 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................ 182 
Declaration of Honor .......................................................................................................... 201 
Academic Background ......................................................................................................... 202 
 
  
List of tables 
 
I 
List of tables 
Table 2.1: Empirical studies on women in upper echelons and firm performance ..................22 
Table 3.1: Summary of survey statistics ................................................................................58 
Table 3.2: Summary of respondents’ characteristics ..............................................................60 
Table 3.3: Industry distribution of the sample .......................................................................61 
Table 3.4: Inquiries of investors with regard to diversity .......................................................64 
Table 3.5: Female representation on corporate boards ..........................................................68 
Table 3.6: Workforce size of the sample’s companies ............................................................68 
Table 3.7: Existence of planning targets for women in leadership and on corporate boards ...70 
Table 3.8: Relationship between share of female employees and planning targets/actual 
                 female representation in leadership ......................................................................71 
Table 3.9: Assumed advantages and disadvantages of disclosing internal planning 
                 targets ..................................................................................................................72 
Table 3.10: State of preparations regarding the fulfilment of the coming gender quota for  
                   supervisory boards .............................................................................................73 
Table 3.12: Items on diversity and gender diversity ..............................................................76 
Table 3.13: Level of acceptance for items on diversity and gender diversity in leadership .....77 
Table 4.1: CONERGY AG key financial figures for FY 2002 to FY 2007 ..................................97 
Table 4.2: CONERGY AG key financial figures for FY 2006 to FY 2011 ................................ 111 
Table 5.1: Average abnormal returns for event studies ........................................................ 129 
Table 5.2: Temporal distribution of announcements on planned layoffs by banks ............... 142 
Table 5.3: Descriptive sample statistics ............................................................................... 144 
Table 5.4: Event study: Banks’ abnormal stock returns by underlying strategy .................... 148 
Table 5.5: Event study: Banks’ abnormal stock returns in different periods ......................... 151 
Table 5.6: Stock price reactions to bank layoff announcements by bank location................. 153 
Table 5.7: Determinants of the abnormal stock return on the announcement day ............... 157 
Table 5.8: Determinants of the cumulative abnormal stock returns [-1;+1] ........................ 159 
 
List of figures 
II 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1.1: Overview of the dissertation`s structure ....................................................................... 5 
Figure 3.1: Frequency of diversity issues in everyday professional life ....................................... 62 
Figure 3.2: Frequency of the topic of diversity in dialogue with investors ................................. 62 
Figure 3.3: Types of investors inquiring about diversity ................................................................ 63 
Figure 3.4: Locations of investors inquiring about diversity ......................................................... 63 
Figure 3.5: Expectation regarding future rising importance of diversity ..................................... 64 
Figure 3.6: Motifs for developing diversity promotion programs ................................................. 65 
Figure 3.7: External stakeholders driving diversity promotion ..................................................... 67 
Figure 3.8: Assumed impact of corporate initiatives to increase the share of women in  
                  leadership on company valuation by capital markets ................................................ 69 
Figure 3.9: Assumed impact of corporate initiatives promoting female leadership on  
                  company valuation by rating agencies ......................................................................... 69 
Figure 3.10: Corporate initiatives for promoting female leadership ............................................ 74 
Figure 3.11: Existing measures for employees for reconciling career and family life ............... 75 
Figure 4.1: Market data photovoltaics in Germany 2015 .............................................................. 92 
Figure 4.2: Sales development CONERGY Group ......................................................................... 101 
Figure 4.3: Evolution of the number of CONERGY’s fully consolidated subsidiaries ............... 105 
Figure 4.4: Acquisitions paid with cash and future earn-outs and thereof goodwill  
                 (in EUR thousand) ......................................................................................................... 106 
Figure 4.5: Return-on-sales ratios of CONERGY AG and selected peers ................................... 112 
Figure 5.1: Strictness of employment protection – individual and collective dismissals ......... 139 
Figure 5.2: Stock price reactions to bank layoff announcements by underlying strategy ....... 150 
Figure 5.3: Stock price reactions to bank layoff announcements in different periods............. 152 
Figure 5.4: Stock price reaction to bank layoff announcements by bank location ................... 154 
List of abbreviations 
III 
List of abbreviations 
2SLS   Two-Stage Least Squares 
3SLS   Three-Stage Least Squares 
AAR   Average Abnormal Return 
AG   Aktiengesellschaft (Stock Company) 
BCBS   Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BSW   Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft (Federal Solar Industry Association) 
CAR   Cumulative Abnormal Return  
CAAR  Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
CAGR   Compound Annual Growth Rate 
CDU   Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) 
CSR   Corporate Social Responsibility 
CSU   Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) 
CEO   Chief Executive Officer 
CFO   Chief Financial Officer 
DAX   Deutscher Aktienindex (German Stock Index) 
EBIT   Earnings before Interest and Taxes 
EBITDA  Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
ECB   European Central Bank 
EEG   Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (Renewable Energies Act) 
EPS   Earnings per share 
ESG   Environmental, Social and Governance 
EU   European Union 
EUR   Euro (currency) 
FDP   Freie Demokratische Partei (Liberal Democratic Party) 
FidAR   Frauen in die Aufsichtsräte  
FREP  German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel 
HR  Human Resources 
HY  Half-Year 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IMR   Inverse Mill’s Ratio 
List of abbreviations 
 
IV 
IR   Investor Relations 
IRO   Investor Relations Officer 
IRR   Internal Rate of Return 
KWh   Kilowatt hour 
LCR  Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
M&A   Mergers and Aquisitions 
MBA   Master of Business Administration 
MDAX   Deutscher Aktienindex für 50 größte Werte nach DAX   
  (German index for 50 largest stocks following DAX) 
MWp   Megawatts peak 
NPV  Net Present Value 
NSFR  Net Stable Funding Ratio 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares 
PE   Private Equity 
PV   Photovoltaics 
ROA   Return on Assets 
ROE   Return on Equity 
ROI   Return on Investment 
ROS   Return on Sales 
SRI   Socially Responsible Investors 
TecDAX  Deutscher Aktienindex für 30 größte Technologiewerte    
  (German Index for 30 largest Technology Stocks) 
TMT   Top Management Team 
TSR   Total Shareholder Return 
US   United States (of America) 
USD   United States Dollar 
Introduction 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Scope 
This dissertation deals with the influence of corporate governance and corporate strategic 
personnel management on shareholder wealth. Factors that impact shareholder wealth are of 
particular interest for corporate finance research. The shareholders, suppliers of finance to the 
firm, pursue the goal of value maximization. The financiers (the principals) engage a person 
(the agent) to conduct and manage the business (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). They delegate 
decision-making authority. The principals request but cannot fully ensure that the agent acts in 
their interest. Possibly contrary interests of principal and agent as well as asymmetric 
information may lead to agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Corporate governance concerns with this agency problem; the underlying question is 
how the suppliers of finance can ensure that they earn a return on their financial investment 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance comprises several mechanisms, processes and 
institutions. One institution is monitoring of management by the board of directors (Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1991). Due to corporations’ great significance and influence in modern economies, 
the costs of their agency problems are highly relevant (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010). 
Corporate governance and the role of the board of directors are thus of fundamental importance 
in economies and for good reason, it has become an active topic of research (Adams, Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 2010). The determinants of both board composition and the board’s actions are in 
the focus of research interest. With regard to board composition, one focus is on the diversity 
of the members both from the executive and the supervisory board, primarily with respect to 
age, gender or ethnic background, and potential effects resulting from this diversity. 
The shareholder value principle places the interests and expectations of a company’s 
shareholders at the center. Management committed to the concept of shareholder value should 
strive to increase market capitalization in the interest of the firm’s financiers. Major strategic 
and financial management decisions should be critically scrutinized by the firm’s owners with 
regard to their value-creation potential. While the effects of financial decisions such as mergers 
and acquisitions or debt issues on firm value have been intensely investigated in corporate 
finance research, the impact of strategic personnel management on shareholder wealth has not 
been studied to the same extent. Personnel management policies comprise for instance 
identification and recruitment of talents, engagement and dismissal of personnel, staff 
development and diversity management. Choice, structuring and execution of related personnel 
measures may impact firm performance, especially when large numbers of employees are 
affected. The demands placed on personnel policy are particularly high in industries that heavily 
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rely on their human capital, typically the services industry. The present dissertation aims at 
shedding light on selected aspects of personnel policy from the corporate finance perspective, 
namely diversity promotion and dismissals.  
The key research question of the present dissertation is how governance and strategic 
personnel management impact firm value and thus shareholder wealth. This dissertation 
focuses on selected aspects of corporate governance and personnel management, namely the 
role and effects of gender diversity on corporate boards, female leadership, CEO overconfidence 
and layoff decisions. 
The first paper reviews empirical evidence regarding the various effects of an increased 
female representation on corporate boards as well as stronger participation of women in 
leadership. The review concentrates on economic rather than moral arguments. The “business 
case” for increased gender diversity in top management teams (TMT) and on corporate boards 
should provide support for a positive effect on firm performance and shareholder wealth in 
order to convince decision makers. Thus, the guiding question of the review is if previous 
research does provide empirical evidence for economic benefits of increased female 
representation in top management positions. 
The second paper moves on from theory to practice: It investigates whether the moral 
or the economic point of view on diversity is dominant in firms in German-speaking countries, 
and it examines the status quo of gender diversity promotion and the attitude towards women 
on boards and female leadership. Increasing female representation in management and on 
boards can be both a corporate governance issue and a personnel management objective at the 
same time. The first two papers discuss if and under what conditions increasing female 
participation may be a strategy for improving corporate governance and thus firm performance. 
The third paper shows the potential adverse effects of failures in corporate governance. 
In the context of a case study, it traces the development of (male) CEO overconfidence with 
fatal consequences for the firm, eventually leading to its insolvency. Male executives in fact 
appear to be overconfident relative to female executives (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Hence, 
besides the poor monitoring and control mechanisms, gender is a factor that plays a role also 
in this context. 
The fourth paper focuses on measures of personnel management by examining the 
wealth effects of layoff decisions. Large-scale layoffs can be of a proactive or reactive nature 
and they are executed for various reasons. A stakeholder conflict is regularly put forward as 
several stakeholders such as the suppliers of finance, labor unions or the public are affected, 
but primarily the shareholders benefit from the dismissals at the expense of employees 
(Fraunhoffer, Mietzner, Schiereck & Schneider, 2014). This paper investigates if layoff decisions 
really increase the equity’s value in which case they would be beneficial for the shareholders.  
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Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the relationship between women on corporate 
boards or in TMTs and financial firm performance. Since the 1980s, a steadily growing number 
of studies has been concerned with various effects of diversity in a business environment. 
Evidence suggests that fostering diversity is not only an imperative of fairness but that firms 
may also realize specific benefits from a diverse workforce. However, there is also evidence for 
the advantageousness of homogeneous teams. The literature review presents evidence for 
positive but also potential negative effects of a diverse workforce on organizational processes 
and outcomes. 
The review starts with an introduction to the concepts of workforce diversity and 
diversity management in organizations and continues with outlining the role of gender diversity 
in the context of business and of corporate governance. Hereafter, previous findings on various 
effects of female representation on corporate boards are presented. The core of the survey is a 
review of 44 studies on the link between women on boards or TMTs and firm performance or 
firm value, respectively.  
On the basis of existing research findings and empirical evidence, section 3 evaluates 
the status quo of diversity in predominantly listed companies in German-speaking Europe. For 
this purpose, an anonymous survey among investor relations professionals in Germany, 
Switzerland and Austria was conducted in cooperation with the German Investor Relations 
Association DIRK e.V. in early 2015. Nearly 100 analyzable data sets were compiled. 
The survey pursues three main objectives. The first objective is to determine the 
significance of workforce diversity from the company’s but also the capital markets’ perspective, 
including the question whether diversity is a relevant parameter for external company 
valuation. The second objective is to examine if companies employ an economic perspective on 
the topic of diversity. Research interests involve the “true” attitude towards the topic of diversity 
(possibly different than the published attitude that can be found in the official company 
documents) and major internal and external drivers for the development and implementation 
of diversity initiatives. With respect to the third objective, the focus is set on gender diversity 
and female leadership. The survey gains insight into strategy and progress regarding a stronger 
participation of women in executive positions. In this context, my research concerns the 
presence of planning objectives for women in management positions, of concrete measures to 
promote female leadership and of incentive measures to reconcile work and family life for both 
mothers and fathers. There are two major reasons for the thematic focus on gender diversity in 
management at that particular time. First, vigorous debates on women in top management 
positions have been held for decades in Germany and also in Austria and Switzerland. The 
German industry, for instance, obliged itself to promote equal participation of women and men 
in the private business sector 15 years ago. I examine what progress has been made until today. 
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Second, the introduction of a women’s quota for supervisory boards was imminent in Germany 
and in Switzerland at the time of the survey. Austria already introduced such a quota for its 
parastatal companies back in 2011. The survey investigates whether companies concerned are 
prepared or have taken measures to fulfill the forthcoming binding gender quota for supervisory 
boards and analyzes the acceptance level of the quota.  
Section 4 of this dissertation is a case study. It describes the rise and fall of Germany-
based CONERGY AG, an integrated systems supplier in the field of renewable energies, during 
the years 1998 to 2007. I argue that the main reason for CONERGY’s distress that finally led to 
its insolvency was excessive expansion into international markets and new business sectors 
within very few years. The responsibility lies primarily with CONERGY’s founder and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) Hans-Martin Rueter, but also with a weak supervisory board, which 
failed in its monitoring and control function and whose Chairman was far from independent 
being Rueter’s uncle and founding partner. Referring to important insights of behavioral 
finance, I identify indicators for the presence of CEO over-optimism and overconfidence. I 
explain why they can provide an explanation for CONERGY’s aggressive expansion strategy and 
I show how this development was further fueled by factors such as the state-funded boom of 
the renewable energies sector and the availability of abundant internal resources. 
 Section 5 concentrates on the personnel measure of large-scale workforce 
reductions. I investigate whether large-scale layoffs are really in the interest of the company’s 
shareholders. Applying event study methodology, I examine the stock price reactions to layoff 
announcements by 49 different banks headquartered in Western Europe and the United States 
between 2004 and 2014, covering the period of the global financial crisis. The banking sector 
is particularly interesting because it has seen massive waves of layoffs during those years albeit 
heavily relying on its human capital. My sample consists of 210 hand-collected layoff 
announcements in total. Univariate and multivariate analysis are applied to investigate the 
determinants of the stock price reaction. I consider event-specific variables such as layoff size 
or the strictness of local labor law, the stated reasons for the layoffs and firm-specific variables 
such as assets per employee or personnel expenses per employee. 
Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes.  
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1.2 Outline of the dissertation 
The present dissertation’s structure is illustrated in a graphic form in figure 1.1. 
Figure 1 – Figure 1.1: Overview of the dissertation`s structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Women on corporate boards and 
in top management and firm 
performance: A literature review 
3. Gender diversity on corporate 
boards and in TMTs in practice -
Evidence from stock-listed companies 
in German-speaking Europe 
4. Too close to the sun: CEO 
optimism and overconfidence as 
drivers for excessive growth.  
The Conergy Case 
5. Layoffs and shareholder wealth 
effects. 
Evidence from the banking industry 
6. Concluding remarks 
Firm value & 
performance 
Firm performance 
Firm value & 
performance 
Firm value 
Governance & 
Personnel Mgmt. 
Governance & 
Personnel Mgmt. 
Corporate 
Governance 
Personnel Mgmt. 
Firm value & 
performance 
Firm value & 
performance 
Firm 
performance 
Firm value 
Literature Review: Women on boards and in TMTS and firm performance 
 
6 
2.  Women on corporate boards and in top 
 management and firm performance:    
 A literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
While organizational diversity and successful diversity management has been a prominent issue 
in the United States since the 1990s, it has gained increasing importance also in Europe during 
recent years. Gender diversity in top management positions is of particular interest in this 
context. Although the share of qualified female graduates as well as the number of working 
women in Europe has steadily increased during the past decades, female representation at top 
managerial levels remains very low. Several European governments decided that political 
intervention was necessary in order to trigger change. Statutory gender quotas for supervisory 
boards were introduced for instance in Norway (2003: 40 percent), in Spain (2007: 30 percent), 
in Italy (2012: 30 percent) and also in Germany (2015: 30 percent).  
Two main lines of argument are central to the debate: the “moral case” for gender 
diversity and the “business case” for gender diversity.  The moral arguments in favor of diversity 
focus on fairness, equal opportunities and compliance with regulatory requirements. This 
understanding of diversity is known as the “discrimination-and-fairness paradigm” (Thomas & 
Ely, 1996). Core elements of the paradigm are equality, conformism and gender-blindness. 
Proponents of equality put forward that women represent half of mankind and thus half of its 
intelligence and capabilities. Thus, women should be equally represented in management 
positions. Proponents of conformism deny gender-specific differences and promote equivalence 
of both sexes.  
Proponents of a business case for gender diversity argue that diversity was not an issue 
of fairness only but would make business sense (Thomas & Ely, 1996). The economic arguments 
in favor of gender diversity focus on the differences between women and men and the resulting 
(although stereotypic) advantages. The “access-and-legitimacy paradigm”, for instance, 
generally accepts and emphasizes differences. Its line of reasoning suggests that an 
organization’s workforce should reflect the diversity of its customers in order to gain access to 
all segments and to gain legitimacy with them (Thomas & Ely, 1996). Female representation 
on boards can indeed be associated with a reputational effect, which is most pronounced for 
firms operating in sectors with close proximity to final customers (Brammer, Millington & 
Pavelin, 2009). In line with this result, the highest proportion of women on boards is found in 
sectors such as consumer services, health, financial services or retailing (Brammer, Millington 
& Pavelin, 2007; Brammer et al., 2009; Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella, 2007). The “Learning-
Literature Review: Women on boards and in TMTS and firm performance 
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and-effectiveness paradigm” as a way of understanding diversity unites the two earlier 
approaches by promoting equal opportunities and recognizing values in cultural differences at 
the same time. It emphasizes the advantages of incorporating the diverse employees’ 
perspectives to enhance processes, strategies and business practices, thereby “tapping diversity’s 
true benefits” (Thomas & Ely, 1996, p. 85). 
Although the enhancement of internal strategies and processes may indirectly impact 
firm performance, the “true benefits” of diversity must be measurable to achieve leadership 
commitment. The business case for diversity should be clear and convincing and naturally 
linked to the company’s specific business objectives (Robinson & Dechant, 1997). This business 
case is particularly relevant when it comes to the call for increased female representation in top 
management and on corporate boards. Economic arguments, hence substantiated figures, are 
most likely to convince. In brief, the business case for increased gender diversity in top 
management and on corporate boards should provide support for a positive effect on firm 
performance and shareholder wealth. Therefore, the key question of the present literature 
review is: 
Does previous research provide empirical evidence for economic benefits  
of increased female representation in top management positions? 
 
Several literature reviews and meta-analyses deal with various effects of workforce diversity on 
teams and organizations. Among the well-known surveys are those by Milliken and Martens 
(1996), Williams and O’Reilly (1998) and Jackson, Joshi and Erhardt (2003). A recent broad 
overview of the literature on diversity is provided by Pitts and Wise (2010). Fields and Keys 
(2003) survey papers examining the effect of board diversity on firm performance or 
shareholder wealth and De Abreu Dos Reis, Sastre Castillo and Roig Dobón (2007) provide an 
overview on 50 years of research in the field of diversity and business performance. The surveys 
yield ambiguous results suggesting that the relationship between diversity and performance is 
not simple and direct but rather moderated by a series of variables, thus context-sensitive.  
Meta-analyses examine differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous teams 
with regard to the impact on performance by evaluation of 13 studies (Bowers, Pharmer, Salas, 
2000) or the impact of highly and less job-related diversity on group cohesion and performance 
by analyzing 24 studies (Webber & Donahue, 2001). Other meta-analyses explore the role of 
contextual influences: Joshi and Roh (2009), for instance, investigate 39 studies to show 
whether contextual factors influence performance outcomes of relations-oriented and task-
oriented diversity. Stahl, Maznevski, Voigt and Jonsen (2010) examine the role of task 
complexity and structural aspects of the team as moderators of the effects of cultural diversity 
on teams on the basis of 108 studies. None of the first three meta-analyses finds a positive and 
significant relationship between diversity and performance. The results of the fourth meta-
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analysis are ambiguous as they suggest that cultural diversity leads to process losses caused by 
conflict and decreased social integration as well as process gains in the form of creativity and 
satisfaction (Stahl et al., 2010). 
Only few literature reviews explicitly consider the relationship of gender diversity in 
upper echelons and firm performance or firm value. Terjesen, Sealy and Singh (2009) present 
the first comprehensive review of how gender diversity on corporate boards influences 
corporate governance outcomes that in turn impact performance by incorporating research 
from more than 400 publications. Their findings indicate that gender diversity on corporate 
boards contributes to corporate governance and firm level outcomes as well as to firm value. 
Mohan (2014) focuses on three areas of research and provides a review of the gender effect on 
pay, corporate performance and entry into top management. She surveys several studies on the 
short-term and long-term performance of companies led by women. Due to ambiguous results, 
the question if a potential gender behavioral difference affects firm performance remains 
unsolved. 
A comprehensive review of literature on female representation on corporate boards or 
in top management teams and firm performance is presented by Kroell, Szlusnus, Hüttermann 
and Boerner (2014) who survey 26 primary studies. They conclude that relevant research does 
not allow the assumption that gender diversity is generally economically beneficial. 
Furthermore, only few boundary conditions could be identified as critical for success. The 
survey conducted by Boerner, Keding and Hüttermann (2012) considers 18 studies including 
five literature reviews and one meta-analysis. The authors state that mixed leadership and the 
targeted promotion of gender diversity in management positions do not per se lead to economic 
benefits. Empirical evidence points towards certain boundary conditions under which women 
in leadership may contribute positively to the company’s success. These include individual 
qualification and experience, the relevance of the specific resources that women bring in for the 
particular firm and if the company’s environment allows female executives to develop their full 
potential. Both publications are available in German language only.  
The most recent surveys review literature published up and including 2012. Since 
several studies have emerged in the meantime, an update seems to be required. I aim at filling 
this gap with my literature review. Moreover, the fact that two of the most recent studies are 
available in German language only means a limitation with regard to the size of the audience 
(Boerner et al., 2012; Kroell et al., 2014). The present survey is drafted in English language 
and thus accessible for international recipients. 
In order to answer my research question, I conduct an analysis of existent empirical 
studies published between 1996 and 2014. In early 2015, the German government decided on 
a gender quota for the supervisory boards of large German listed firms. I seek to comprehend 
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which conclusions regarding the relationship between gender diversity in upper echelons and 
firm performance could be drawn on the basis of published empirical evidence at that time. For 
this purpose, I identify relevant publications through searches in academic databases (Web of 
Science, EBSCO). I focus primarily on literature in English language as the vast majority of 
papers is published in English. I use the following keywords, linked by Boolean Operators 
(AND/OR): “board diversity”; “board gender diversity”, “Women on boards”, “gender diversity”, 
“female representation”, “boards of directors”, “top management”, “performance”, “firm 
performance”, “firm value”, “firm valuation”. Furthermore, I search the reference lists of the 
identified studies for further relevant papers, according to the snowball principle.  
I identify 44 relevant publications on the link between gender diversity on corporate 
boards and in TMTs and firm performance or shareholder wealth. Ten studies that emerged 
since 2012 are not included in the most recent publications of Kroell et al. (2014) and Mohan 
(2014). I primarily consider papers from academic journals, in particular finance and 
management journals. For the core of my study, I focus on papers that examine the relation 
between one or more gender diversity measures as independent variable(s) and one or more 
financial performance measures as dependent variable(s). However, I additionally provide a 
detailed introduction into diversity in the context of business as well as an overview of the 
variety of nonfinancial effects of gender diversity in upper echelons. 
I contribute to the literature by providing a structured overview of the relevant research 
including comparisons between theoretical models, research designs and empirical results. 
Furthermore, I trace the change of perception of the link between gender diversity and measures 
of performance and shareholder wealth over time. Finally, I make suggestions for future 
research.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 recaps the theories of diversity in the context of 
business. This section also sets out the various effects of gender diversity on corporate boards 
indirectly linked to firm performance. Section 2.3, the core of my study, presents research on 
the direct link between female representation and accounting-based as well as market-based 
measures for firm performance. Finally, section 2.4 points out unsettled issues and concludes.  
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2.2 Theoretical background 
2.2.1 Workforce diversity in organizations 
The topic "diversity in business" can be addressed from several sides. Taking an optimistic view, 
diversity of a company's workforce promises a great variety of beliefs, attitudes and capabilities. 
Differing perspectives and approaches to problems as well as openness to exchange of ideas and 
knowledge will most likely lead to increased creativity and better team performance (Mannix 
& Neale, 2005). From an ethical point of view, it could be argued that the thriving diversity of 
the population should be reflected in the diversity of a company's workforce. Securing equal 
rights, equal responsibilities and equal opportunities for all current and possible future 
employees, regardless of origin, nationality, religion, race, gender or age, should then be a 
desirable objective. This maxim should apply to all areas of human resource management - the 
recruitment process, the allocation of duties, to promotion procedures and the composition of 
teams up to the highest levels.  
While the moral arguments in favor of diversity may be reasonable and widely accepted, 
other perspectives provide a mixed picture. The social-psychological perspective probably 
fosters a rather pessimistic view (Mannix & Neale, 2005). When striving to understand the 
effects of diversity, social-psychology provides three major theoretical approaches: information 
processing, the similarity-attraction and the self- and social categorization paradigm (Mannix 
& Neale, 2005). The information processing paradigm confirms the optimistic assessment by 
arguing that a group benefits from its diversity as each member has access to a wide range of 
knowledge, information and skills. This increased information may also increase group 
performance. By contrast, the similarity-attraction paradigm, part of interpersonal attraction 
theory (Berscheid, 1985), implies the principle that people are attracted by similarity rather 
than by diversity. Similarly, the self-/social categorization paradigm, part of social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), argues that individuals intuitively seek for categorizing 
themselves and others into groups. Criteria such as age, nationality/race, gender or values serve 
as determinants for similarity (in-group members) respectively as means for distinction (out-
group members) on the social level. According to the so-called in-group bias, there is a clear 
tendency to favor in-group members over out-group members. This preference applies to several 
dimensions such as the assessment of people, social interaction or the allocation of resources 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In reverse, this means that individuals will experience more cohesion 
and social integration in homogeneous groups (Mannix & Neale, 2005) - weighty arguments 
against diversity. 
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Similarly, the economical perspective provides arguments both for and against diversity. 
At least since the early 1990s, proponents of diversity have suggested a direct and positive 
impact on business performance and firm value. Cox and Blake (1991) review research data 
supporting the existence of a link between managing diversity and organizational 
competitiveness. They state that solid diversity management can create a competitive advantage 
in six dimensions of business performance, more precisely cost, resource acquisition, marketing 
success, creativity and innovation, problem-solving and organizational flexibility. Concrete 
examples for organizational accommodation to diversity as presented by Cox and Blake are 
increased use of flexible working hours or company investment in in-house child care. The 
authors further argue that the share of minorities increases on the labor market due to 
demographic change. As companies are in competition for excellent employees from 
underrepresented groups, the company’s reputation regarding its efforts to effectively manage 
diversity gains in significance. 
People from different gender, race or age hold different attitudes, perspectives and 
beliefs. They also differ in their cognitive functioning. Hence, according to Cox & Blake (1991), 
cultural diversity should have a positive impact on team creativity and innovation as well as on 
problem solving and decision making. Heterogeneous groups may be more successful than 
homogeneous groups in solving the most contentious problems (Lucas-Pérez, Mínguez-Vera, 
Baixauli-Soler & Martín-Ugedo, 2015). General system flexibility may be enhanced by 
managing cultural diversity for two reasons: firstly, particularly flexible cognitive structures are 
assigned to women and racioethnic minorities (Cox & Blake, 1991). Second, the firm’s processes 
and policies are dissolved and the company is more open to change.  
Heffernan (2002) examines diversity in terms of economic power. The transformation 
of organizations into “more projects and matrix organizational structures” should also be 
reflected in a variety of input, that means employees with differing education, expertise and 
experience. “A business is, after all, the clients and the customers it serves” (Heffernan, 2002). 
Hence, diversity of perspectives can be crucial for business success. Companies have realized 
that diversity fosters creativity on the lower and middle organizational levels as well as in the 
external relationship with customers and consumers. As a logical consequence, a variety of 
viewpoints and ideas should be equally advantageous for the upper levels up to the corporate 
board level (Heffernan, 2002).   
The reason why diversity is seldom a top business priority is that alternative business 
initiatives promise concrete results and clear returns in the short-term. Robinson and Dechant 
(1997) call for the creation of a sound business case for diversity in order to receive support 
from the top and resources for the implementation of diversity initiatives. The authors concur 
with Cox & Blake (1991) with regard to the major business reasons for diversity such as cost 
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savings due to lower turnover costs and absenteeism rates or avoidance of lawsuits on sexual, 
race and age discrimination; further improvements in attracting, retaining and promoting 
excellent employees with diverse backgrounds; driving business growth through increased 
marketplace understanding, greater creativity and innovation, producing higher-quality 
problem-solving, improved leadership effectiveness and effective global relationships.  
However, diversity initiatives must be treated like any other business investment to 
achieve leadership commitment. A realistic assessment of the expected return on investment 
increases the probability of winning the in-house competition for the company’s scarce 
resources (Robinson & Dechant, 1997). Research consortium "Diversity Research Network" 
commits itself to this task. Associated scholars (Kochan, Bezrukova, Jackson, Joshi, Jehn, 
Leonard, … Thomas, 2003) strive to assess the diversity-performance link in multiple firms in 
order to find evidence for their view that increasing diversity of the workforce enhances 
organizational effectiveness. The authors report on the findings of their multiannual, 
collaborative industry-university research project. They express their disenchantment in view 
of the fact that only four out of originally 20 Fortune 500 companies were willing to cooperate. 
Although not representative due to the small sample, quantitative results for the four companies 
are similar. Effects proven by earlier studies could not be confirmed: there is neither a 
significant positive impact of gender and racial diversity on performance nor a significant 
negative impact of diversity on group processes. With regard to the general lack of direct effects 
of diversity on performance it is presumed that context is of great importance. Kochan et al. 
(2003) note that diversity may increase performance under certain conditions. Thus, one of 
several provided managerial implications is to focus on these specific conditions and modify the 
business case for diversity accordingly. The request to adopt a more analytical approach is 
related to the call for diligent data collection to enable a thorough analysis of the link between 
diversity-oriented HR activities and business performance. 
Contrary to the arguments raised by the proponents of diversity in business, there is also 
evidence that diversity may adversely affect firm performance. Tsui, Egan & O'Reilly (1992) 
show that the greater the differences on age, gender or race, the lower the individual's 
psychological and behavioral attachment to the organization. Surprisingly, the effects shown 
by Tsui and colleagues relating to difference in gender (race) are stronger for males (whites) 
than for females (non-whites). The authors provide as one possible explanation that females as 
well as non-whites are used to be minorities in organizational settings and have learned to cope 
with this difference whereas white men were traditionally part of gender-(race-)homogeneous 
groups, where there was neither an opportunity nor a necessity to adapt to the presence of 
females (or non-whites) within their work environment (Tsui et al., 1992).  
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The need for a successful diversity management is undeniable in view of the above. 
Integration of employees remains a priority task for companies. Cox and Blake (1991) admit 
that women (and minorities) may increase companies' costs due to higher absenteeism and 
turnover rates. They stress that diversity needs to be managed by increasing awareness among 
team members of their cultural differences in order to realize performance benefits (see also 
Kochan et al., 2003).  
Although team heterogeneity is positively related to propensity to action and willingness 
for competition (Hambrick, Cho & Chen, 1996), homogeneous groups outperform 
heterogeneous groups because their communication processes are more efficient and thus 
improve decision-making significantly (Hambrick et al., 1996). According to Hambrick et al. 
(1996), the internal similarity of homogeneous team members, their joint vocabulary and way 
of exchanging information create an advantage by increasing the team's ability to understand 
the competitor's move and to decide on an adequate countermove. These results are in 
accordance with the findings on intergroup relations from social psychology. Cooperation is 
better and emotional conflicts are rarer in homogeneous groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Communication patterns become stabilized and routinized within groups over time (Wagner, 
Pfeffer & O'Reilly, 1984) and group members are familiar with these. Patterns need to be 
changed if (out-group) individuals enter the group at a later stage. Furthermore, frequent 
communication creates similarity among group members in terms of beliefs and perception of 
the organization (Wagner et al., 1984). Joint characteristics of group members tend to predict 
their similarity and frequency of communication and these in turn determine if there is rather 
cohesion or conflict (Wagner et al., 1984). Interestingly, Katz (1982) notes that group longevity 
has a negative impact on internal and external communication of group members: overall 
communication is reduced and thus the respective project groups become increasingly isolated 
from key information sources. 
With regard to the present study's topic, the following part of the literature review will 
focus on studies that deal with gender diversity in the context of management and corporate 
governance. 
 
2.2.2 Gender diversity in the context of business 
Previous literature has provided evidence that women show relatively more risk aversion in 
financial decision making1 than men (Bernasek & Shwiff, 2001; Eckel & Grossman, 2002; 
                                                          
1 A literature review on gender differences in investing is provided by Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996).  
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Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Sunden & Surette, 1998), even irrespective of the level of task 
familiarity and framing of tasks, costs or ambiguity (Powell & Ansic, 1997). Risk aversion will 
likely lead to diligent action. Strategic mistakes may be avoided. 
However, claimed female risk aversion may also be judged negatively as women might 
shy away from high-risk decisions crucial for the firm's success (Schubert, Brown, Gysler & 
Brachinger, 1999). The fact that firms with female executives are less likely to make acquisitions 
(Huang & Kisgen, 2013) could hence also mean that these companies pass up golden 
opportunities.  
According to Schubert et al. (1999), the stereotyping of women said to be risk-averse 
may lead to statistical discrimination and reduces women's chances of success in financial and 
labor markets as the environment does not entrust them to make risky decisions necessary for 
the company. It should be noted that gender-specific risk behavior arises in abstract gambling 
experiments. The authors believe that these experiments might be inadequate for the analysis 
of gender-specific risk propensities as financial decisions have to be considered in broader 
context. Contrary to other studies, Schubert et al. (1999) find no evidence for stereotypic risk 
attitudes. They add a context scenario to the gambling (control) scenario. Measuring risk 
behavior in practice-relevant contextual financial decisions (investment and insurance 
decisions), they note that women do not generally make less risky financial choices than men. 
Rather, the risk propensity of men versus women in financial decisions strongly depends on the 
decision frame (Schubert et al., 1999).  
Their results are consistent with other findings from the literature on gender differences 
in leadership styles (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001), concluding that there are no 
fundamental differences in male and female behavior but differences dependent on certain 
tasks and situations. The gender-stereotypic expectation that women lead in an interpersonally 
oriented and men in a task-oriented style cannot be confirmed in organizational studies. Rather, 
male and female leaders do not differ in these two styles (Eagly & Johnson, 1990). This 
difference however appears in laboratory experiments and when assessing leadership styles of 
people that do not actually occupy a leadership role. A gender difference that can be proven in 
all types of leadership studies is the female tendency to adopt a more democratic and less 
autocratic or directive style than men (Eagly & Johnson, 1990). 
Nielsen and Huse (2010) show that women do not generally perform better or worse 
than men in operational tasks but bring specific advantages when it comes to tasks related to 
firm strategy. According to the authors, this could be explained by enhanced empathy towards 
others and the ability to consider multiple views, both often ascribed to women, fostering 
oversight of firm strategy (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). 
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In fact, business teams with an equal gender mix perform better than male-dominated 
teams. On average, sales and profits are higher for groups with a proper balance of women and 
men (Hoogendorn, Oosterbeek & van Praag, 2013). Teams perform also worse when they are 
dominated by women. The relation between sales and share of women is inverse U-shaped. For 
a share of women below 50 percent, sales and profits do rise along with an increase in the share 
of women. For higher shares of women above 50 percent, sales tend to decrease and the relation 
between profits and the share of women is flat. 
 
2.2.3 The effects of female representation on corporate boards 
Various theories can be used for examining the composition of corporate boards, in particular 
the role of women on corporate boards, and its impact on firm performance: agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory. Agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is most often used for this purpose. Agency theory views corporate 
boards as representatives of shareholders' (principal's) interests. The corporate board monitors 
and controls management’s (agent's) actions. Independence of supervising board members from 
executive directors is crucial for its functioning. If diversity is understood as one manifestation 
of independence as individuals with diverse gender (respectively age, nationality) add new, 
possibly critical perspectives, a diverse board could be more effective in monitoring. Although 
this approach sounds convincing at first glance, Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) point out 
that "agency theory simply does not provide a clear-cut prediction concerning the link between 
board diversity and firm value" (p. 37). 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) says that it is not only the interest of shareholders 
that counts but the interests of all internal and external stakeholders of a firm. The board is a 
linkage instrument between the firm and its environment. Ideally, increased equality of 
representation on corporate boards corresponds to demographic characteristics among key 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers or potential and current employees (Brammer et al., 
2007). Appointing women to the board can thus provide legitimacy to the firm (Lückerath-
Rovers, 2013).  
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), is a third line of research that 
is used to investigate the composition of corporate boards. Similarly to stakeholder theory, 
corporate boards are seen as an essential link between the company and its external resources 
on which the firm depends; this link is the basis for good performance (Lückerath-Rovers, 
2013). There are (at least) four categories of benefits provided to companies through corporate 
boards in their linkage function. These are information/advice, legitimacy, access to resources 
or communication channels and obtaining commitment of support from the environment 
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(Hillman et al., 2007; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Hence, composition of the board does have an 
impact. Hillman et al. (2007) apply these categories with regard to gender diversity on 
corporate boards. Legitimacy may accrue from appointing women to the board; second, 
companies that depend on the resource "female employees" can realize benefits by building 
bonds with current and potential (female) employees (Hillman et al., 2007). Third, advice and 
scope and content of information may be improved by adding female perspectives and 
experience. 
Resource dependence theory suggests that large firms experience increased pressure for 
legitimacy (Hillman et al., 2007). In accordance with theory, firm size appears to be highly 
relevant: the relation to the women's ratio on boards is positive (Adams & Ferreira, 2004; Carter 
et al., 2003; Hillman et al., 2007). Hillman et al. (2007) further provide evidence for a positive 
relationship between a firm's number of female employees and female representation on 
boards. The share of female employees varies between industries. The industry the company is 
operating thus partly determines the probability of having women on the board. Industry sectors 
are associated with gender-based connotations due to overrepresentation of one sex in its labor 
force (Hillman et al., 2007) respectively in its customer group (Harrigan, 1981). Construction, 
engineering, manufacturing or automotive sectors could thus be considered as "typically male" 
and branches such as media, health, insurance, retail trade or services regarded as "typically 
female". Indeed, board composition varies systematically across industries and companies with 
a high share of women in their workforce tend to have more women on boards. 
Moreover, close proximity to the customer appears to be an industry characteristic 
associated with a higher share of women on board. Brammer et al.'s (2007) results suggest that 
the latter factor is of higher importance for shaping board diversity. They argue that the 
company-specific business environment influences board diversity. Moreover, board diversity is 
"particularly an imperative to reflect corresponding diversity among its customers" (Brammer 
et al., 2007; Heffernan, 2002). Accordingly, Brammer et al. (2007) report highest female 
representation on UK boards for the sectors banking and retailing (with relatively high rates of 
female employment and a high degree of customer proximity) and lowest for the industry 
sectors resources and engineering (with a relatively low rate of female employment and 
distance from final consumers). Hillman et al. (2007) prove these relationships for the health 
and financial sector, Brammer et al. (2009) for consumer services and knowledge-based areas. 
In Carter et al.'s (2003) sample, firms from the financial-services industry have the highest share 
with three or more women on the board of directors and only 23 percent have no women on 
board. By contrast, 44 percent of firms from the mining and construction sector have no women 
on board and no company from this industry has more than two women on its board. Holst and 
Kirsch (2014) point out that the three German companies (financial sector excluded) with the 
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highest share of women on board as of year-end 2013 belong to the cosmetics and fragrances 
industry (Douglas, 56 percent women on board), travel industry (TUI, 50 percent) and 
pharmaceuticals wholesale (Noweda, 44 percent).  
Furthermore, firm risk is the most robust and important determinant of the share of 
women on corporate boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Board size is also positively related to 
the presence of women on corporate boards: firms with two or more female directors have 
larger boards (Carter et al., 2003). Furthermore, firms with two or more female board members 
hold a larger number of board meetings and have a higher share of minority directors than 
those with no women on board (Carter et al., 2003). 
Eventually though, when striving to obtain leadership commitment, increasing female 
representation on corporate boards should yield persuasive advantages from an economical 
perspective. Returning to Robinson and Dechant's (1997) call for a solid business case for 
diversity, evidence for positive effects of women on boards is required. Various positive effects 
with regard to board functioning and work discipline as well as to gender composition of 
internal top management or to company reputation are proven. However, these are opposed by 
several negative effects. 
Female directors appear to have a notable impact on board inputs and company 
outcomes. In particular, gender board composition is positively related to board effectiveness 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Nielsen & Huse, 2010). The impact of female board members depends 
on the type of task performed. Nielsen and Huse (2010) find a positive direct relationship 
between female representation on board and board strategic control but no direct relationship 
with board operational control. Thus, women influence board processes in such a way that 
board effectiveness in strategic control is enhanced (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). One of these board 
processes through which women influence board effectiveness is the use of board development 
activities such as board work instructions or evaluations. Furthermore, female directors reduce 
the level of board conflict and thus improve effectiveness (the authors point out that board 
processes might be more important than board composition). 
In a sample of US firms, Adams & Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have better 
attendance records than male directors and the higher their presence on boards the fewer the 
attendance problems of their male colleagues. Women are more likely to join monitoring-
related committees, particularly to audit, nominating and corporate governance committees. 
By contrast, they are less likely to sit on compensation committees. The results suggest that 
gender-diverse boards are tougher monitors and have stronger governance. Adams & Ferreira 
(2009) highlight that the female directors’ impact is comparable to that of independent 
directors described in governance theory (see also Lucas-Pérez et al, 2015; Nielsen & Huse, 
2010). 
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The relation between the variability of stock returns, the structure of director 
compensation and the gender diversity of corporate boards is subject to an investigation by 
Adams and Ferreira (2004). On the basis of a cross-sectional sample of boards of directors of 
1,024 publicly traded firms, the authors find several significant correlations. First, companies 
that experience more variability in their stock returns have fewer women on their boards of 
directors. Second, firms with more diverse boards provide their directors with more 
performance-related payments. Third, companies with more diverse boards have higher 
numbers of board meetings.  
In an analysis of a sample including 120 companies listed on the Spanish stock exchange 
during the years 2004 to 2009, Lucas-Pérez et al. (2015) strive to show how gender diversity 
can determine governance effectiveness. Taking into consideration arguments from various 
theories, they examine two possible "forms" of gender diversity's firm effectiveness: first, how it 
affects top managers' compensation and second, how it transforms board characteristics that 
are crucial for the board's monitoring effectiveness such as composition, structure, size and 
functioning (Lucas-Pérez et al, 2015). In proving the positive relationship between gender 
diversity and performance-related pay for top managers, they confirm the earlier results of 
Adams and Ferreira (2004). Based on their evidence, they further suggest that higher female 
representation on boards leads to a greater variety of knowledge, skills and decision-making 
criteria. They conclude that gender-diverse groups may be particularly suitable to solve 
problems with potential for disputes. This conclusion is in accordance with Heffernan saying 
that “group think” may be avoided through composing a heterogeneous board. A diverse board 
may analyze own actions and decisions quickly and thoroughly and thus anticipate reactions of 
the external environment such as public criticism (Heffernan, 2002). 
Furthermore, Lucas-Pérez et al. (2015) identify a substitution effect running in two 
directions. Gender diversity on the board may improve monitoring by compensating for lacking 
board characteristics that enhance board effectiveness, for example increased independency 
due to a high share of external directors, separation of CEO role and Chairman role instead of 
duality (one person holding both positions simultaneously), a medium board size between five 
and 15 members and a high number of compensation committee meetings - synonymous with 
board functioning. The effect also runs in the opposite direction: firms with duality of CEO and 
Chairman roles and a low number of external or independent directors have a higher share of 
women on their board of directors (Lucas-Pérez et al., 2015). 
Matsa and Miller (2011) show that female representation on corporate boards does 
affect the gender composition of top management. Controlling for timing, they find that changes 
in board composition precede a greater share of female executives. Further controlling for a full 
set of firm-fixed effects, the relation is still significant. Moreover, an increase in female board 
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members appears to have a positive impact on women's share of top executives total 
compensation  (overproportional to their number of positions) as well as on the likelihood of 
having a female among the top five executives or even as CEO. They point out that the long-
term impact of their results may be much larger than short-term effects, illustrating the 
following "feedback cycle": increasing the share of women on corporate boards can lead to a 
subsequent increase in the ratio of women in management positions. A rise in the number of 
female managers expands the pool of potential female board members which in turn may lead 
to greater female board membership and, as a consequence, to further increases in female 
executives. Statutory quotas for women on boards of directors might thus lead to general 
spillovers in management. 
Female representation on board is also associated with a reputational effect (Brammer 
et al., 2009). The reputational effect varies significantly across industries suggesting that the 
presence of women on corporate boards is assessed favorably only in sectors with close 
proximity to final customers (interestingly, the correlation corresponds to the relation between 
customer proximity of a sector and the probability of having female directors). The authors’ 
interpretation of this finding is that reputational assessors adopt a rather narrow view of the 
relevance of women on boards and potential resources that they may provide to the board. That 
is, increased board independency due to female representation or the mentoring role for other 
women within the firm appear not to be relevant for the assessment.  
The potential positive effects of increased female representation on boards are opposed 
by possible negative effects suggested by studies from various lines of research. As the board 
turns from a homogeneous into a heterogeneous group when female directors join, it is likely 
that cohesion is reduced and the probability of conflict increases (e.j. Hambrick et al., 1996; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Communication and exchange of information could be impeded, 
decision-making processes could become more complex, more time-consuming and less 
effective due to conflicting opinions (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2010).  
If there is only one woman or a small minority of women on the board, these women 
could be considered as a symbol or "token" (Kanter, 1977). The theory of tokenism implies that 
filling a vacant position with a token employee is usually driven by the motivation to create the 
appearance of diversity and is thus a purely symbolic act. The prevalent dominant group (in 
this case: males) will strive to heighten the barriers between themselves and the minority group 
(females). Women being the minority have to cope with the resulting effects: they are often 
assumed to be insufficiently qualified, not taken seriously, doubted or not trusted (Arfken, 
Bellar & Helms, 2004; Kanter, 1977; Torchia, Calabro & Huse, 2011). As a result, being labelled 
as a token leads to feelings of discomfort, isolation or self-doubt (Torchia et al., 2011). All these 
effects would adversely affect cooperation within the board.  
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The various effects above are all suitable to have an impact on firm performance. It is 
nevertheless essential to examine direct links between gender diversity on the board and firm 
performance and firm value, respectively.  
 
2.3 Gender diversity on corporate boards and in TMTs  
 and firm  performance 
2.3.1 Overview: relevant research to date 
With regard to board composition and firm performance, an early empirical analysis conducted 
by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) indicates that there appears to be no link. The authors note 
that even if there was a relation, it would be small with little economic significance. Board 
composition is investigated in terms of directors’ "origin", that means inside versus outside 
directors – the gender of board members is not considered. They provide as one possible 
explanation that board composition does simply not matter but admit inconsistency with the 
then growing literature suggesting that outside directors have a decisive impact on monitoring 
management. Conducting a survey of economic literature on the composition of boards, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) confirm their previous conclusion: board composition appears 
not to be related to corporate performance. Board size, on the other hand, appears to be 
negatively related to corporate performance. However, both board composition and size do 
appear to be related to the quality of certain decisions of the board and firm performance 
appears to be one important factor affecting changes to boards (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001). 
Literature has grown further during the past two decades and several studies find a 
relationship between board composition and firm performance. The impact of outside directors 
on monitoring management they refer to, for instance, has been proven for female directors 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Lucas-Pérez et al, 2015; Nielsen & Huse, 2010). Economic arguments 
in favor of diversity support the view that board diversity results in higher firm performance. 
The existence of such a positive relationship is backed by consultancy firm McKinsey and non-
profit organization Catalyst. Since 2007, McKinsey publishes an annual study called "Women 
matter", exploring female representation in the global workplace and its impact from different 
perspectives. The 2007 study suggests that companies with high female representation on board 
and top management level also yield the best performance. The recent report consists of a 
qualitative and a quantitative study of the relationship between women in top management 
teams and firm performance for a sample of European companies. Catalyst, fostering gender 
diversity in business, conducts research on the relationship between the women's ratio on 
corporate boards and firm financial performance, focusing on US enterprises. However, 
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methodological weaknesses might affect the quality of the results (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). 
McKinsey selects the companies for its sample on subjective criteria and fails to clarify the 
criterion "specific attention to diversity in the annual report". Both studies compare means of 
financial ratios although a comparison of medians would be more suitable as financial ratios 
often do not follow a normal distribution. Furthermore, there is a lack of evidence proving the 
statistical significance of McKinsey's as well as Catalyst's 2007 results (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). 
Furthermore, the present literature review primarily considers academic literature. I thus 
exclude McKinsey’s and Catalyst’s studies. 
I identify 44 relevant studies published during the period 1996-2014. The fact that more 
than half of the papers (26) presented in this survey were published between 2010 and 2014 
underlines the increasing awareness of and interest in female representation in upper echelons 
and its associated effects. The topic receives attention in the Academy of Management Journal, 
the Strategic Management Journal and the Journal of Corporate Finance and is of relevance for 
journals covering the field of corporate governance. Most studies (5) were published in the 
Journal of Business Ethics, four in the Journal of Business Research. The sample size in the 
studies under review varies considerably. Analyses in the first decade of empirical research focus 
on the United States only. It is only since 2006 that the interest of research concentrates also 
on other countries. In total, 21 studies were conducted in the United States, six in Scandinavian 
countries, four in the UK, two each in Spain and in Germany and nine in other countries. The 
papers reviewed cover the investigation period 1989 to 2011. The following table 2.1 gives an 
overview of the relevant literature on the link between female representation on corporate 
boards or in top management teams and firm performance or firm value, respectively. 
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2.3.2 Research methodology and operationalization of variables 
The majority of papers that investigate the relationship between diversity and performance are 
cross-sectional or panel data studies. The dominant research methodology applied is regression 
analysis. 
The independent variable (female representation/gender diversity in upper echelons) is 
operationalized by different indicators. Most studies measure gender diversity by more than 
one indicator. The percentage of women on corporate boards (executive boards/top 
management teams) is used as independent variable in 30 cases. 17 studies apply dummy 
variables for the presence of one (or more) woman on the board, women on the executive 
board, a female CEO or women in top management. Nine studies make use of the heterogeneity 
index developed by Blau (1977), one additionally of the Shannon (1948) index, recognized 
indices for measuring the level of gender diversity in management teams.  
The vast majority of studies applies a combination of different performance measures 
for operationalization of the dependent variable. Accounting-based performance measures are 
backward-looking whereas market-based measures are future-oriented. The mostly used 
accounting-based performance measure is return on assets (ROA). ROA is an indicator for 
management’s efficiency in generating earnings by using its assets and constitutes the relevant 
dependent variable in 26 studies. Tobin’s Q is the mostly used market-based performance 
measure. 18 of the studies under review choose Tobin’s Q or approximations to it (such as the 
market-to-book ratio which divides the equity’s market value by its book value) in order to 
capture the market valuation of the firm. For the calculation of Tobin’s Q, the total market value 
is divided by the total value of the assets. A high Tobin’s Q ratio indicates overvaluation whereas 
a low ratio implies undervaluation. Carter et al. (2003) are the first to focus on both 
performance indicators. Overall, 13 studies use both ROA and Tobin’s Q for their analyses (e.g. 
Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Bøhren & Strøm, 2010; Dobbin & Jung, 2011; Gregory-Smith, Main & 
O’Reilly, 2014). Other frequently applied accounting-based measures include return on equity 
(ROE), return on investment (ROI), return on sales (ROS) or employee productivity (e.g. 
operating revenue per employee, value added per employee). An alternative figure applied to 
capture the market’s perception of the company’s performance is the total shareholder return 
(TSR) considering stock price changes and dividends paid.  
The effects of female board representation are also investigated by setting the focus on 
external firm valuation. Event study methodology using time series is used in order to analyze 
the short-term stock market reaction to the appointment of female directors and a multiple 
regression approach to assess the long term influence on firm value. This approach is applied 
for instance by Farrell and Hersch (2005), Lee and James (2007), Francoeur, Labelle and 
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Sinclair-Desgagné (2008) or Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2010). A quarter of the papers (11) 
in the present survey use short-term abnormal stock returns following company-specific 
announcements, average monthly (abnormal) returns or long-term stock returns in order to 
measure gender diversity effects on firm value and thus shareholder wealth. Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012) use the approach of a natural experiment setting. 
 
2.3.3 The issue of endogeneity 
A central problem that occurs in most corporate governance studies is endogeneity. Roberts and 
Whited (2012) devote an extensive survey to the topic of endogeneity in empirical corporate 
finance. They define endogeneity roughly as a correlation between the explanatory variable and 
the error term in the regression. Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) state: 
“This endogeneity creates estimation problems if governance choices are made  
on the basis of unobservables correlated with the error term in the regression  
equations being estimated. […] Governance structures arise endogenously because  
economic actors choose them in response to the governance issues they face.” 
(Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010, p. 59) 
 
Happ (2016) discusses the issue of endogeneity in his literature review on the influence of 
ownership and capital structure on firm performance. Several causes for endogeneity can be 
identified: unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and reverse causation (see also Happ, 2016), 
whereas the latter can be understood as one concrete example for simultaneity. In the case of 
unobservable heterogeneity, the dependent and the independent variable are both impacted by 
the same exogenous factor, which cannot be measured directly (Happ, 2016). The presence of 
omitted variables and variables being measured incorrectly may be classified as subcategories 
of unobservable heterogeneity (Happ, 2016). Omitted-variable bias occurs when one or more 
important causal factors are not considered in the model. Due to the heterogeneity of the objects 
of study such as firms, corporate boards or TMTs with a view to various, hard to observe 
dimensions, the problem is particularly serious in corporate finance (Roberts & Whited, 2012). 
With respect to the topic of gender diversity and firm performance, omitted variables might 
have an effect on both the selection of directors and performance and could thus lead to 
spurious correlations between the variables of interest (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Simultaneity 
is present from an econometric point of view if dependent and independent variable are 
determined in equilibrium, in other words, left-hand side (y) and right-hand side (one or more 
x’s) of the equation are determined simultaneously (Roberts & Whited, 2012). Following 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), it is to be expected that board composition - as does ownership 
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structure - will vary systematically in ways coherent with value maximization. Boards are 
selected under the objective of maximizing shareholder wealth. With respect to reverse causation 
(e.g. Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998) as one form of simultaneity, it is possible that having women 
on the board improves firm performance. It is also conceivable, however, that well-performing 
firms decide to increase female representation on their boards. It could also mean that a 
financially well performing firm has greater attractiveness for a female CEO (Strøm et al., 
2014), also because women have freedom of choice given the scarcity of experienced female 
managers (Farrell & Hersch, 2005). Thus, board diversity could affect firm value and vice versa 
(Carter et al., 2003).  
Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) note that most corporate finance researchers would 
acknowledge unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity as possible sources of endogeneity. 
They point out that scholars often ignore a third source that “arises from the possibility that 
current values of governance variables are a function of past firm performance” (Wintoki et al., 
2012, p. 582). Not considering this issue could have serious consequences for inference. 
Further potential endogeneity issues that may occur when investigating the relationship 
between gender diversity in TMTs and firm performance are that an executive’s gender is 
random, that boards discriminate based on gender, that women self-select into particular types 
of firms (Huang & Kisgen, 2013) or that the selection of a female leader might be related to an 
emphasized focus on female customers (Strøm et al., 2014). Moreover, time-delayed data 
collection of independent (female representation/gender diversity) and dependent variable 
(firm financial performance) is a central requirement for the proof of causation (Kroell et al., 
2014). Potential effects of women in executive positions on firm performance will become 
apparent only after a certain period of time has elapsed. 
In summary, parameter estimates might be biased and inconsistent due to endogeneity, 
making reliable inference difficult or impossible (Roberts & Whited, 2012). It stands to reason 
that the method applied has a notable influence on the results of empirical studies and also on 
the interpretation of results and the conclusions drawn from them. However, within the 
framework of the present literature review, I may only highlight key aspects of endogeneity and 
sketch important trends in dealing with potential endogeneity. 
The early papers in this review do not take the aspect of endogeneity into account (e.g. 
Erhardt et al., 2003; Shrader et al., 1997; Siciliano, 1996). Single OLS regression, for instance, 
does not explicitly control for endogeneity and can thus produce biased coefficient estimates 
(Carter et al., 2003), However, during the past decade, studies have applied other methods to 
their (panel) data set, underscoring the efforts to enhance validity and reliability of the models 
and to rule out endogeneity. Dobbin and Jung (2011) underline the importance of controlling 
for endogeneity: 
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„Early cross-sectional studies suggested that board gender diversity has positive effects  
 on both profits and stock performance. However, the use of panel data and statistical  
 methods designed to rule out endogeneity suggested that female directors tend to have 
 neutral or negative effects. The big picture seems to be that gender board diversity does  
 not help firms—and it may hurt them” (Dobbin & Jung, 2011, pp. 836).  
 
In order to control for possible endogeneity between gender diversity variable and firm 
value/performance, various regression models and statistical test procedures are applied.  
Lagged dependent variables and the inclusion of fixed effects are used striving to mitigate 
omitted variables and to address unobserved changes over time as well as industry- and firm-
specific characteristics (e.g. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010). Fixed-effects 
estimation can possibly improve unobservable heterogeneity bias. The underlying strong 
assumption of exogeneity might be unrealistic though, as current values of the independent 
variable are not likely to be completely independent from past values of the dependent variable 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Instrumental variables (IVs) are another possibility to handle endogeneity. An 
instrumental variable replaces the endogenous independent variable in the regression. It should 
be sufficiently correlated to the endogenous independent variable but must not be correlated 
to the error term (Happ, 2016). IVs are often used in two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. 
Two-stage least squares regression is employed by Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), Carter 
et al. (2003), Bøhren and Strøm (2010) or Khan and Vieito (2013) and three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) regression by Carter, D’Souza, Simkins and Simpson (2010). Carter et al. (2010) use 
single OLS regression equation and a 3SLS regression analysis, both accounting for firm and 
time fixed effects. 3SLS estimation is considered to be advantageous compared with 2SLS 
because it accounts for both potential endogeneity and cross-correlation between equations 
(Carter et al., 2010). 
Carter et al. (2003) consider other explanatory variables such as firm size, board size, 
CEO/chair duality or the percentage of insiders on the board and the approximation of Tobin’s 
Q in their 2SLS model. Bøhren and Strøm (2010) examine the interaction of the four board 
mechanisms gender mix, employee directors, director independence and multiple directorships 
with firm value. Amongst others, they control for the effects of firm characteristics including 
unobservable fixed and random effects and of potential endogeneity between board 
mechanisms and firm value. They use instrumental variables and 2SLS regression. Endogenous 
variables they specify in the estimation in addition to performance are board independence, 
CEO director, exported CEO, imported CEO, board size, gender and board age dispersion. Two 
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ownership variables, network, employee directors, risk and firm size constitute the exogenous 
variables (Bøhren & Strøm, 2010). 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) use a difference-in-differences approach in order to mitigate 
endogeneity issues, comparing activity before and after transitions from a male to a female 
executive with a control sample of male-to-male transition firms. Panel data regressions with 
firm fixed effects with a female executive dummy variable are conducted in addition as a 
robustness check. Chapple and Humphrey (2014) handle the endogeneity problem through 
forming and comparing portfolios of firms with gender diverse boards to those without. 
Portfolio formation is the method of choice as the interest is focused on the market-level impact 
of gender diversity. They apply OLS and firm fixed-effects regression, followed by an Arellano 
and Bond dynamic panel model. The authors further state that the firm-specific characteristics 
were averaged out by applying this approach and the precision of estimates from regression 
analysis was improved. The authors claim that the heterogeneity issue was thus eliminated and 
the omitted variables problem reduced (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014). Deszö and Ross (2012) 
handle the issue of reverse causation by controlling for prior firm performance through adding 
lagged values of Tobin’s Q to the regression. If the positive association between female 
leadership and firm performance was driven by reverse causality, it should then disappear. 
However, two new problems may emerge: adding lagged values to a panel data regression may 
result in difficulties with autocorrelation and other control variables related to firm policies 
might also be endogenous (Deszö & Ross, 2012). Deszö and Ross (2012) as well as further 
recent studies (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2010; Chapple & Humphrey, 2014; He & Huang, 
2011; Liu et al., 2014) try to overcome these challenges by using generalized method-of-
moments (GMM) estimators as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) or Wintoki (2012). Strøm et al. (2014) address the problem 
of reverse causation of female leadership in financial performance regression by applying the 
Heckman (1978) model for an endogenous dummy variable. They solve the sample selectivity 
problem by the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) test.  
 
2.3.4 Empirical evidence on the diversity-performance relationship 
The empirical evidence obtained to the present is inconsistent. Different methods lead to 
ambiguous results, but results are contradictory even within identical methodological 
approaches. There is both evidence for a positive relation between female representation on 
boards and performance (15 studies) and for a negative link (5 studies). Numerous studies 
provide mixed evidence regarding the relationship between women in top management 
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positions and measures of performance (13 studies) and a substantial number of studies cannot 
establish any link between gender diversity and financial performance (13 studies).  
Carter et al. (2003) were among the first to present empirical evidence for a relationship 
between board diversity and improved financial value. The authors examine the relationship 
between board diversity, defined as the percentage of women, African Americans, Asians, 
Hispanics and other minorities on the board of directors and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms. 
The approximation of Tobin’s Q is used as the measure of firm value and regressed against the 
presence and percentage of women/minorities on the board of directors as measures of board 
diversity. Carter and colleagues find statistically significant positive relationships between the 
presence of women on the board and firm value: firms with two or more women on board 
perform better in terms of Tobin's Q. Thus, female representation on boards is associated with 
higher market valuation. They also perform better in terms of return on assets (ROA). An 
additional finding is that the fraction of women and minorities directors increases with firm 
size but decreases as the number of insiders increases. The authors conclude that companies 
that increase the number of women on boards are likely to also have more minorities on their 
boards and vice versa.  
Three studies in the investigation period confirm a positive and significant link between 
the women’s ratio on the board and ROA (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003; Liu et al., 2014; 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen  & Hanuman, 2012) and two a positive link between the CEO being 
female and ROA (Khan & Vieito, 2013; Strøm et al., 2014). Krishnan and Park (2005) find a 
positive and significant relation between female representation in top management and ROA. 
Positive effects of gender diversity on employee productivity are documented by Ali, Ng and 
Kulik (2014) as well as for the presence of one or more female directors on ROE by Lückerath-
Rovers (2013). With respect to market-based measures of performance, a positive relation 
between board gender diversity and Tobin’s Q is also found by Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008). Moreover, two studies using event study methodology show that the stock market 
responds with positive and significant abnormal returns to announcements of female top 
executive appointments (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2010; Kang, Ding & Charoenwong, 2010). 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that investors appear to honor financial decisions of firms with 
female executives as announcement returns are higher around the respective companies' 
acquisitions and debt offerings. Their research reveals significant differences in firm behavior 
between firms with male executives versus those with female executives, indicating that models 
of capital structure and acquisitions that concentrate solely on company features miss this 
essential factor. Firms with female executives show slower growth, are less likely to make 
acquisitions and are also less likely to issue debt than companies with male executives. By 
analogy, value destroying acquisitions firms are rather executed by companies with male 
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executives. Thereby, they provide evidence that male executives are overconfident relative to 
female executives. Overconfidence is also expressed in men's tendency to provide narrower 
earnings forecasts and to exercise options at a later stage. The still small percentage of women 
in executive positions is surprising when considering that women tend to make shareholder-
friendly decisions. Possible explanations might be a potential scarcity of qualified female 
executives or in the analysis' limited focus on selected corporate decisions, which means that 
male executives could perform better in other areas such as strategy or compliance. 
Interestingly, using numerous regression models in combination may yield conflicting 
results: while the OLS regression analysis provides evidence for a (insignificant) positive 
relationship between diversity and Tobin’s Q, the coefficient is significantly negative using firm 
fixed effects and a dynamic panel model (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Chapple & Humphrey, 
2014). The authors of the respective studies note that these disparities underscore the 
importance for correct model specification. 
It appears that the presence of women on the board does not automatically improve 
performance. Five studies in this survey provide evidence for a negative relationship between 
the variables of interest. Contrary to the two event studies that showed positive market reactions 
to female top executive announcements and contrary to the positive market reactions to 
financial decisions of female-led firms observed by Huang and Kisgen (2013), 248 listed 
companies in Norway in a natural experiment setting on the whole experience a negative 
market reaction in response to the official announcement of the gender quota (Ahern & Dittmar, 
2012). Stock returns are stronger negative for firms that had no female directors at that time. 
There seems to be consistency with the hypothesis that boards are selected to maximize 
shareholder value and that severe constraints in the choice of directors imposed by law lead to 
significant reductions in value (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). The findings further show a negative 
and significant link between the women's ratio on the board and Tobin's Q, persisting over time. 
Similarly, Lee and James (2007), who employ event study methodology in combination with 
multivariate regression analysis, find negative and significant cumulative returns for female 
executives – and positive and significant cumulative returns for male executives. These market 
reactions are backed by Kolev (2013) who regresses firm-specific monthly TSRs against the 
indicator variable female CEO and finds that female CEOs underperform their male 
counterparts in terms of shareholders’ returns by roughly 0.35 percent per month. Although 
only significant for larger firms and only considering one financial year, evidence for a negative 
link between female representation and ROA and between the women's ratio on boards and 
Tobin's Q is provided by Darmadi (2013). The results imply that a higher proportion of women 
tends to be found in low-performing firms. Negative and significant effects of the proportion of 
shareholder-elected females on the board on performance measures Tobin's Q, ROA and ROS 
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are documented by Bøhren and Strøm (2010). The results are robust to how performance is 
measured. Thus, they argue that valuation arguments do not appear suitable to justify politics 
of board design:  
“from the owners’ point of view, politicians should ignore independence and encourage  
 less gender diversity, fewer employee directors, and more directors with multiple seats. 
 Alternatively, one could argue that for gender mix in particular, political arguments  
 should not be based on beneficial economic consequences for the firm’s stockholders” 
 (Bøhren & Strøm, 2010, p. 1305). 
 
One possible explanation for negative stock returns to the presence of women in upper echelons 
is investor bias or sex-role stereotyping (Dobbin & Jung, 2011; Gregory, Jeanes, Tharyan & 
Tonks, 2014; Lee & James, 2007). Using pooled, cross-sectional time-series models with fixed 
firm and year effects, Dobbin and Jung (2011) explore different effects of changes in the gender 
composition of boards. Besides examining the effects on ROA and Tobin’s Q, they also 
investigate the effects on the equity positions of institutional investors and other investor groups 
including banks, mutual funds and public pension funds. Their findings indicate that female 
directors have negative effects on stock value and no effects on profits. The results provide 
support for the authors’ thesis that institutional investors sell shares of firms that previously 
appointed females to the board. The reason for the sale is not a fall in profits but the investors’ 
bias against women (Dobbin & Jung, 2011). Gregory et al. (2014) analyze short-term and long-
term stock returns to announcements of directors’ trades by males and females. The price 
reaction to male directors’ buy trades is faster and larger than that for female directors’. 
However, markets recognize in the long term that female executives’ trades are in fact 
informative about future corporate performance. The initially negative market reactions are 
indicators for the persistence of biased beliefs about the abilities of female managers (Gregory 
et al., 2014; Wolfers, 2006). Hence, the analysis of financial data can reveal discrimination.  
A third group of twelve studies finds no relationship at all, neither positive nor negative. 
Four of them were published quite recently (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014; Dale-Olsen, Schøne 
& Verner, 2013; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014; Velte, Eulerich & van Uum, 2014). The selected 
variables or research methods fail to account for the ambiguous results. In contrast to other 
studies, the result of a classic market-model event study for 111 US firms is that no shareholder 
wealth effects are associated with the announcements of the addition of a women to the board 
(Farrell & Hersch, 2005). Equally, Carter et al. (2010), replicating the 2003 analysis with a new 
sample (of similar size) find no significant relation between the women’s ratio on the board and 
Tobin’s Q or ROA.  
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2.3.5 Intervening variables as moderators of the relationship  
Research reveals that the relationship between gender diversity on the board and firm 
performance appears to be more complex. One reason for the inconsistency of evidence could 
be the often one-sided focus on a direct relation between gender diversity and firm performance 
instead of taking into account other board-related intervening variables that may also influence 
this relationship (Lucas-Pérez et al., 2015). It is more likely that boundary conditions and 
further variables moderate this relationship (Kroell et al., 2014). Following this approach, the 
effects of gender diversity in top management are conditional on certain organizational 
variables. Several studies explore the effects of moderating variables by applying interaction 
analyses or group comparisons through regression analyses. 
Smith, Smith and Verner (2006), for instance, use different independent variables and 
various dependent variables. A positive link can be found in dependence of the selected 
performance measure and in dependence of the women’s education. For instance, the measure 
gross profit is affected more positively and more significantly than other measures such as net 
income after taxes. Moreover, performance effects are positive and stronger for female CEOs 
with a university degree whereas they are much smaller or insignificant for female CEOs 
without such a degree (Smith et al., 2006).  
Francoeur et al. (2008) point out that one boundary condition seems to be if the 
company is operating in a complex environment. If this is the case, firms with a high proportion 
of female officers experience positive and significant monthly abnormal returns. Deszö and Ross 
(2012) provide empirical evidence for the moderating influence of the variable “strategic focus 
on innovation intensity”. While the simple effect of female representation in top management 
on performance is insignificant, the effects are positive and highly significant for all measures 
only when moderated by innovation intensity. The relationship is characterized as follows: “the 
more a firm’s strategy is focused on innovation, the more female representation in top 
management improves firm performance” (p.1081). The authors note that within the context 
of innovation, the informational and social benefits of gender diversity and the specific female 
managers’ behavior are likely to play a crucial role for managerial task performance (Deszö & 
Ross, 2012). These findings support the theory that increased diversity enhances creativity and 
problem-solving capabilities (Cox & Blake, 1991) and that heterogeneous teams may be more 
successful than homogeneous groups in solving the most contentious problems (Lucas-Pérez et 
al., 2015). 
The role of the firm’s strategic orientation, its organizational culture and the 
multivariate interaction among these variables is examined by Dwyer, Richard and Chadwick 
(2003). With respect to growth orientation, they show that firms with high levels of gender 
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diversity and growth have the highest productivity. With regard to ROE, the interaction is 
significant at only a level of P < .10. Furthermore, the presence of an “adhocracy culture” (a 
democratic form of organization that fosters flexibility, individuality and spontaneity and which 
stands in contrast to bureaucracy culture) is identified as a factor that significantly moderates 
gender diversity’s effects on performance. However, the observed association between the 
gender diversity and adhocracy variable and ROE is negative, contrary to that hypothesized. 
The explanation offered by the authors is that the adhocracy culture type has an external rather 
than an internal, employee-focused orientation, it is results-oriented and emphasizes 
competition. Dywer et al. (2003) point out that prior studies have shown that women are more 
cooperative, encourage participation and rather avoid competition. Thus, the specific benefits 
of female leadership might not unfold within an adhocracy culture. 
The sector in which a company is operating in appears to be a further moderator of the 
relationship between female representation in top management and firm performance. 
Rodríguez-Domínguez, García-Sánchez and Gallego-Álvarez (2010) find that performance 
variables are positively affected by female directors employed in companies that are active in 
the areas of technology and telecommunications. Performance is negatively affected by female 
directors in companies operating in the services sector. Ali, Kulik and Metz (2011), in contrast, 
show that the positive effects of gender diversity are stronger in the services than in the 
manufacturing industry. They argue that the services sector was in the best position to realize 
the benefits stemming from gender diversity because the higher importance attached to market 
insight as well as greater interaction among employees and between employees and customers. 
This finding fits well with previous studies showing that female directors are rather found in 
the services and retail sectors with close proximity to end customers. 
Moreover, the firm-specific quality of corporate governance also seems to play a role. 
Gender diversity on corporate boards has a positive impact on the performance of firms that 
otherwise have weak governance and shareholder rights as intensified monitoring could 
enhance firm value (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). The effects are negative for companies with 
strong shareholder rights, suggesting that increased gender diversity might lead to over-
monitoring. Adams and Ferreira contextualize their findings and the current debate on 
enforcing gender quotas in the boardroom. They conclude that their results are evidence of 
female directors’ “substantial and value-relevant impact” on board structure. However, the 
average effect of gender diversity on firm performance is negative. Thus, in their view, no 
evidence supports the introduction of gender quotas. In contrast, the results suggest that 
mandating gender quotas for board directors can even reduce firm value for companies with 
strong governance. 
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2.3.6 Evidence for a curvilinear relationship 
Numerous studies take a new perspective by exploring the relation between gender diversity on 
corporate boards and firm financial performance based on critical mass theory (Joecks, Pull & 
Vetter, 2013; Konrad, Kramer & Erkut, 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). Joecks et al. (2013) find 
evidence for a non-linear and concave relation between gender diversity on the board and firm 
performance, measured using ROE. The U-shaped link indicates that it needs a critical mass of 
about 30 percent women on the board in order to realize potential benefits stemming from a 
more diverse board. It further suggests that increased gender diversity on the board will only 
enhance performance if female representation is ten percent or higher and performance will be 
better than the one of male boards only above the threshold of 30 percent. At very low levels 
of female representation below ten percent, an increase in diversity might even have a negative 
impact on firm performance (Joecks et al., 2013). This U-shaped relationship may be one 
possible explanation for the controversial empirical evidence on the relation of gender diversity 
in the boardroom and firm performance. Several other studies also shift away from assuming a 
simple, linear relation between diversity and performance by furnishing evidence for a 
curvilinear relation (Ali, Kulik & Metz, 2011; Ali, Ng & Kulik, 2014; Hoogendorn et al., 2013; 
Richard, Dwyer, Barnett & Chadwick; 2004). The findings are also in line with Williams and 
O'Reilly's (1998) assumption that the overall effect of increasing diversity has a U-shaped form. 
Difference lies in the shape of the curve (besides differing performance measures and 
assumptions regarding moderating effects): Joecks et al. (2013) present a concave U-shaped 
relation whereas Hoogendorn et al. (2013) show an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
share of women in business teams and profits. An inverted U-shaped relationship for gender 
diversity and productivity is confirmed by Ali, Ng und Kulik (2014) as well as Ali, Kulik and 
Metz (2011). Richard et al. (2004) cannot fully support their hypothesized curvilinear 
relationship between cultural diversity in management and firm performance, but when adding 
moderating effects such as "firm's level of risk taking" to their analysis they observe an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between gender diversity in management and productivity (expressed by 
the logarithm of net income per employee) in firms characterized by high levels of risk taking. 
For firms with low levels of risk taking, the relation is concave U-shaped. The authors' 
interpretation is that totally homogeneous groups may not succeed in an environment with 
aggressive competition requiring decision speed whereas the positive effects of moderate 
diversity may create benefits in a high-risk context. Further increasing diversity may in turn 
lead to cognitive biasing, communication problems and conflicts.  
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2.4 Summary and conclusion 
No uniform picture emerges from almost 20 years of research on the relationship between 
gender diversity on corporate boards and on TMTs and firm performance. There is no clear 
trend towards a general economic advantageousness of increased female leadership and 
performance, the findings are ambiguous. While 15 studies find empirical evidence for a 
positive relationship, five studies report a negative relationship. Several studies report mixed 
evidence regarding the relationship (13 studies) and a substantial number of studies cannot 
establish any link between gender diversity and financial performance (14 studies). A wide 
variety of different regression models is applied, furthermore events study methodology or 
interaction analysis. The independent variable (female representation/gender diversity in upper 
echelons) is in most cases operationalized by more than one indicator. The percentage of 
women on corporate boards (executive boards/top management teams) is used as independent 
variable in two thirds of the studies surveyed. Dummy variables for the presence of one (or 
more) women on the board, women on the executive board, a female CEO or women in top 
management are applied in a third of the analyses under review. Numerous studies make use 
of the heterogeneity index developed by Blau (1977), one additionally of the Shannon (1948) 
index. Most studies apply a combination of different performance measures for 
operationalization of the dependent variable. Accounting-based performance measures are 
ROA, ROE, ROS and employee-productivity, whereas Tobin’s Q, TSR and cumulative abnormal 
stock returns are used as market-based performance measures. 
Findings suggest that the relationship between female representation in top 
management positions and financial firm performance appears to be more complex than 
originally assumed. The answer to my research question is thus: it depends. Certain boundary 
conditions and moderating factors appear to influence the relationship. First, performance 
effects vary between different business sectors. Female representation in top management is 
associated with better performance if the firm is operating in a complex business environment. 
Positive effects are observed in particular in the areas of technology and telecommunications. 
Second, the firm’s strategic orientation is a decisive factor. Firms with a strategic focus on 
innovation benefit from increased gender diversity in TMTs with regard to performance and 
firms with a strong growth orientation benefit with respect to productivity. Third, women’s 
education is a factor of relevance. Performance effects are positive and stronger for female CEOs 
with a university degree. Fourth, performance effects depend on the quality of a firm’s corporate 
governance. Gender diversity on the board has a positive impact on the performance of firms 
that otherwise have weak governance and shareholder rights as intensified monitoring could 
enhance firm value. Fifth, it needs a critical mass of women in order to realize the potential 
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benefits from increased gender diversity. There is evidence for a curvilinear instead of a simple, 
linear relationship between gender diversity and firm performance.  
To sum up, the impact of gender diversity on financial firm performance is not as clearly 
positive as the proponents claim it to be. Even when taking a broader view on business 
performance, the “business case” for gender diversity is not fully clear and convincing. A 
business may benefit from the various perspectives, beliefs and capabilities of a (gender-)diverse 
workforce as they potentially enhance market knowledge and creativity and avoid “group 
think”. Different business practices, risk preferences or problem-solving approaches are suitable 
to improve management activity and strategic thinking. On the other hand, homogeneous 
management may perform better than diverse teams as communication processes and decision-
making processes are more efficient and its members are more open to the exchange of ideas. 
Cooperation is better in homogeneous teams, cohesion is stronger and emotional conflicts are 
rarer. 
With regard to potential effects on firm performance, there appears to be no generally 
applicable rule for the “right” level of gender diversity in upper echelons. However, critical mass 
theory gives an indication. The reported evidence on a U-shaped link means that it needs a 
critical mass of about 30 percent women on the board in order to realize potential benefits 
stemming from a gender-diverse board. This finding lends support to the statutory gender 
quotas for supervisory boards at levels between 30 and 40 percent. With respect to the identified 
boundary conditions, it might further be advisable to develop firm- or even team-specific 
diversity policies under consideration of the respective business environment, the strategic 
orientation and the quality of existing corporate governance. 
Possible starting points for future research activities are potential additional moderating 
variables that influence the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance or the 
curvilinear shape of this relationship. In-depth analyses of effects variations between different 
industries could help in designing appropriate diversity concepts for individual firms. 
Furthermore, construction and application of innovative statistical methods aiming at 
mitigating the endogeneity problems are required.  
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3. Gender diversity on corporate boards and in 
TMTs in practice: Evidence from stock-listed 
companies in German-speaking Europe2 
3.1 Introduction 
In April 2015, the Hamburg/Hanover stock exchange launched the German Gender Index, 
comprised of 50 German stock-listed companies with a balanced ratio of women and men on 
their supervisory and executive boards (Hamburg/Hanover Stock Exchange, 2015). In the same 
month, Cologne-based fund provider Ampega introduced a special product that was a novelty 
on the German market for funds. The Ampega GenderPlus Equity Fund invests in corporations 
with a high percentage of women in executive positions and that are listed in the German Gender 
Index (Ampega, 2015). In an interview with Capital, Ampega’s managing director Koeberlein 
said that his fund was neither a “marketing gag” nor a passing fashion; albeit the studies to date 
painted a mixed picture, a tendency towards a mixed-gender better performance could be 
observed (Groth, 2015). Koeberlein was convinced that fund managers worldwide would 
consider the number of women in public company management more strongly as selection 
criterion in the future. According to this argumentation, investors choose the GenderPlus fund 
on the basis of higher return assumptions and thus fundamental economic reasons. 
The growing relevance of corporate diversity for capital markets has also been 
encouraged by a second development - the increasing importance of so-called impact investing: 
“the idea behind impact investing is that investors can pursue financial returns while also 
intentionally addressing social and environmental challenges” (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011, 
p.11). Investors have increasingly considered non-financial assets such as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in their company valuation for many years (Hockerts & Moir, 2004; 
Hoffmann & Fieseler, 2012; Rivoli, 1995). From an investor’s point of view, diversity promotion 
programs can be one manifestation of corporate social responsibility3. 
From the company’s perspective, investors mean an important stakeholder group. 
However, there may be even more relevant stakeholder groups that push the issue forward. 
Stakeholders include regulators/politics, the media, the public, employees or lobby groups. 
With respect to politics, the German Federal Council (Bundesrat) in March 2015 approved the 
act on the equal participation of women and men in executive positions including a statutory 
gender quota for supervisory boards of large German listed companies. 
                                                          
2 This chapter is largely based on a joint working paper with Dirk Schiereck and Anette von Ahsen. 
3 See also Bear, Rahman and Post (2010). 
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It seems as if diversity and particularly gender diversity were becoming increasingly 
important issues for capital markets. But what are actually the major drivers behind the 
establishment of diversity programs in companies? The programs to promote diversity could be 
the result of economic considerations. In this case, the decision makers most likely expect 
economic benefits from increased diversity. Initiatives could also be the result of ethical 
considerations and the promotion of diversity might be a corporate guiding principle or a 
measure under the umbrella of the company’s sustainability strategy (Stock-Homburg, von 
Ahsen & Wagner, 2014). However, it may as well be first and foremost regulatory pressure that 
forces firms to develop and implement diversity measures.  
The present study analyzes unique data from anonymous surveys of investor relations 
officers (IROs) in German-speaking Europe to examine the drivers behind and the attitude 
towards diversity management as well as the implementation status of regulatory requirements. 
I aim at checking for discrepancies between aspirations and reality.  
The survey pursues three essential objectives. First, I strive to determine the significance 
of workforce diversity from the capital markets’ perspective. Linked to this is the question 
whether diversity is a relevant parameter for external company valuation. The investor relations 
officer is the interface between the listed company and the capital market and thus in a position 
to give an assessment of the attitude on both sides towards diversity in general and gender 
diversity in top echelons in particular. 
Second, I investigate whether the questioned listed companies employ an economic 
perspective on the topic of diversity. Closely related to the foregoing is the question of 
motivation. I aim at identifying internal and external drivers other than capital markets behind 
the development and implementation of corporate diversity programs. 
Third, I intend to gain an insight into strategy and progress regarding a stronger 
participation of women in executive positions within listed companies in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland. Referring to voluntary commitments of the industry as well as corporate 
governance codes’ recommendations, I investigate whether companies have implemented 
specific promotion programs for women in leadership and whether they have created an 
appropriate infrastructure for reconciling career and family life. The survey also evaluates the 
status quo for internal planning targets for female representation in management positions. In 
this context, I are particularly interested to learn more about the reasons why many firms do 
not disclose these planning targets. Moreover, the survey examines whether companies 
concerned are prepared or have taken measures to fulfill the coming binding gender quota for 
supervisory boards and analyzes the acceptance level of the quota beyond the official statements 
in the financial reports.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows. An overview of the regulatory background regarding the equal 
participation of women and men in working life, the promotion of female leadership and 
increased female representation on corporate boards is given in section 3.2. For a 
comprehensive review of the existing literature on diversity in general and gender diversity in 
particular, I refer to section 2 of this dissertation. In section 3.3, two supplementary subsections 
present empirical evidence of special relevance for the present survey. In section 3.3.2, I discuss 
the link between diversity and CSR as well as the role of investor relations within this context. 
In section 3.3.3, I give a short recap on the investor reaction to female representation on 
corporate boards and in top management as it is of vital importance when surveying investor 
relations professionals on this topic. Based on the prior systematic stocktaking of relevant 
literature and in light of the introduction of a gender quota for supervisory boards in Germany, 
I develop my central hypotheses for my survey results in subsection 3.3.4. I also point out how 
I contribute to the existing literature. Subsequently, the sample data and the survey 
methodology (section 3.4.1) are described as well as limitations of the survey method (section 
3.4.2). Descriptive statistics and the results are presented in section 3.5 before section 3.6 
summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
3.2 Regulatory background 
A greater participation of women in traditionally male-dominated top management and control 
levels has been under discussion in Germany for more than three decades. The German industry 
has always been opposed to any regulatory constraints and takes a stand against a statutory 
women’s quota still today. Instead, the industry has been in favor of voluntary measures. In 
2001, the German federal government and leading associations of the German industry made 
an Agreement on the promotion of equal opportunities for women and men in the private business 
sector - known as the industry’s “self-obligation”. Industry associations assured to improve 
women’s education perspectives and professional opportunities as well as the reconciliation of 
work and family life for both mothers and fathers through active incentive measures (German 
Federal Government and German industry, July 2, 2011, p. 2). The objective was a strong 
increase in the rate of employment content of women, also in areas where women had been 
underrepresented: management positions and professions of the future. In this respect, income 
disparities between men and women should be reduced. Realization of the agreement was to 
be evaluated every two years by a joint committee composed by an equal number of members 
from both parties. Provided that the agreement was realized successfully, the Federal 
Government pledged that it would not take any legislative initiatives to ensure equal 
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opportunities (German Federal Government and German industry, July 2, 2011, p. 5). Pressure 
on the German industry increased when recommendations concerning female participation in 
leadership were added to the German Corporate Governance Code in the years 2009 and 2010. 
The Corporate Governance Code, submitted by the Government Commission and most recently 
updated on May 5, 2015, constitutes key statutory provisions and contains international and 
national standards for prudent and responsible corporate management. According to section 
5.1.2 para. 5, the supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”), when appointing executive board 
members, should also respect diversity and, in particular, ensure an appropriate consideration 
of women (Government Commission, 2015). In accordance with section 5.4.1, this also applies 
when proposing candidates for the supervisory board. Likewise, the executive board should pay 
attention to diversity – again concretized by an appropriate consideration of women - when 
filling managerial positions in the enterprise (Government Commission, section 4.1.5, para. 4). 
However, previous research has elucidated that corporations hardly meet the self-
obligation and only reluctantly comply with the recommendations. As an analysis of DAX30 
annual reports 2010 yields, 73 percent contain quantitative statements about female 
representation in the enlarged management group, although management levels are not 
defined consistently (Heidemann, Landherr & Müller, 2013). However, 30 percent do not name 
concrete targets for an appropriate female representation on the supervisory board. Only four 
firms do this by stating a specific quota. 23 out of 30 DAX-listed companies report on women 
on their supervisory boards whose share is within the interval 0 to 30 percent. Almost two thirds 
(60.7 percent) of enterprises indicate for female supervisory board members a proportion of 
more than ten percent. With regard to the executive board, the percentage of women is 2.2 
percent in 2010. Similar evidence is provided for MDAX-companies in 2012 (Eggers, 2014). 
Only every seventh supervisory board member and no more than every fiftieth executive board 
member in the MDAX is female. 62 percent of the 50 MDAX-companies make statements on the 
subject of women in top management positions, half of these in quantitative form. Solely eight 
enterprises set quantitative targets for increasing the percentage of women on executive levels. 
Compared to the rest of Europe, Germany in 2012 was slightly above the 16 percent-
average for the EU-27 with an 18 percent share of women in top executive positions in its largest 
listed firms (European Commission, 2012). Scandinavia was clearly leading the field: Finland 
came first with a percentage of 29 percent, followed by Latvia (28 percent) and Sweden (26 
percent). Least women are found on executive boards in Hungary, Portugal (7 percent each) 
and Malta (4 percent). However, positions on supervisory and executive boards seem to have 
been added up. As FidAR (Frauen in die Aufsichtsräte), an association promoting an increase 
of women on supervisory boards, shows in its periodical surveys, the share of female executive 
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board members in Germany’s 160 listed DAX-companies4 has slightly increased from 3.7 percent 
in 2012 to 5.2 percent in 2015. The percentage of female supervisory boards has developed 
significantly better during the same period. Female representation increased by 50 percent from 
14.2 percent in 2012 to 21.4 percent in 2015 (FidAR, 2012/2015). 
Very small growth rates of women in top management positions and low speed of 
realization rekindled the debate on a statutory quota. The grand coalition of CDU/CSU and 
SPD, in power since 2013, had agreed on the introduction of a women’s quota for supervisory 
boards in its coalition negotiations in 2014. On March 6, 2015, the German parliament 
(Bundestag) voted for the introduction of a women’s quota by a large majority. On March 27, 
2015, the German Federal Council (Bundesrat) approved the act on the introduction of a quota. 
The “women’s quota” is actually a gender quota intended to enable equal participation of 
women and men in executive positions in business and public administration. The act obligates 
employers to consider the under-represented gender, in most cases women, to a greater degree. 
The act, which took effect on January 1, 2016, consists of three pillars (Bundestag, 
2015). First, listed companies, which are subject to full co-determination, must meet a gender 
quota of 30 percent when filling a vacant post on the Supervisory Board. In the case of failure 
to meet the quota, the post must remain unfilled. At the time of the act’s approval, 108 listed 
stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaft - AG) and partnerships limited by shares 
(Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien - KgaA) were affected by this regulation. Second, 
supervisory and executive boards of companies that are listed or subject to co-determination 
are obligated to set targets and timeframes for increasing the ratio of women in management 
positions. Supervisory boards have the duty to set targets for their own supervisory and the 
executive board. Executive boards are obliged to set targets for the top two management levels. 
In all cases, timeframes for achievement must not exceed five years. The group of firms affected 
consists of 3,500 companies of different legal forms. Besides AG, KgaA and Societas Europea 
(Europäische AG - SE), these legal forms also include limited liability companies (Gesellschaft 
mit beschraenkter Haftung - GmbH) or registered cooperatives (eingetragene Genossenschaft - 
eG). As stated in the explanatory memorandum of the act, pressure on firms to set ambitious 
targets with short timeframes is created by introducing reporting requirements in parallel 
(Bundestag, 2015). Companies concerned are obligated to disclose targets and timeframes and 
to report “transparently” and regularly on progress respectively reasons for non-achievement 
within the framework of their Declaration of Corporate Governance. Third, regulation also 
                                                          
4 Four major indizes together comprise 160 German listed companies that trade on the Frankfurt Stock exchange. In 
terms of market capitalization and order book volume, DAX30 comprises the 30 largest German listed companies, 
followed by the 50 next largest firms listed in MDAX, followed by further 50 firms listed in SDAX. Index TecDAX 
comprises the 30 largest German technology stocks. 
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applies on public service. The Federal Administration (Bundesverwaltung) must set targets to 
increase the percentage of the underrepresented sex - women or men. 
A vigorous debate on women in top management positions is also held in Austria and 
Switzerland. In 2011, the Austrian government within Council of Ministers obligated itself to 
meet a women’s quota for supervisory boards (“Aufsichtsrat”) of in total 55 parastatal 
companies. The law provided for two stages: the objective of 25 percent until 2013 and the 
target of 35 percent until 2018. Gender equality in management positions (although without 
any targets) has been embodied in the law in 2010 (“Unternehmensgesetzbuch”) and 2012 
(“Aktiengesetz”) as well as in the Austrian Corporate Governance Code (Arbeiterkammer, 
2015).  Female representation in Austria’s 200 companies with the highest turnover increased 
from 7.7 percent in 2007 to 13.5 percent in 2013 and to 16.2 percent in 2015 (Arbeiterkammer, 
2015). Changes in executive management have been only marginal. The percentage of women 
rose only slightly from 3.7 percent in 2006 to 5.6 percent in 2013 and 5.9 percent in 2015. 
In November 2014, the Swiss government declared that it planned the introduction of 
a binding women’s quota for supervisory boards (“Verwaltungsrat”) of 30 percent. Possibly 
fostered by the public debate and the government’s announcement, every third vacancy on the 
supervisory boards of Switzerland’s 90 largest firms was filled with a woman in 2014. Female 
representation on Swiss supervisory boards thus increased from ten percent in 2010 to 13 
percent in 2013 and to 15 percent in 2015. Women in executive management of 120 companies 
surveyed accounted for four percent in 2006. Their share reached six percent in 2013 and 
remained unchanged since then, also in 2015 (Guido Schilling AG, 2015). 
 
3.3 Literature review and hypotheses development 
3.3.1 Diversity and gender diversity in the context of business 
I refer to the comprehensive literature review in section 2 of this dissertation. There I discuss 
the impact of diversity policies for business in general. I focus on gender diversity and set out 
empirical evidence on the link between female executives and firm performance. I argue why 
there are good performance-related reasons for increasing the ratio of women in management 
positions up to the board level. I further provide governance-related arguments why enhanced 
female representation on executive levels is in the interest of shareholders and I show how 
capital markets react to increased gender diversity in top management teams and on corporate 
boards.  
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3.3.2 Diversity, CSR and the role of investor relations  
Following either the discrimination-and-fairness or the access-and-legitimacy paradigm, 
diversity policies can be included in the category of corporate social responsibility (Bear et al., 
2010). Undoubtedly, there is overlapping content (Hansen, 2014). Investors have increasingly 
considered CSR aspects in their valuation of companies in recent years (Hockerts & Moir, 2004; 
Hoffmann & Fieseler, 2012). In the past, however, so-called “mainstream” investors were 
interested solely in CSR measures if these impacted stated results or the cost of capital. 
Similarly, from equity analysts’ point of view, environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues are always linked to economic responsibilities (Fieseler, 2011). By contrast, specialized 
socially responsible investors (SRI) demonstrated sincere concern with the interactions of firms 
and society (Hockerts & Moir, 2004). Despite their different approaches, the interests of 
mainstream investors and SRI may overlap. They share a common objective: to make 
investments in companies on the assumption that greater responsibility will result in higher 
value, consistent with a best-in-class approach. An economic justification is crucial to convince 
the broader investment community of CSR initiatives including diversity programs. 
In 2006, equity analysts at the German Stock Exchange in Frankfurt covering DAX-
companies were interviewed regarding their CSR perception (Fieseler, 2011). The survey 
revealed that ESG issues were gaining in importance for mainstream investment analyses but 
that there were considerable weaknesses in investor relations’ communication. IR should 
communicate the firm’s CSR performance more actively to external capital markets players. 
Indeed, there has also been a proactive trend shift towards a stronger focus on CSR in corporate 
communication (Arvidsson, 2010). Moreover, IR should address CSR topics strategically 
(Hoffmann & Fieseler, 2012), “not only as a cost, a constraint or a charitable deed. In other 
words, capital markets will consider CSR more relevant if companies describe it as a benefit to 
shareholders, a source of opportunity, risk prevention and competitive advantage” (Fieseler, 
2011, p. 143). IR should thus frame ESG issues as integral element of a firm’s strategy and 
equity story and elucidate the long-term prospects that influenced the strategy behind investing 
in ESG activities (Fieseler, 2011). Communication strategy for individual target groups should 
be to educate mainstream investors about the essentiality of CSR including diversity policies, to 
interact with engagement funds on the topic in greater depth and to give feedback to rating 
agencies on the appropriateness of rating criteria and methodology (Hockerts & Moir, 2004). 
IR must also transfer information to the company by educating the board about investor 
sentiment and by providing early warnings on reputational risks and emerging issues to 
corporate communication and specialized staff functions (Hockerts & Moir, 2004).  
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3.3.3 Shareholder reactions to women on boards and in TMTs 
Empirical evidence on the investor reaction to gender-diverse boards is ambiguous. Schmid & 
Dauth (2014) find no significant influence of gender on abnormal returns to appointments of 
international top managers. Similarly, Farrell and Hersch (2005) find only insignificant 
abnormal returns on the appointment of female board members. Other studies prove a generally 
positive reaction to the announcement of a women added to the board (Campbell et al., 2010; 
Kang et al., 2010). Campbell et al. (2010) document positive capital markets’ reaction in the 
short term and in the long term, suggesting that shareholders believe that women add value. 
Investors’ openness is far less when respective directors occupy a CEO position. Shareholders 
respond more negatively to announcements of female CEO appointments than to male CEO 
appointments (Kang et al., 2010; Lee & James, 2007). Market reactions are less negative for 
women that are recruited from within the company than from outside and also less negative for 
appointments of women in top management positions other than the CEO role (Lee & James, 
2007). Shareholder reaction to the announcement of the law on a gender quota in Norway was 
negative, particularly for firms that had no women on their boards at that time, suggesting that 
the restrictions with regard to future composition of the board imposed by the quota were rated 
negatively (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012).  
 
3.4.4 Contributions to literature and hypotheses 
My ambition is to contribute to existing literature in two ways. First, I extend the extant 
literature on diversity and firm performance by providing an analysis of the current practice of 
diversity management in stock-listed enterprises in German-speaking Europe. By conducting an 
anonymous web survey, I gain insight into attitudes towards diversity policies and determine 
the relevance of diversity for firm performance from both the company and the capital markets 
perspective. Second, I show to what extent companies comply with (self-)regulatory 
requirements regarding women’s participation in leadership and whether firms are prepared 
for coming regulatory changes. 
Since more than ten years have elapsed since Hockerts and Moir’s (2004) and Fieseler’s 
(2011) analyses, I hypothesize that now mainstream investors are aware of the potential 
benefits of diversity and thus constitute a driving force for development and advancement of 
corporate diversity policies. I assume that mainstream investors similarly to SRI and specialized 
investors express deeper interest in diversity and request information on status quo and progress 
of diversity initiatives. I expect that capital market participants are aware of the various 
potential benefits of gender diversity in leadership and consequently consider it as a relevant 
parameter for company valuation. The same holds true for rating agencies. I expect that rating 
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agencies do consider gender diversity in leadership as a factor of relevance for the rating 
process. 
I further hypothesize that companies interviewed do generally not employ an economic 
perspective on the topic of diversity. Since the ongoing debate on diversity has until now mainly 
been a debate on equal rights and equal treatment, I assume that empirical findings on the 
economic benefits of staff diversity have not found their way into practice yet. I presume that 
the companies primarily pursue internal ethical and moral objectives, following the 
discrimination-and-fairness paradigm. I hypothesize that external regulatory requirements gave 
cause to develop and implement diversity initiatives within organizations in many cases. 
Accordingly, I expect that regulators are perceived as a major driving force over all other 
external stakeholders. 
At the time of the survey, the great coalition had already agreed on the introduction of 
a gender quota for supervisory boards. With regard to issuers’ preparation for the coming 
binding quota, I expect that companies concerned have taken specific measures to identify and 
win qualified female candidates for positions on corporate boards. German industry initiatives 
have clearly demonstrated their opposition against a statutory quota for more than two decades 
and favored a voluntary self-obligation to increase the percentage of women in executive 
positions instead. I thus expect the acceptance level of the quota to be low. 
However, I hypothesize that companies comply with the German economy’s self-
obligation. I thus expect that firms have established internal planning targets for women in 
management positions. I further assume that companies have implemented measures to identify 
and promote current and potential female managers internally.  
 
3.4 Research Methodology 
3.4.1 Survey methodology and data sources 
I developed a preliminary version of the questionnaire in consideration of general principles for 
constructing web surveys, using the Tailored Design Method (Dillman, 2000). With respect to 
survey design and process, I have been also guided by Brau and Fawcett’s (2006) survey of chief 
financial officers (CFOs) aiming at comparing theory and practice of the initial public offering 
(IPO) process as well as Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey seeking to compare theory and 
practice in the fields of cost of capital, capital structure and capital budgeting. The following 
pretest was done in several steps. First, I asked academics from corporate finance for a critical 
review of the questionnaire. On the basis of their feedback on content and formulation of 
questions, I revised the questionnaire. The second version was sent out for further test runs to 
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selected professionals from business and banking. In a last step, I requested feedback from 
experts in marketing and sociology. In several cases, I changed formats and formulations of 
questions in order to avoid the different kinds of measurement error that may occur in surveys 
such as bias resulting from misleading wording or response tendencies. These modifications 
were also intended to increase the response rate. Moreover, I had asked for documentation of 
the individual time required for processing the questionnaire and obtained an average of eleven 
minutes. 
The final version of the questionnaire contains 43 questions, including six questions that 
followed previous filter questions. 13 of these questions refer to demographic features of the 
respondent and the relevant employer. 23 questions have the form of a closed question, eight 
thereof are questions of attitude. Four questions are semi-open and 16 questions are worded as 
open questions. The survey includes questions of attitude as I am interested in the respondents’ 
personal view on the subject. I use four-point Likert scales for eight items. Respondents rate 
whether they agree or disagree with a certain statement (item) by ticking numbers from 1 (“I 
fully agree”) to 4 (“I fully disagree). I choose the 4-point instead of a 3- or 5-point scale with 
the objective of avoiding a tendency towards the center in the answers. Questions of attitude 
appear randomized in order to minimize systematic cognitive bias in the form of a halo effect. 
The final version of the questionnaire is included as appendix A1. 
The survey was conducted in cooperation with DIRK e.V. – German Investor Relations 
Association. DIRK had 306 members at that time and, according to its own statement, 
represented around 85 percent of the capital listed on the stock exchange in Germany. 257 
persons are corporate members, 59 are individual members. The majority of the corporate 
members are investor relations professionals (>90 percent), others belong to various fields of 
the finance department from the CFO’s (>5 percent) to the treasurer’s level. Employees from 
staff units and corporate communications for a third group. The individual members are 
predominantly investor relations professionals (approx. 50 percent) or consultants (approx. 40 
percent). The remaining part of 10 percent is classified as “others”. The survey was performed 
as an anonymous online survey during the period January 20, 2015 to February 10, 2015. In 
Germany, DIRK invited 1,055 addressees of its extended member distribution list members and 
newsletter subscribers to participate in the survey. I decided to remind addressees repeatedly 
at frequent intervals; timing of follow-up appears to have no significant impact on the response 
rate (Deutskens, De Ruyter, Wetzels & Oosterveld, 2004). After the expiry of a week, on January 
27, DIRK sent out a reminder. On January 30, DIRK referred to the survey again in its regular 
newsletter. The two leading industry associations from Austria and Switzerland contributed as 
well. CIRA – Cercle Investor Relations Austria – sent out a first invitation to participate to 65 
Austrian recipients on January 20 and a subsequent reminder to an extended number of 270 
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addressees on February 4. Swiss investor relations association IR club invited 60 members. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the survey statistics. 
Table 3.1: Summary of survey statistics 
invited for participation 1,385 
- thereof in Germany 1,055 (76.17%) 
- thereof in Austria 270 (19.49%) 
- thereof in Switzerland 60 (4.33%) 
gross participation 194 
net participation 155 
interrupted (interruption rate) 59 (30.57%) 
survey completed (completion rate) 96 (49.48%) 
response rate (1.385 invitations) 6.9% 
page with most terminations Page 1; number of terminations: 41 
average processing time (arithmetic mean) 0h 12m 46.44s 
average processing time (median) 0h 10m 48.5s 
time of day with highest number of accesses Hour 8; number of accesses: 42 
average number of participants per day 12.12 
average number of participants per week 48.50 
 
Improving the response rate by material or non-material incentives (e.g. Goeritz, 2006; Marcus, 
Bosnjak, Lindner, Pilischenko & Schütz, 2007) was not feasible as the survey was designed as 
an anonymous web survey and by specifying personal data for potential prize allocation, 
respondents would have been identifiable. In addition, incentives are assumed to have less 
influence in online surveys than offline (Goeritz, 2004). DIRK periodically conducts surveys 
among its members. The most prominent example is the Stimmungsbarometer (“sentiment 
barometer“). On behalf of DIRK, the Association for Consumer Research (GfK) consults around 
300 investor relations professionals employed at listed companies in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland twice a year on their assessment of the current and future position of their 
company. According to information provided by DIRK, 80 responses on average come from 
Germany. Thus, the response rate to the Stimmungsbarometer is at least 26 percent. Several 
responses from Austria and Switzerland come on top of this number. 
I adjust the data for incomplete or erroneous answers. The number of data sets originally 
amounted to 96. I delete two data sets to avoid defaults as the respondents had hardly answered 
any question. Second, I delete obviously faulty answers and leave the respective field empty in 
three cases. For instance, one respondent claims to have 13 female members on its executive 
board that has zero in total. In another case, I identify a “7455%” share of female employees as 
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a faulty answer. Third, when respondents state to have zero members on the executive board 
and/or supervisory board (in one case although claiming to be share and bond issuer), I delete 
the entries relating to the share of female board members and leave the fields without an entry 
in order to avoid bias. In the end, 93 evaluable data sets remain. A quantitative content analysis 
is used for evaluation of collected data, predominantly as univariate or bivariate frequency 
analysis.  
 
3.4.2 Limitations of the survey method 
The advantage of the present survey is clearly the exclusive access to a narrowly defined group 
of participants through leading professional associations. Almost 90 percent of the respondents 
are members of the investor relations department of a listed company. I believe that an IRO, 
who is usually highly specialized in finance and corporate governance, is in a daily dialogue 
with internal decision-makers and external stakeholders. Owing to this function as interface 
between the issuer and capital markets, the survey method provides direct insight in the 
attitudes on both sides towards the issue of gender diversity in top echelons.  
However, the chosen survey method is subject to at least three limitations. First, the IRO himself 
could not have an appropriate insight into or understanding of top management’s attitude 
towards the topic of women on executive levels. The same could be true for capital markets 
actors such as investors or research analysts.  
Second, sample selection bias could be present. Sample selection bias can occur from 
several factors. To start with, the chosen survey period from mid-January to mid-February is 
traditionally a time of heavy workload as IROs contribute to the creation of the annual financial 
statements. Even so I decided to conduct the survey at this particular time as the women’s quota 
was a hotly debated issue in the public exactly then. The rather low response rate of 6.9 percent, 
however, may indicate that a significant number of addressees did not participate in the survey 
due to time constraints. This could also mean that actual respondents are less involved in certain 
important tasks such as creation of financial reports and thus represent a certain subgroup of 
all IROs. The non-participating IROs’ responses could have been quite different. On the other 
hand, representativeness does not automatically increase in-line with the response rate. Surveys 
with very low response rates may even provide more precise results than surveys with high 
response rates (Krosnick, 1999). Nonetheless, nonresponse bias could affect my results’ validity.   
Furthermore, self-selection is a possibility. A total of 41 terminations occurred at page 
1. It is conceivable that only participants with a strong personal interest in the topic of gender 
diversity decide to continue. A disproportionate participation of women does not seem to be 
the case as the gender ratio is fairly balanced. Yet, respondents’ individual involvement or 
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experience could influence the likelihood of continued participation. It is also possible that 
participants mistrust the given guaranty of anonymity and thus decline or interrupt 
participation. Several missing entries regarding characteristics of the relevant company such as 
industry classification or total number of employees may be interpreted as evidence for distrust. 
For both reasons, the surveyed data could not be representative for the population.  
Third, social desirability bias could be present due to the sensitive topic. Social 
desirability could impact responsiveness in both cases: when reflecting the company’s point of 
view and also when representing one’s own opinion. I try to overcome this risk by ensuring 
anonymity. However, distrust in the survey’s anonymity – obvious or latent - could increase the 
tendency to give socially desirable answers.  
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Survey sample 
The ratio of male and female survey participants is fairly balanced, the proportion of females 
does not significantly differ from the hypothesized value of 50 percent. Therefore, gender bias 
is unlikely. The vast majority of respondents is member of the investor relations department. 
The remaining respondents hold various other positions within their company such as CFO, 
holder, staff division, group communications or treasury. The following table 3.2 shows the 
summary of the respondents’ characteristics. 
Table 3.2: Summary of respondents’ characteristics 
 Freq. Percent Cum.  test statistics 
Gender    Binomial test 
Female  45 48.4 48.4 Expected k = 46.5 
Assumed p = 0.50000 
Observed p = 0.51613 
 
Pr(k <= 45 or k >= 48) = 0.835846   
(two-sided test) 
Male  48 51.6 100.00 
Department affiliation     
Member of IR department  84 90.32 90.32  
Other department/position 9 9.68 100.00  
Headquarters    Chi-square goodness of fit 
Germany 70 75.27 75.27 chisq(3) is 10.94, p = .0121 
Austria 10 12.90 88.17 
Switzerland 12 10.75 98.92 
other country 1 1.08 100.00 
 
Survey: Gender diversity on corporate boards and in TMTs in practice 
 
61 
 
Three quarters of 93 companies surveyed have their headquarters in Germany. Presence of 
other countries is considerably weaker. Composition by location of headquarters in my sample 
does not differ significantly from the hypothesized values derived from distribution of 
invitations. 
Industry distribution of the sample is well diversified. IT/media/telecommunications is 
the most strongly represented industry, followed by chemicals/synthetics and real 
estate/building industry. The automotive sector is represented weakest with only one company. 
Table 3.3 presents the industry distribution of the sample. 
Table 3.3: Industry distribution of the sample 
Industry classification Freq. Percent Cum. 
Financial services 8 8.60 8.60 
IT/media/telecommunications 10 10.75 19.35 
Automotive 1 1.08 20.43 
Transport/logistics 6 6.45 26.88 
Engineering/plant construction 3 3.23 30.11 
Chemicals/synthetics 9 9.68 39.78 
Healthcare/pharmaceuticals/life sciences 8 8.60 48.39 
Energy/utilities 5 5.38 53.76 
Capital goods/basic resources 6 6.45 60.22 
Real Estate/building industry 9 9.68 69.89 
Services/consulting 4 4.30 74.19 
Technology/electronics/semiconductors 4 4.30 78.49 
Insurances 3 3.23 81.72 
Trade 3 3.23 84.95 
Industry 6 6.45 91.40 
Others 2 2.15 93.55 
Not specified 6 6.45 100.00 
Total 93 100.00  
 
3.5.2 Role and importance of diversity for investor relations and 
 capital markets 
The majority of IROs is only rarely concerned with the issue of diversity. Only one out of eight 
IROs reports to deal with the topic frequently. Figure 3.1 shows how frequently the IROs 
surveyed encounter the topic of diversity. 
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Figure 3.1: Frequency of diversity issues in everyday professional life 
     
Results show that only a marginal number of investors expresses interest in diversity issues. 43 
percent of survey participants respond that they never discuss the topic with investors. Inquiries 
on this topic are rare.  Hence, my hypothesis of increased awareness of diversity on the part of 
investors cannot be confirmed. 
The question relating to the frequency of the diversity topic in the dialogue with 
investors is designed as a filter question. In case the answer is “never”, respondents jump over 
the questions on investor types/locations as well as concrete demands of investors. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the frequency of diversity issues in the dialogue with investors. 
Figure 3.2: Frequency of the topic of diversity in dialogue with investors 
 
 
To an open question about the types of investors placing inquiries about diversity, respondents 
name primarily investors with a focus on sustainability, ESG (Environment, Social, Governance) 
and CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility)/SRI (Socially Responsible Investing). Other investor 
types including mainstream investors are of subordinate or no importance in this context. This 
refutes my hypothesis of increased awareness of diversity across a broader range of investor 
groups. The following figure 3.3 displays the number of inquiries by investor type. 
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Figure 3.3: Types of investors inquiring about diversity 
 
In terms of geographical distribution, most inquiries related to diversity come from investors 
from the United States and Canada. This fact is not surprising considering that the topic of 
diversity had its origin in the United States - diversity and diversity management have been 
highly-regarded issues in North-America for 30 years now. It can thus be expected that 
awareness for the topic is higher among investors from this region. The United Kingdom, 
Scandinavia and France are also mentioned several times. German investors are of minor 
importance. Figure 3.4 displays the number of inquiries sorted by the location of investors. 
Figure 3.4: Locations of investors inquiring about diversity 
 
Due to the filter function, only 53 out of 93 respondents were asked the question on concrete 
investors’ demands with regard to diversity. They had stated earlier to discuss the topic at least 
“seldom” with shareholders. 40 usable answers are available for analysis. Table 3.4 lists the 
investors’ concrete demands or information requests. 
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Table 3.4: Inquiries of investors with regard to diversity 
Inquiries  Mentions 
No concrete demands but information requests 16 
- about women’s ratio on corporate boards and in leadership 4 
- about corporate governance (experience and qualification of all board 
members, independence of supervisory board members) 
2 
- about diversity of staff in all its dimensions 2 
- about share of disabled employees 1 
Concrete demands 25 
- for setting specific targets and formulating appropriate strategies 10 
- for increasing the share of women on corporate boards and in management 
positions including concrete measures 
8 
- for reliable key figures as basis for measurability, comparability, evaluation 5 
- for enhanced transparency with respect to targets/measures and justification 
in case of non-achievement 
4 
- for fulfillment of current and future regulatory requirements  4 
- for increasing diversity on corporate boards and in management positions 2 
(multiple answers allowed) 
Concrete demands of investors support Hockerts & Moir’s (2004) and Fieseler’s (2011) 
assessment of capital market participants’ (apparently predominantly specialized investors’) 
expectations regarding IR messages. Investors’ calls for specific diversity targets and strategies 
as well as for reliable key figures for measurability and evaluation suggest that the proposed IR 
communication strategy focusing on long-term prospects and shareholder value creation 
potential of diversity policies is justified.  
After all, a third of respondents expects that the topic of diversity will increase in importance 
in the future. Figure 3.5 illustrates the distribution in detail. 
Figure 3.5: Expectation regarding future rising importance of diversity 
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3.5.3 Motivation behind the development of diversity promotion 
 programs 
The closed question on the main drivers behind the development of diversity programs allows 
for multiple answers. Most frequently mentioned drivers for developing diversity promotion 
programs are ethical motifs, whereas only one fifth gives economic objectives as a reason in this 
context. I assume that the respective companies consider diversity as a profitable value in 
economic terms. These results support my hypothesis that the majority of companies does not 
employ an economic perspective on the topic of diversity but follows the discrimination-and-
fairness paradigm instead. A third of respondents indicates that external regulators are key 
drivers for planning and implementation of diversity programs. Although diversity programs in 
the latter case are likely rather an onerous fulfillment of an obligation than a success factor 
from a company’s point of view, they prove the efficacy of political interference. This is opposed 
by another fifth of the surveyed companies, which has not implemented any diversity promotion 
measures to date. Figure 3.6 displays the frequency of motifs mentioned in graphical form. 
Figure 3.6: Motifs for developing diversity promotion programs 
 
(Multiple answers allowed) 
 
The item “other factors” is supplemented by free text answers in five cases. Three respondents 
state that the issue of sustainability in the broadest sense was currently gaining momentum. 
When journalists and politics focused on the topic, stock-listed companies could not evade it. 
Another company in the sample implemented a program of measures for sustainability that led 
to the development of diversity promotion programs. Diversity promotion programs were 
further developed as a response to a poor external rating or at the request of employees 
following an opinion survey. A fifth of respondents concretizes the company’s internal economic 
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motifs by indicating the objective to retain well-trained specialists within the work process and 
the company.  
Consistent with the low percentage of firms that indicate economic motifs for the 
development of diversity programs and further supporting my hypothesis that firms generally 
do not employ an economic perspective on diversity, the number of companies that conducted 
a cost-benefit assessment for such initiatives is extremely small. No more than two respondents 
state that their company has appraised the benefits of diversity programs in relation to their 
costs, in one case with a positive result, that is, benefits exceed costs. More than half of the 
companies has not performed such an analysis; around 40 percent of the respondents are unable 
to provide these data.  
 
3.5.4 Other external stakeholders driving diversity promotion 
Questioned in the form of an open question (allowing for multiple answers) on the influence of 
external stakeholders other than investors, 37.6 percent name politics/regulators (“above all: 
politicians”) or the German Corporate Governance Code, respectively. This result verifies my 
hypothesis that external regulatory requirements gave cause to develop and implement diversity 
initiatives within organizations. The fact that regulators and politics are the most important 
driving force for corporate diversity promotion programs meets my expectation. 
29.0 percent name interest groups and women’s associations, more precisely the 
German Women’s Lawyer Association (7.5 percent) and Women on Supervisory Boards (FidAR, 
3.2 percent). 19.4 percent assign a vital role to the media or critical journalists.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), among them RespACT, UN Global Compact 
or BioDiversity, are cited being important external stakeholders by 6.5 percent, followed by the 
public/society, associations of shareholders/consultants on share voting rights and employees 
(5.4 percent each). Rating agencies with a focus on sustainability (such as imug) or similarly 
specialized research analysts are mentioned repeatedly. Customers in some cases also address 
this issue. The frequency of responses by stakeholder group is shown in figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7: External stakeholders driving diversity promotion 
 
 
3.5.5 Women in Leadership 
The ratio of women to total staff in the present sample varies by industry. Industry sectors 
healthcare, pharma and life sciences are clearly leading the field with an average women’s ratio 
of 0.51 (median). Other industry sectors with a high percentage of female employees are 
services/consulting with a 0.57 median as well as financial services and insurances with a 
median ratio of 0.46 each. The trade sector follows with a median of 0.45. The lowest shares 
across all industries are registered in the building industry. At five companies from the 
construction sector, female employees account for only twelve to 15 percent. Similarly low 
ratios are recorded for the chemicals/synthetics sector (adj. median 0.20) and industry 
companies (adj. median 0.21). The remaining sectors are in the middle range of 25 to 40 
percent. 
The percentage of women on supervisory boards in my sample is below the 2015 FidAR 
figure for Germany (21.4 percent) but above the corresponding ratios for Switzerland (15 
percent) and Austria (16.2 percent). The ratio of women on executive boards in my sample is 
lower than reported 2015 numbers for all three countries. However, distance to reported mean 
values is smaller. Swiss executive boards have the highest share of women in 2015 (6 percent). 
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In second place come Austrian boards (5.9 percent), third German executive boards (5.2 
percent). The following table 3.5 shows the female representation on the corporate boards of 
the sample’s firms. 
Table 3.5: Female representation on corporate boards 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Percent 
Executive Board            
members on executive board 89 4.2 1.9 1 9  
thereof female board members 89 0.2 0.5 0 2 4.81% 
Supervisory Board          
members on supervisory board 89 8.9 5.6 0 21  
thereof female board members 93 1.6 2.1 0 11 18.12% 
female shareholder representatives 89 0.9 1.2 0 6 10.60% 
female employee representatives 92 0.7 1.2 0 5 8.06% 
 
High women’s ratios, particularly on supervisory boards, are more likely to be found in large 
listed firms (DAX- and MDAX companies and in Germany). I assume that many of these firms 
increased female representation on their supervisory boards in anticipation of a statutory quota 
as well as due to greater public pressure.  Very large companies are underrepresented in my 
sample. 14 out of 93 companies have more than 50,000 employees, only four of them employ 
more than 100,000 staff. By contrast, 40 companies surveyed have less than 5,000 employees. 
This distribution possibly lowers the mean value. The size of the sample’s firms defined by the 
number of employees is shown in table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Workforce size of the sample’s companies 
Number of employees Freq. Percent Cum. 
up to 5,000 40 43.01 43.01 
>5,000 to 25,000 32 34.41 77.42 
>25,000 to 50,000 6 6.45 83.87 
>50,000 50 100,000 10 10.75 94.62 
>100,000 4 4.30 98.92 
not specified 1 1.08 100.00 
Total 93 100.00  
 
Knowing and understanding the parameters for company valuation as well as underlying 
assumptions is essential for IROs. Therefore, I asked them to assess if gender diversity in 
leadership was a relevant parameter for company valuation by capital markets. Figure 3.8 
presents the distribution of responses with respect to the assumed impact on external valuation 
by capital market players. 
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Figure 3.8: Assumed impact of corporate initiatives to increase the share of women in leadership on company 
valuation by capital markets 
 
Three quarters of respondents believe that corporate initiatives to increase the ratio of women 
in executive positions do not impact company valuation by capital market players. Only about 
a tenth considers that a commitment to promote gender diversity in leadership has a positive 
impact on the valuation process. With regard to rating agencies, nearly two thirds believe that 
gender diversity promotion programs do not affect a company’s rating. One respondent out of 
seven, however, assumes a positive influence. This assessment may partly be fostered by the 
growth in importance of rating agencies that are specialists in sustainability. A negative 
influence on the rating is expected by two IROs. 
Results clearly refute my hypothesis that capital markets consider gender diversity in 
leadership as a relevant parameter for company valuation. Results also falsify my hypothesis 
that gender diversity in leadership means a relevant parameter for the agencies’ rating process. 
Figure 3.9 shows how IROs assess the impact of initiatives promoting female leadership on 
external valuation by rating agencies. 
Figure 3.9: Assumed impact of corporate initiatives promoting female leadership on company valuation by 
rating agencies 
 
I hypothesized that companies comply with the German economy’s self-obligation and thus 
expected that firms have established internal planning targets for women in management 
positions. Surprisingly, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed. Almost two thirds of all surveyed 
companies have not set any planning targets for the share of women in management positions. 
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Around 17 percent have defined objectives, whereas 20 percent claim to have done so but would 
not disclose. More than half of the firms surveyed have not set themselves goals for female 
representation on corporate boards. Roughly a fifth of all companies has set targets for the share 
of women on supervisory boards but only three percent have formulated objectives for women 
on executive boards. The following table 3.7 displays the distribution of responses in detail. 
Table 3.7: Existence of planning targets for women in leadership and on corporate boards 
Variable Freq. Percent Cum. 
Planning targets for women in management positions 
Planning targets existent 16 17.20 17.20 
Planning targets not existent  57 61.29 78.49 
Planning targets existent/no disclosure 19 20.43 98.92 
Missing/not specified 1 1.08 100.00 
total 93 100.00  
Planning targets for women on corporate boards (multiple answers allowed) 
Planning targets for women on executive board 3 3.23  
Planning targets for women on supervisory board 20 21.51  
Planning targets for boards existent/no disclosure 10  10.75  
Planning targets for boards not existent 50 53.76  
Not specified (“I do not know.”) 14 15.05  
 
The following table 3.8 displays Pearson Chi-square values and indicates levels of significance 
for the relationships between the variable “share of female employees” and various other 
variables. There is no statistically significant relationship between the share of female 
employees and having planning targets for enhanced participation of women in management 
positions, for having planning targets for women on the executive board or supervisory board. 
Interestingly, there is also no statistically significant relationship between the share of female 
staff members and the number of female supervisory board members. However, there appears 
to be a significant relationship between the ratio of female employees and the number of women 
on the executive board.  
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Table 3.8: Relationship between share of female employees and planning targets/actual female representation 
in leadership 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Obs. Pearson  
chi-square 
Degrees  
of freedom 
p-
value 
 
Share of 
female 
employees 
 
Planning targets for women in leadership 88 13.4205 21 0.893 
Planning targets for women on executive 
board 
88 8.8034 7 0.267 
Planning targets for women on 
supervisory board 
88 7.9373 7 0.338 
Number of women on executive board 88 23.4096 14 0.054* 
Number of women on supervisory board 88 47.5610 63 0.926 
 
60 percent of participants responded to the question regarding assumed advantages of 
disclosing internal planning targets for women in management positions for companies, which 
was worded as an open question and thus allowed multiple answers. Table 3.9 shows what 
advantages and/or disadvantages the respondents assume and how frequently they are 
mentioned. 38 percent of respondents see benefits in the disclosure. Around half of these believe 
in an improvement of the company’s public perception, supporting the findings of Bear et al. 
(2010) and Brammer et al. (2009). This reputation effect is assumed to work towards different 
stakeholders such as investors, the media or potential employees. Firms could position 
themselves as open and progressive and be a forerunner. In compliance with generally accepted 
professional standards of investor relations, transparency and liability towards stakeholders is 
considered to be a further advantage of disclosure. Setting concrete objectives for gender 
diversity would enable a target-actual comparison by external parties. Moreover, conducted 
measures for promoting diversity could be evaluated. The ensuing internal and external 
pressure of expectation (perceived as positive) would increase the probability of success for 
objective achievement as well as for the company’s credibility. Furthermore, IROs assume an 
increase in the attractiveness as an employer in general and for women in particular.  
23 percent of respondents, however, do not see any advantages to the company from 
the disclosure of internal planning targets for female representation in executive positions. Few 
IROs indicate that they disclose only for regulatory reasons, which means to fulfill the 
requirements of the German Corporate Governance Code. Others state it more sharply: the 
publication of planning targets for an enhanced participation of women served the purpose of 
“calming the waves”. The publication represented no benefit to firms; companies bowed to the 
pressure “imposed by interested parties”.  
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Questioned on the drawbacks of disclosure, 48 percent of respondents identify potential 
disadvantages. The number is significantly higher than the percentage of respondents that 
assumes benefits from disclosure. Almost half of IROs surveyed seem to associate more 
detriments than benefits with the disclosure of internally targeted aims. Most frequently 
mentioned is the originating pressure of fulfillment of the company’s own objectives (here 
perceived as negative). Non-achievement of the self-imposed targets would lead to pressure for 
justification and to “unnecessary discussions”. Main criticism is that publication of such figures 
created an additional pressure that was neither in the issuer’s nor in the shareholders’ interest. 
IROs surveyed also cite the risk of a reputational damage in case of non-achievement of targets. 
The possibility of wrong personnel decisions follows close behind. Respondents state that 
companies ran the risk of “waiving to choose from the very best candidates” when giving priority 
“to a quota over qualification”. Moreover, women who were appointed to a post according to a 
quota would become subject to stigmatization and be perceived as “tokens”.  
Table 3.9: Assumed advantages and disadvantages of disclosing internal planning targets 
Assumed advantages of disclosing 
planning targets (multiple answers 
allowed) 
Mentions Assumed disadvantages of 
disclosing planning targets 
(multiple answers allowed) 
Mentions 
benefits to company assumed 35 
(37.6%) 
disadvantages assumed 45  
(48.4%) 
no benefits to company assumed 21  
(22.6%) 
no disadvantages assumed 12  
(12.9%) 
positive reputational effect 15 pressure of fulfillment of own 
objectives and for justification 
20 
transparency and liability towards 
stakeholders 
10 risk of wrong personnel decisions 
 
10 
increased attractiveness as 
employer 
5 risk of reputational damage in case 
of non-achievement 
5 
fulfilment of regulatory 
requirements 
4 stigmatization of women as tokens 3 
higher valuation of the company 1 demotivation/insecurity of 
company’s own employees 
2 
other advantages 1 other disadvantages 7 
total number of responses to this 
question 
56/93 
(60.2%) 
total number of responses to this 
question 
57/93 
(61.3%) 
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A further disadvantage is seen in the ensuing demotivation or insecurity of the respective 
company’s (male) employees, if performance and capabilities were no longer the only relevant 
criteria when filling vacancies. Finally, diversity “must not be an end in itself”.   
 With regard to the forthcoming statutory gender quota for German supervisory boards, 
a third of German companies in my sample had taken or were currently developing preparatory 
measures at the time of the survey to ensure achievement of the quota. Measures were 
concretized only in a very limited number of cases, such as “search for suitable female 
candidates” or “new election of a female supervisory board member by the Annual General 
Meeting (then replacing a man)”. Another third of respondents – a relatively high proportion - 
indicated to have no knowledge of preparatory measures in anticipation of the quota. Most 
likely, such initiatives do not fall in the sphere of investor relations’ activities and transparency 
of the process might be poor. It may further be assumed that these IROs had not received 
external requests on this topic yet and thus not researched it at the time of the survey. Table 
3.10 reports the state of preparation with respect to fulfilment of the forthcoming gender quota 
for supervisory boards.  
Table 3.10: State of preparations regarding the fulfilment of the coming gender quota for supervisory boards 
 
Corporate initiatives to date 
Only Germany Total Sample  
Freq.  Percent Cum. Freq. Percent 
Measures taken 10 14.29 14.29 11 11.83 
Measures currently being developed   12 17.14 31.43 12 12.90 
No measures taken  12 17.14 48.57 14 15.05 
I don't know 22 31.43 80.00 27 29.03 
Quota does not apply to our firm  14 20.00 100.00 29 31.18 
Total 70 100.00   93 100.00 
 
 
3.5.6 Promotional measures for women in leadership and 
reconciliation of career-family life 
Only 31 percent (28) of companies surveyed launched promotional programs for women in 
leadership and on supervisory boards. 52 percent (48) have not developed such programs yet. 
17 percent (16) of respondents were unable to answer this question.  
Separated by country, 29 percent (20) out of 70 German companies have promotional 
programs for women in leadership in place. The fact that two thirds of German companies 
surveyed have not implemented any concrete programs within a period of 15 years refutes my 
hypothesis that companies comply with the German economy’s self-obligation by implementing 
measures to identify and promote current and potential female managers internally. Programs 
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have been launched at five of ten Austrian companies and at two of twelve Swiss companies. 
The following figure 3.10 illustrates how many references were made to various corporate 
initiatives promoting female leadership. 
Figure 3.10: Corporate initiatives for promoting female leadership 
 
 
Most frequently mentioned promotional measures for women are mentoring programs. These 
are often tandems, i.e. one Junior Executive (mentee) and one Manager (mentor) work together 
in tandem during mentoring. In order to ensure that dependencies do not impede an honest 
dialogue, mentee and mentor should ideally belong to different departments or sectors within 
the company or should be recruited from different companies or industries (business-cross 
mentoring). A “cadre of multiple mentors” is desirable (De Janasz, Sullivan & Whiting, 2003). 
These mentors advise on formation of intelligent networks, since “in the same way that 
organizations seek partnerships in an effort to capitalize on collaborative strengths, so can 
individuals at any level of an organization or any stage in their careers form facilitative mentor 
relationships” (De Janasz et al., 2003, p. 88). Women’s networks, second most frequently 
mentioned program, are thus a promising approach to advance women’s careers. However, 
particularly vocational mentoring (rather than personal mentoring) seems to be associated with 
mentees’ career success and job satisfaction (Ensher, Thomas & Murphy, 2011; Orpen, 1995). 
Specific leadership programs customized to the needs of young female managers are also 
occurring quite frequently.  
Despite many firms’ stronger efforts to advance female careers and the various 
promotion programs already in place, the compatibility of family life and career remains an 
essential prerequisite for female leadership. Although measures to ensure flexible working 
conditions such as flexitime (flexible working times) or part-time arrangements and the option 
of working from home office appear to be common practice, programs tailored to the particular 
necessities of women in executive positions remain scarce. One example of such programs is 
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facilitation of tandem leadership, provided by seven companies in my sample. Figure 3.11 
illustrates how many references were made to various corporate measures for reconciling career 
and family life. 
Figure 3.11: Existing measures for employees for reconciling career and family life 
 
 
3.5.7 Questions of attitude towards diversity and gender diversity 
Within the framework of questions of attitude, I ask to what extent respondents agree with 
certain statements (so-called items) on diversity in general and gender diversity in particular. 
The following table 3.12 presents these eight items on (gender) diversity. Three statements 
relate to empirical findings on diversity in business. Five statements concern the individually 
attached importance of diversity initiatives. The number of observations differs in each case due 
to the response option “not specified”. 
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Table 3.12: Items on diversity and gender diversity 
No.  Items 
 Empirical findings 
1 Willingness for exchange of knowledge and information is greater within homogeneous 
management bodies than within heterogeneous ones. 
2 Women on supervisory boards are stricter monitors than male board members.  
3 Women often lack the requisite experience for an executive position owing to career breaks 
due to past family leaves.  
 Importance attached to diversity  
4 A binding women's quota is mandatory to increase the percentage of women on supervisory 
boards.  
5 Still too little attention is being paid to the topic of diversity in German enterprises. 
6 In case the costs of diversity measures exceed their benefits, enterprises should 
consequentially refrain from such activities. 
7 When filling vacant posts in top echelons, diversity aspects should be irrelevant.  
8 There are not sufficient adequate female candidates available for filling vacancies on 
supervisory boards in accordance with the women's quota from 2016 on. 
 
The following table 3.13 shows the acceptance levels for each of the eight items on diversity 
and gender diversity in leadership. Surprisingly, results show that respondents disagree with 
items formulated on the basis of empirical findings. Their mean rating on the willingness for 
exchange of knowledge and information does not confirm earlier findings. Respondents rather 
disagree with the statement that this willingness is greater within homogeneous than within 
heterogeneous management teams. Even stronger disagreement is expressed with the second 
item. On average, female supervisory board members seem to be not perceived as stricter 
monitors than male board members. Disagreement is strongest on the item of family leaves 
meaning an impediment for women’s careers. In all three cases, ratings of female and male 
respondents did not differ to a statistically significant degree. 
Results are different for items concerning the importance that respondents individually 
attach to diversity. Gender-specific differences are observed in ratings on all five items and are 
statistically significant. The mean value for the combined gender groups expresses rather 
disagreement on the compelling necessity of a women’s quota for supervisory boards, thus again 
confirming my hypothesis of a low acceptance level of the quota among IROs. The individual 
analysis of both groups gives a varying picture. Male respondents strongly disagree whereas 
female respondents rather agree. Gender differences can also be seen in the assessment of the 
female candidate pool for supervisory boards. Male respondents rather agree with the item that 
the number of adequate female candidates is insufficient. Female respondents rather disagree. 
Furthermore, ratings differ by gender when assessing the general importance of diversity in 
German enterprises. Women rather agree with the statement that still too little attention is 
being paid to the topic of diversity, men rather disagree. A similar pattern is observed for the 
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item that diversity aspects should be irrelevant when filling vacant posts in top echelons. Male 
respondents rather agree with this view, whereas female respondents rather disagree. Gender 
differences for all three items could be statistically fixed at the 1 percent level by a two-sample 
t-test with equal variances and a two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test.  
Table 3.13: Level of acceptance for items on diversity and gender diversity in leadership 
Item 
No./ 
Obs. 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
(male) 
Mean 
(female) 
t-test 
(p-value) 
Wilcoxson 
Rank-Sum 
(Mann-
Whitney)test 
Min 
 
 
 
 
Max 
 
 
 
 
1 
(73) 
2.863014 .9763177 3.02778 2.7027 T = 1.4326 
(0.1564) 
 
z = 1.125 
(0.2607) 
1 4 
2  
(61) 
3.163934 .8201692 3.33333 3.0 T = 1.6077 
(0.1132) 
z = 1.797 
(0.0724*) 
1 4 
3  
(84) 
3.357143 .6520192 3.33333 3.38095 T = -0.3329 
(0.7401) 
z = -0.377 
(0.7063) 
 
2 4 
4  
(81) 
2.777778 1.048809 3.24390 2.3 T = 4.5133 
(0.0000***) 
z = 4.035 
(0.0001***) 
 
1 4 
5 
(77) 
2.441558  .9527454 2.97297 1.95 t = 5.5558 
(0.0000***) 
 
z = 4.788 
(0.0000***) 
1 4 
6 
(77) 
2.337662 .9263737 2.025641 2.657895 t = -3.1671 
(0.0022**) 
 
z = -3.090 
(0.0020**) 
1 4 
7  
(83) 
2.349398 .9930703 1.97561 2.71429 t = -3.6311 
(0.0005***) 
z = -3.494 
(0.0005***) 
 
1 4 
8 
(76) 
2.513158 .9590748 2.02703 2.97436 t = -4.9268 
(0.0000***)  
Z= -4.377 
(0.0000***) 
1 4 
   
   1: "I fully agree." 
4: "I totally disagree." 
 
Gender-specific differences also become apparent in answers on the item relating to the 
cost/effectiveness ratio of diversity initiatives. The mean value for the combined groups of 2.34 
indicates that IROs surveyed do apply an economic perspective on the issue of diversity. 
However, this mean value is driven by men’s ratings. From the male perspective, economic 
benefit should be prerequisite for undertaking diversity initiatives. Men rather agree that if costs 
exceed benefits, companies should refrain from diversity activities. The female view differs 
significantly, expressing rather disagreement and indicating that women view diversity 
initiatives not solely under economic aspects.  
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3.6 Summary and conclusion 
This study pursued three key objectives. First, it aimed at determining the significance of 
workforce diversity from the capital markets’ perspective and at clarifying the question whether 
particularly gender diversity in leadership means a relevant parameter for external company 
valuation. Results suggest that staff diversity remains a niche topic for capital markets. Mainly 
specialized investors and rating agencies with a focus on sustainability, CSR and ESG 
respectively make inquiries relating to workforce diversity. So-called mainstream investors, who 
represent the majority, show little interest in the topic. Consequently, roughly two thirds of 
IROs surveyed believe that corporate initiatives for increased gender diversity in executive 
positions have no impact on external company valuation by capital market participants 
including rating agencies. However, investors with an interest in diversity call for specific 
targets and strategies as well as for reliable key figures for measurability and evaluation.  
Second, I investigated whether the questioned listed companies employ an economic 
perspective on the topic of diversity and which internal and external stakeholders drive 
development and implementation of corporate diversity programs. My findings indicate that 
the vast majority of companies in German-speaking Europe does not consider diversity issues 
under economic aspects but predominantly under aspects of fairness and equality. Internal 
stakeholders pushing ahead diversity promotion - albeit of less importance - are employees, 
explicitly named homosexual employees and management. Most influential external 
stakeholders driving diversity initiatives are in this priority sequence government authorities 
and regulators, women’s and interest associations and the media.  
Third, I intended to gain an insight into strategy and progress regarding a stronger 
participation of women in executive positions. I investigated whether companies have 
implemented specific promotion programs for women in leadership and whether they have 
created an appropriate infrastructure for reconciling career and family life. Unexpectedly, half 
of the companies in my sample have not implemented specific promotion programs for women 
in leadership. Furthermore, only very few companies have launched specific measures targeted 
at female leaders to enable reconciliation of career and family life.  Firms primarily offer flexible 
working hours and the opportunity to work from home. The survey also evaluated the status 
quo for internal planning targets for female representation in management positions. Almost 
two thirds of all surveyed companies have not set any planning targets, around a quarter has 
defined objectives, whereas a fifth claims to have done so but would not disclose. A positive 
reputational effect as well as transparency and liability towards stakeholders are the mostly 
mentioned assumed advantages of disclosure whereas pressure of fulfillment of own objectives 
and for justification and the risk of wrong personnel decisions constitute assumed disadvantages 
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of disclosure. More than 50 percent of the firms surveyed have not set themselves goals for 
female representation on corporate boards. Roughly a fifth of all companies has set targets for 
the share of women on supervisory boards but only a marginal share has formulated objectives 
for women on executive boards. 
The introduction of a gender quota for German supervisory boards had been foreseeable 
for quite a while. It is therefore surprising that only a third of German companies in my sample 
had taken or were currently developing preparatory measures at the time of the survey to ensure 
achievement of the quota from 2016 on. The general acceptance of the quota from investor 
relations is rather low. IROs surveyed on average rather disagree with the view that a quota is 
mandatory to increase the percentage of women on supervisory boards.  
However, I observe significant differences between male and female respondents in the 
assessment of diversity initiatives. On average, male IROs rather employ an economic 
perspective on the topic and they are of the view that firms already pay sufficient attention to 
diversity.  They further believe that diversity aspects should be irrelevant when filling vacant 
posts in top echelons and they strongly oppose the quota. In addition, they are of the opinion 
that there are not sufficient adequate female candidates available for filling vacancies on 
supervisory boards in accordance with the women's quota from 2016 on. By contrast, female 
IROs on average believe in the need for diversity promotion programs - potentially also in the 
case of a negative cost-effectiveness-ratio - and that diversity aspects should play a role in 
recruitment for top management positions. They are of the opinion that still too little attention 
is being paid to that topic by companies. They do not oppose the quota to the same extent as 
their male colleagues and they disagree with the assessment that there are not sufficient female 
candidates available for filling vacant board posts. 
I conclude that contrary to expectation, capital markets’ perception of diversity issues 
has not materially changed within the past decade. The aim for investor relations must be to 
educate mainstream investors and rating agencies on the potential economic benefits stemming 
from workforce diversity in general and gender diversity in management in particular. IR 
communication strategy should focus on long-term prospects and shareholder value creation 
potential of diversity policies. In-depth analysis and performance measurement of a firm’s 
diversity activities are necessary preconditions to obtain reliable information. Robust 
quantitative figures may constitute strong arguments for increased diversity to convince the 
mainstream. 
Raising awareness about the potential economic benefits must also take place within the 
organization. Employing an economic perspective on diversity issues is long overdue – not as a 
replacement but as an addition to the still dominant fairness-and-discrimination paradigm. 
Robust quantitative figures, derived from critical evaluation of existing diversity policies, may 
Survey: Gender diversity on corporate boards and in TMTs in practice 
 
80 
 
constitute convincing arguments for increased diversity also in the debate with internal skeptics 
and help to select measures that promise long-term success. The fact that regulators rank first 
among external stakeholders driving diversity promotion is proof of the effectiveness of political 
interference. 
The majority of companies in my sample does not comply with voluntary commitments 
of the industry or corporate governance codes’ recommendations, which are different in each 
country, but broadly comparable. There is significant pent-up demand with respect to programs 
to promote female leadership as well as with regard to appropriate offers facilitating 
reconciliation of family life and career, tailored to the needs of female executives. Corporate 
disclosure policy needs to be revised in order to enhance transparency. In light of these results, 
tighter reporting requirements regarding the participation of women in executive positions and 
stricter obligations to state reasons in the case of deviation or non-achievement (included in the 
German act adopted in 2015) will possibly accelerate this process. 
 
There is reason to believe that those investor relations professionals who expect the topic of 
diversity to increase in importance in the future will be proven right.  
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4. Too close to the sun: CEO optimism and 
 overconfidence as drivers for excessive growth. 
 The Conergy Case 
4.1 Introduction 
Implementing a suitable management team and monitoring this team closely is one of the most 
important challenges with regard to personnel issues for every supervisory board. This 
challenge becomes even more crucial when the business environment is very dynamic, as is the 
case in the renewable energy sector. The present case study describes the rise and fall of 
Germany-based CONERGY AG, an integrated systems supplier in the field of renewable 
energies, during the years 1998 to 2007. Main reason for CONERGY’s distress from which the 
company failed to recover was overly rapid expansion into international markets and new 
business sectors within very few years. The main responsibility for this excessive company 
growth lies with CONERGY’s founder and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Hans-Martin Rueter. 
In order to trace and comprehend the CEO’s motivation and actions, I refer to findings of 
behavioral finance. I show how important insights of behavioral finance such as managerial 
optimism and overconfidence can provide an explanation for CONERGY’s aggressive expansion 
strategy. I argue that being confident and driven by strong optimism, Rueter pushed the 
company successfully forward in its early stages but eventually fell victim to overconfidence. 
He was finally dismissed as CEO at the end of 2007. It appears that the supervisory board failed 
in its function to effectively monitor and control the CEO’s actions. The close relationships and 
mutual trust between the CEO and some board members may have been detrimental: Rueter’s 
uncle and co-founder was Chairman of the board, his brother a further board member. 
I identify four major effects of Rueter’s ambitious expansion strategy, which in 
combination caused CONERGY’s severe crisis. First, the large number of newly founded 
subsidiaries as well as poorly targeted acquisitions generated rapidly rising costs, particularly 
personnel costs. Second, the growing complexity on the organizational level as well as on the 
technology and product level became hardly manageable. Third, increasing cash requirements 
and weak working capital management caused precarious shortfalls in liquidity, nearly resulting 
in insolvency. Moreover, CONERGY failed in procurement. It suffered repeatedly from delays 
in delivery of photovoltaic components leading to revenue losses and did not succeed in 
securing raw materials at economic costs to profitably operate its large-scale production facility 
in Eastern Germany. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 4.2, I give an overview of relevant 
behavioral finance literature, focusing particularly on the impact of CEO optimism and 
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overconfidence on corporate strategy and development. Section 4.3 provides background 
information regarding structure and development of the German renewable energies sector. I 
show how government subsidies not only paved the way for the emergence of a new industry 
but triggered an unprecedented photovoltaics (PV) boom in Germany. Section 4.4 describes 
data and methodology.  In section 4.5, I elucidate how managerial overconfidence may have 
driven excessive growth and investigate how complexity within the Group grew with both rapid 
organic growth and immoderate acquisitions. I shed light on capital markets’ view on the 
company’s expansion. I determine the factors that drove the inordinate increase of fixed costs, 
cash requirements and working capital and trace the company’s procurement activities over 
time. The aftermath of the crisis and management’s attempts to restructure the company are 
outlined in section 4.6. Section 4.7 summarizes my findings and concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Irrational managers’ behavior in behavioral corporate finance 
The construct of Homo Economicus or economic man is a central assumption in economics, more 
precisely neo-classical economic theory. Human beings are understood as rational utility-
maximizers. Their actions are aimed at optimizing individual well-being under the existing 
circumstances whereas well-being in this context is defined by the utility function that claims 
that utilities of possible outcomes are weighted by their probabilities. “Rationality” is attributed 
to the Homo Economicus as he pursues clearly defined objectives having stable preferences and 
making rational choices, striving to achieve the highest possible well-being or ‘utility’ given at 
minimal cost. Applying the neo-classical axiom to the firm, the prime aim must be maximizing 
cash flows at lowest possible cost based on rational-economic actions. Accordingly, firm 
managers (the ‘agents’) as well as investors should behave rationally. 
Beginning in the 1950s, however, experimental evidence from the field of cognitive 
psychology toppled the theory of rational behavior. Allais (1953) criticizes the idea that a 
rational man must behave according to the Bernoulli principle or the expected utility 
hypothesis. He argues that decisions under risk in reality are made under the influence of 
additional (psychological) factors. Furthermore, probabilities can be significantly influenced 
and changed by subjective expectations. Social scientist Simon states that the concept of 
economic man was “in need of fairly drastic revision” (Simon, 1955, p. 99). He attempts to 
consider additional important variables of a complex decision-making situation in order to 
adequately define “rational behavior” in this specific situation.  
Case Study: CEO optimism and overconfidence 
 
83 
 
The psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979) build on Allais’ findings and develop 
an alternative model to expected utility theory: prospect theory. They show that people make 
choices among risky prospects that violate the basic principles of utility theory. The certainty 
effect, e.g., says that people tend to overweight certain outcomes with lower expected utility 
relative to uncertain or risky outcomes with higher expected utility, equivalent to risk aversion. 
However, if the probability of winning is minuscule, most people choose the option that 
provides the larger possible gain. Preferences among negative prospects mirror the preferences 
among positive prospects. People prefer uncertain negative outcomes, that is the risk of loss, 
rather than certain negative outcomes, meaning a sure loss. This observed risk seeking behavior 
is named reflection effect. Weinstein (1980), also from the field of psychology, provides support 
for the existence of an optimistic bias regarding future life events. People show a tendency to 
believe that the own prospects to experience positive events are better than the prospects of 
their peers. Vice versa they tend to believe that they are less likely to experience negative events. 
This assessment is further enhanced given high commitment and a controllable situation as they 
estimate their individual skills and competencies to be better than average. 
Corporate finance focuses on the interaction of managers and investors. Its objective is 
to explain the financial contracts and the investment behavior that result from this interaction 
(Baker, Ruback & Wurgler, 2004). Understanding both parties’ beliefs and preferences is a 
crucial prerequisite for the analysis of patterns (Baker et al., 2004). Traditional capital market 
theory, as for instance Markowitz’ (1952) portfolio theory and the majority of corporate finance 
research assumes rational behavior of market participants. 
Behavioral corporate finance research replaces the traditionally presumed rationality 
with possibly more realistic behavioral assumptions. The relevant literature is divided into two 
approaches. The first approach assumes that investors behave less than fully rational, the second 
approach is based on the assumption that managers behave less than fully rational (Baker et al., 
2004). With regard to the first approach that assumes imperfection of securities market 
arbitrage and concentrates on irrational investors (coexisting with rational managers), the 
literature is very large (Baker et al., 2004). Research deals, among others topics, with the 
phenomena of optimism and overconfidence, which are of particular relevance for the present 
study. Investors’ overconfidence and the effect on trading volumes, trading behavior and 
investment policy has been investigated to a noticeable degree (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2001; 
Kent, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 2001; Kent, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Odean, 
1998; Statman, Thorley & Vorkink, 2006). An interesting finding for the present paper is that 
most people tend to claim the full credit for their own successes, which leads to overconfidence 
(Gervais & Odean, 2001). Overconfidence is dynamic and changes with successes and failures. 
Overconfidence should hence diminish with greater experience.  
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The second approach, in contrast, focuses on irrational managers operating in efficient 
markets. Irrational behavior is understood as deviating from rational expectations and 
presumed utility maximization on the part of the manager and is clearly distinguished from 
moral hazard behavior such as empire building (Baker et al., 2004). Instead, the manager 
himself believes that he actually pursues to goal of maximizing firm value successfully but in 
fact departs from his objective (Baker et al., 2004). In this context, the emphasis of literature is 
on the influence of optimism and overconfidence on corporate managers’ behavior.  
 
4.2.2 Managerial (CEO) optimism and overconfidence 
The fact that individuals are usually (too) optimistic and overconfident has been often 
empirically confirmed (e.g. Weinstein, 1980). Optimism means that they overestimate the 
probability of outcomes favorable to themselves and overconfidence describes the tendency to 
overestimate one’s own capabilities (Gervais, Heaton & Odean, 2002). This is also known as 
the “better-than-average” effect. From the shareholders’ perspective, it is of vital importance 
whether managerial optimism and overconfidence are beneficial or detrimental to firm value. 
While moderate managerial optimism and overconfidence can in fact increase firm value as 
managers’ greater willingness to take risks corresponds more closely to that of shareholders’ 
(Gervais et al., 2002). Moreover, it is argued that overconfidence offers potential benefits such 
as encouraging entrepreneurship or attracting employees with similar beliefs by providing a 
strong vision (Malmendier & Tate, 2008)5. Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2007) extend their 
analysis of the impact of overconfident CEOs on corporate financial policies by additionally 
focusing on managerial beliefs and personal experiences. However, extreme forms of optimism 
and overconfidence have detrimental effects on the value of the firm (Gervais et al., 2002), 
which will be discussed in following subsections. 
 
4.2.3 Sources of CEO overconfidence 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) identify four main sources for CEO overconfidence. First, 
evidence suggests that firm performance is attributed to the organization’s CEO. Not only will 
the CEO himself likely claim full credit for good firm performance (Gervais & Odean, 2001) but 
it will also be credited to him externally. Recent organizational successes will encourage CEO 
overconfidence and inter-organizational prestige (D’Aveni, 1990; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; 
Meindl, Ehrlich & Dukerich, 1985). Interestingly, this holds true even when the successes could 
more objectively be attributed to other reasons. At the same time, poor performance is also 
                                                          
5 See Bernardo and Welch (2001) and Van den Steen (2005). 
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attributed to the CEO, thus adversely affecting CEO’s power and confidence (Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997). Second, favorable attributions are also made by the media. Media praise will 
further foster CEO overconfidence (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2009; 
Meindl et.al, 1985). A third source is the CEO’s self-importance. The “better-than-average” 
effect is particularly pronounced, the evaluation of his or her own abilities distorted (Hayward 
& Hambrick, 1997). The fourth factor is weak board vigilance. This can be assumed, for 
instance, when duality of chairman and CEO position is given or the proportion of insiders on 
the board is high (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 
 
4.2.4 Potential effects on acquisition activity 
The concept of managerial overconfidence was initially introduced by Roll (1986) and for a 
long period of time stated as a reason for failed mergers. Takeovers in Roll’s view reflect 
individual decisions. He finds that acquiring firms on average pay too high a price for their 
target. At least part of the paid premiums could be caused by valuation errors and hubris. The 
bidder, being too optimistic about potential synergies, may justify the premium to himself by 
attributing a higher value to the combined firm. Roll termed this phenomenon the “hubris 
hypothesis of corporate takeovers”6. The hypothesis predicts that managerial hubris will lead to 
heightened acquisitiveness with zero increase in value for both bidder and target as the target’s 
rising share price is compensated by the bidder’s falling share price. 
Empirical evidence indicates that gender appears to be a relevant factor when discussing 
overconfidence (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2011; Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Levi, Li & Zhang, 2014). 
Huang and Kisgen (2013), for instance, examine corporate financial and investment decisions. 
Their evidence suggests that male executives exhibit relative overconfidence compared with 
female executives. Men undertake more acquisitions and issue debt more often than women. 
Moreover, announcement returns to acquisitions and debt issues made by firms with male 
executives are lower than to those made by firms with female executives. The findings of Levi 
et al. (2014) suggest that female directors, being less overconfident, less overestimate merger 
gains. As a consequence, companies with female directors are less likely to make acquisitions. 
In case these firms acquire, they pay lower bid premia (Levi et al., 2014).  
Moreover, the size of bid premia are highly associated with the four indicators of CEO 
overconfidence, namely the recent performance of the acquiring company, recent media praise 
for the CEO, a measure of the CEO's self-importance, and the combination of these three factors 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Poor monitoring through the board of directors further 
                                                          
6 Forbes (2009) provides a deeper insight into the field with his case study “Hubris at Work: The AOL-Time Warner 
Merger”. 
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strengthens the relationship between CEO hubris and paid bid premia, particularly when the 
proportion of inside directors is high (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) further find that the probability for conducting an 
acquisition is 65 percent higher for CEO’s classified as overconfident, confirming Roll’s (1986) 
findings. In case the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing, the effect is 
even stronger. Interestingly, not only CEO overconfidence but also CEO dominance is important 
in explaining the decision to acquire another firm. CEO dominance appears to be at least as 
significant as overconfidence (Brown & Sarma, 2007). 
There are other drivers that further promote acquisitiveness. Harford (1999) reports 
that firms with abundant internal resources show a greater willingness to attempt acquisitions 
than other firms, they are more inclined to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are 
rather unattractive to other potential bidders. Harford (1999) finds abnormal declines in 
operating performance subsequent to mergers in which a cash-rich firm is involved. 
Moreover, there are strong incentives for managers to grow the firm beyond the optimal 
size. By increasing resources and means under their control, growth enhances managers’ power 
(Jensen, 1986). Following Baker et al. (2004), I distinguish irrational managers’ behavior from 
moral hazard behavior. Nonetheless, both phenomena share common elements. An alternative 
explanatory model to overconfidence for managerial striving for growth can be so-called 
“empire-building” from the field of moral hazard behavior. The main common element is 
increased acquisitiveness at the expense of shareholders. Activities are particularly intense in 
both cases if internal cash reserves are high7. The substantial difference is that “empire-builders” 
act primarily to the personal benefit regarding power, wealth and status, which is likely to the 
detriment of shareholders whereas overconfident CEOs believe that they act in the interest of 
shareholders.  
Working in committees, managers are even more prone to escalate their commitment to 
projects although outcomes have become uncertain (Shefrin, 2001). Behavioral obstacles 
external to the firm are psychologically induced errors of investors and analysts; they also may 
behave irrationally and push managers for takeovers that promise to build earnings but destroy 
economic value (Shefrin, 2001). Investors and analysts may place considerable pressure on 
managers. 
 
                                                          
7 See also Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Jensen (1986). 
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4.2.5 Potential effects on investment policy  
Heaton (2002) characterizes managers as optimistic when they systematically overrate the 
probability of a positive performance of their firm while underrating the probability of negative 
firm performance. Heaton (2002) discusses managerial optimism in relation to free cash flow 
available to the firm and explains two offsetting biases. Firstly, optimistic managers prefer 
internal financing. They believe that capital markets undervalue their risky securities. In case 
they depend on external financing, optimistic managers may thus miss projects even with a 
positive net present value (NPV). Second, they overvalue their own corporate projects as well 
as their own ability to manage these projects. Optimistic managers believe that the expected 
projects’ NPVs are higher than realistic assumptions predict them to be. They are prone to invest 
in projects with a negative NPV (Heaton, 2002). Thus, managerial optimism predicts biased 
cash flow estimates8 and also a pecking order capital structure decision.  
Furthermore, firms with overconfident Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) use lower 
discount rates to value cash flows (Ben David, Graham & Harvey, 2007). They invest more and 
use more debt. The probability that these firms pay dividends is lower, whereas the probability 
that they repurchase shares is higher. They tend to use proportionally more long-term than 
short-term debt (Ben David et al., 2007).  
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that overconfident CEOs have a heightened sensitivity 
of corporate investment to cash flow, especially among equity-dependent firms. As 
overconfident executives overestimate the returns to their investment projects and show bias 
against external financing, they tend to overinvest when having ample internal resources but 
refrain from investing when having to rely on external funds. Thus, overconfidence can indeed 
account for distortions in corporate investment. 
However, overconfident managers are open to investing their own assets into their 
company. Malmendier and Tate (2005) even argue that CEOs’ personal overinvestment in their 
own companies results only from overconfidence. 
 
4.2.6 Potential effects on risk preferences  
March and Shapira (1987) show that in contradiction with classical decision theory, managers 
generally are unlikely to decide on risk and risk taking on the basis of carefully calculated 
probabilities of possible outcomes. The executives use few key values rather than thorough 
probability calculations to assess and express their risk exposure. Furthermore, they view risk 
                                                          
8 Statman and Tyejbee (1985) find that decision-makers in firms who evaluate forecasts consider those to be 
optimistically biased and that they adjust the figures accordingly.  
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as crucial to success in decision making and risk taking as substantial part of the managerial 
role. Consistent with this view, risk is perceived to be manageable and controllable. 
Contrary to the negative impact of managerial overconfidence and optimism on 
investment policy, cash flow estimates and capital structure decisions, Gervais et al. (2002) 
identify a positive role of managerial overconfidence and optimism. They compare rational, 
rather cautious managers with overconfident, optimistic managers. According to their findings, 
risk-averse, rational managers tend to postpone projects in order to analyze options carefully, 
often longer than in shareholders’ interest. By contrast, overconfident managers underestimate 
risks. Overconfident and also optimistic managers thus undertake projects quickly. The authors 
draw the conclusion that moderate overconfidence and optimism can increase the value of the 
firm as these managers act in the interest of shareholders more than rational managers do9.  
 
4.2.7 Methods for identification and measurement of CEO 
 overconfidence 
Scholars in prior research have applied various methodologies to identify and measure CEO 
overconfidence. One popular method is content analysis of press coverage relating to the person 
of interest. For instance, articles from renowned newspapers and magazines that relate to the 
respective person are rated according to their overall tone, that is positive or negative (Hayward 
& Hambrick, 1997). Another possibility is to count words that indicate the presence of optimism 
and confidence and words with opposite meaning, respectively (Malmendier et al., 2007). The 
number of articles that portray the respective CEO as overconfident is then compared with the 
number of articles indicating opposite characteristics.  
An alternative method is the survey-based approach. A direct survey of top executives 
allows for application of psychometric personality tests and thus insight into their underlying 
psychological traits and attitudes (Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013).  
Previous research considers factors that foster CEO overconfidence and thus enhance 
the probability of its occurrence. These are for instance prior positive firm performance and a 
high CEO’s pay relative to other executives’ pay (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Another factor 
considered is the moment of exercise of options with the firm’s shares as underlying held by the 
CEO. These options are often part of the CEO’s pay package. The CEO will be characterized as 
overconfident if he or she exercises his or her (not tradeable) options lately, because he expects 
a further increase of the share price (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). The narrowness of earnings 
                                                          
9 Confirming results are reported by Gervais, Heaton & Odean (2007). 
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forecasts may also indicate CEO overconfidence: point estimates are more likely to be given 
than range estimates (e.g. Ben David et al., 2012). 
 
4.3 Background: The German Renewable Energies Sector 
 - a state-funded boom 
A detailed description of the German renewable energies sector’s development is of vital 
importance for the present case study. The German state stipulated demand for renewable 
energies, particularly for photovoltaics, and created a new, strongly growing market for related 
products and services. Companies active in this sector benefited enormously for several years, 
not so much because of exceptional performance of their management but simply because of 
the state-funded boom. However, top management teams of these companies may have claimed 
the full credit for the strong results during the boom years. Claiming successes as one’s personal 
accomplishment facilitates the emergence of overconfidence (Gervais & Odean, 2001). 
The German government had started promoting the expansion of renewable energies in 
Germany in 1990 by passing the law on the sale of electricity from renewable energy sources 
to the grid (“Stromeinspeisungsgesetz” or Electricity Feeding Act)10. Renewable energies at that 
time comprised the sources water power, wind power, solar insulation, biomass, landfill gas, 
mine gas and gas from purification plants. The large utilities in Germany had often refused or 
heavily hampered the feed-in of electricity generated from renewable energy sources by mainly 
small producers (except hydro-electric power). The law now obliged utilities to grant access to 
the grid to operators of renewable energy plants with a maximum capacity of five megawatts 
peak (MWp) and guaranteed a minimum remuneration for the electricity fed in, linked to 
average electricity prices. The utilities were allowed to pass these costs on to consumers via the 
electricity bill. Initially, operators of wind power plants were the main beneficiaries as the 
guaranteed compensation roughly covered production costs. By contrast, costs for electricity 
from solar technology, primarily photovoltaics, were many times higher in these early days. 
Originally designed as a wide-range test to assess the current “state of the art” for grid-
connected PV plants with small capacities and the need for further development (Hoffmann, 
2008), the former Ministry for Research and Technology introduced the joint federal and state 
government “1,000-roofs-program” in September 1990. The costly installation of a grid-
connected PV plant was encouraged by the government through subsidies of up to 70 percent. 
                                                          
10 The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy provides detailed information on legislation in this field on 
its information portal http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de. The development of the market for renewable 
energies in Germany over time is described e.g. in Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (2016). 
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While costs for generating electricity with a PV plant still amounted to 90 ct/kilowatthour 
(KWh) back in 1991, compensation for each KWh as defined by the Electricity Feeding Act was 
only 8.5 ct/KWh. At these prices, investors were far away from operating their photovoltaics 
plant on a break-even basis not to mention yielding any positive return. In order to achieve an 
economic benefit in addition to the indisputable environmental value, many plant owners used 
the generated electricity for their own domestic purposes instead of feeding it into the grid. 
However, in yield terms, the market for photovoltaics was clearly not an attractive option in the 
early nineties. 
The German government eventually recognized the opportunities offered by solar 
technology and alternative renewable energy sources. In 1999, it launched the successor 
program “100,000 roofs” for the promotion of photovoltaics and later embedded it in the 
Renewable Energies Act (“Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz/EEG”) aiming at supporting the 
expansion of the entire renewable energies sector. The “100,000-roofs-program” supported the 
installation of new PV plants by granting credits at reduced interest rates to private citizens, 
freelancers and small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The Electricity Feeding Act was replaced by the Renewable Energies Act on April 1, 
2000. The act’s purpose was “to facilitate a sustainable development of energy supply in the 
interest of managing global warming and protecting the environment and to achieve a 
substantial increase in the percentage contribution made by renewable energy sources to power 
supply in order at least to double the share of renewable energy sources in total energy 
consumption by 2010, in keeping with the objectives defined by the European Union and by 
the Federal Republic of Germany” (Renewable Energies Act, 2000, Section 1). The law 
regulated the purchase of and remuneration for electricity generated exclusively from 
renewable energy sources by utility companies that operate grids for public power supply. 
Geothermal energy was additionally incorporated in the group of promoted renewable energies. 
Grid operators were obliged to connect renewable energy systems to their grid and to purchase 
the generated electricity as a priority at fixed prices for a period of 20 years after grid 
connection. Prices varied substantially according to the differing electricity production costs 
and also depended on the individual system size (Renewable Energies Act, 2000, Section 4 to 
8). Except for water and gas, the act provided for a varying yearly degression of minimum 
remuneration with the objective to encourage a reduction of electricity production costs and an 
increase in efficiency over time11. The yearly degression was one percent for power from 
                                                          
11 Frondel et al. (2010) argue that despite massive expenditures for the subsidy programs, German renewable energy 
policy has failed to develop a sustainable and competitive economic sector and also to encourage cost reduction and 
increases in efficiency on the part of industry.  
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biomass and one and a half percent for wind power. The stipulated degression for photovoltaics 
was five percent, being effective going forward as of January 1 each year.  
The 100,000-roofs-program ran out end of 2003, after the targeted 300 megawatts 
(MW) mark for newly installed PV power had been reached (Federal Environment Ministry, 
2003, June 23). The government had fixed the upper limit for the promotion of PV plants at a 
total of 350 MWp. Adding the 50 MWp installed power of the ‘pioneer plants, this limit was 
reached and promotion was due to expire at the end of the year. The amendment of the 
Renewable Energies Act was delayed and expected during the course of the year 2004. In order 
to prevent a slump in the photovoltaics market, the revised regulations for the promotion of 
solar power were brought forward to December 2003 (Federal Environment Ministry, 2003, 
Dec. 30). The Photovoltaic Interim Act (“Photovoltaik-Vorschaltgesetz”) maintained the highly 
attractive subsidization rates for photovoltaics. The government continued to award low-
interest loans for the installation of PV systems. Furthermore, continuous support was to be 
provided for research and development (total funding in 2003: EUR 27 million, Federal 
Environment Ministry, 2003, Dec. 30). The complete Renewable Energies Act was amended as 
planned in mid-2004. 
The second amendment of the Renewable Energies Act was adopted in June 2008 and 
became effective in January 2009. While the promotion of renewable energies was continued 
in principal, a multitude of specifications and rules was added. Heat generation in addition to 
power generation was also incorporated into the law. The return on investment for a newly 
installed PV system was unalterably guaranteed for a period of 20 years. Hence, investing in a 
PV system was comparably attractive as investing in federal bonds. The government had created 
the basis for - although artificial - steady demand for power from solar insulation and other 
renewable energy sources. It can be stated that the Renewable Energies Act has decisively 
supported and fostered the power generation through renewable energies in Germany 
(Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Peters, Schmidt, Wiederkehr & Schneider, 2011). With respect to 
photovoltaics, the act even triggered an unprecedented boom during the years 2004 to 201112 
due to highly favorable subsidies. The following figure 4.1 shows the development of 
photovoltaics installations in Germany over sixteen years.  
  
                                                          
12 Jacobsson & Lauber (2006) explore the German diffusion of renewable energy technology and in particular the 
reasons for the rapid spread of solar cell technology until 2004. 
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Figure 4.1: Market data photovoltaics in Germany 2015 
 
Source: Federal Solar Industry Association - Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft (BSW), 2016 
However, effective 2009, the regulatory framework for photovoltaics was supplemented by the 
option of adjusting the following year’s degression rate according to the actual number of new 
installations in the current year. The reasons for this regulation of market size lie in the growing 
criticism of PV subsidies in Germany13 as well as significant decreases in PV system prizes due 
to dropped production costs while the number of installations grew considerably, burdening all 
German end customers via their electricity bill. 2009 was the year of first drastic changes to the 
incentive program. It marked the beginning of the industry’s downturn. 
The photovoltaics boom ended in 2010/2011. Competition had become fierce after 
Asian – mainly Chinese - producers had entered international markets with aggressive pricing. 
Prices for solar modules and primary products were significantly below those of German as well 
as other European or US producers and thus soon found a strong demand. As a consequence, 
PV system prices fell quickly and steeply; given unchanged feed-in tariffs, investors’ internal 
rates of return (IRR) increased inversely proportional. To counteract this development, the 
German government decided to lower the feed-in tariffs drastically within a very short time in 
order to adjust for the deterioration in prices. Moreover, the upcoming coalition between the 
parties CDU/CSU and FDP promoted the idea of extending the life of German nuclear power 
plants. The new amendment of the Renewable Energies Act, passed in 2011 and effective in 
2012, was clearly to the detriment of German producers as it increased price pressure still 
further. Moreover, Germany had been the largest PV market worldwide up to that time. Thus, 
most of the German established players – amongst them former top stocks such as Q-Cells or 
                                                          
13 For a critical perspective, see Frondel, Ritter & Schmidt (2008). 
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Centrotherm - were displaced from the market and eventually experienced insolvency14. The 
German photovoltaics industry collapsed during 2012, with only very few players remaining, 
amongst them SMA Solar Technology or Solarworld. Similarly, CONERGY had once profited 
considerably from the boom in the photovoltaics sector. Its share price had risen up to EUR 
173.41 with a target price of EUR 250, on May 15, 2006, being a top pick – albeit labelled “high 
risk) (Citigroup Equity Research, 2006, May 15). After a 1:3 stock split in June 2006, the stock 
price stood at EUR 45.70 at the end of 2006 (Dec. 15). However, the share price plummeted 
more than 80 percent within 18 months as a result of the company’s crisis. It did not move out 
of the penny-stock range for several years until it filed for insolvency in July 2013. 
Comparing CONERGY’s share price with the benchmark indices DAX subsector 
Renewable Energy – consisting of numerous solar companies at that time - and the TecDAX - 
formerly also named the “SolarDAX” - over time, however, it becomes apparent that CONERGY’s 
crisis emerged one year before the start of the industry’s downturn. CONERGY started to 
stumble at a time when the vast majority of solar companies was at its height. 
I argue that CONERGY’s failure is hence not to be causally attributed to the overall 
negative development in the renewable energy sector but rather to serious failures on the part 
of the management. Managerial over-optimism and overconfidence might partly explain the 
Group’s rapid rise as well as its sharp fall. Since overconfidence is dynamic, it is likely that 
overconfidence further increased along with the company’s success, enabled through the state-
funded industry boom. Moreover, the supervisory board with Dieter Ammer as its Chairman 
failed in its duty to monitor and control the CEO’s actions. Ammer was Rueter’s uncle and also 
co-founder of Conergy AG. It appears that it lacked the necessary distance and that Ammer 
violated his duty of due care and diligence. 
  
                                                          
14 Insolvencies of German solar technology companies: 12/2011: Solon, Solar Millennium; 02/2012: Ralos, Sun 
Concept; 03/2012: Odersun, Solar Hybrid, Scheuten Solar (German subsidiaries);  04/2012: Q-Cells, 05/2012: 
Sovello, Inventux, scn energy, Pairan; 06/2012: Solarwatt; 07/2012: Centrotherm, Global Solar Energy Deutschland 
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4.4 Data and methodology 
The sample of the present case study consists of only one CEO and one company and is thus 
not representative. Methods for measuring overconfidence designed for large samples are 
inappropriate in a case study. Hence, I concentrate on content analyses of a wide range of 
documents. I focus on the investigation period January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2007. 2002 
marks the beginning of the impressive rise of CONERGY AG, whereas 2006 and 2007 were the 
years of its steep fall. Moreover, Rueter resigned from his post as CEO in November 2007. 
I examine press coverage on CONERGY following Malmendier et al. (2007) to evaluate 
if CEO Rueter is portrayed as being optimistic and confident by the media. I use the Lexis-Nexis 
database to search for newspaper articles in German and English language published between 
2002 and 2007. I use the same search terms as Malmendier et al. (2007), which are “confident” 
or “confidence,” “optimistic” or “optimism,” (while checking for the negated forms of 
“confident” and “optimistic”) as well as “reliable,” “cautious,” “conservative,” “practical,” 
“frugal,” or “steady.” The equivalent terms in German language are “überzeugt”, 
“selbstbewusst”, “Selbstbewusstsein” and “optimistisch”, „Optimismus“ and the negated forms 
„nicht selbstbewusst“, „nicht überzeugt”, “nicht optimistisch”. Words with the opposite meaning 
can be translated as „verlässlich“, „vorsichtig, „konservativ“, “pragmatisch”, “bescheiden” or 
“beständig”. 
In order to capture capital market perception of Rueter as a person but also of his 
strategic decisions and his behavior, I analyze analyst reports, complemented by informal 
background discussions with research analysts. I also examine CONERGY’s various publicly 
available company documents such as annual reports, ad-hoc announcements, corporate news 
and presentations for investors and analysts in order to trace the firm’s development under the 
leadership of Rueter and to search for further indicators of optimistic bias and overconfidence. 
I elucidate what additional external factors accelerated the firm’s decline. Furthermore, I 
analyze statements made by Rueter in company documents and in interviews to record his self-
image.  
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Portray of CEO Rueter in press coverage 
Ten articles in total could be identified that use search terms that indicate the presence of 
optimism or confidence in direct relation with the person Hans-Martin Rueter within the 
relevant period of time. “Optimism” or “optimistic” is used six times, “confident” or “confidence” 
seven times. There was not one single article that associated a search word of the opposite 
group with Hans-Martin Rueter. Hence, following Malmendier et al. (2007), we can classify 
Hans-Martin Rueter as optimistic and confident. 
There are further indicators that Rueter was not only optimistic and confident but also 
possessed charisma. Analysts attest a winning and charming character to Rueter. They 
perceived him as being markedly approachable, credible and trustworthy15. Rueter generally 
appeared optimistic and possessed great persuasiveness, in particular when presenting the ‘big 
picture’: market and strategy, successes achieved and growth prospects. It is said that he was 
always able to electrify people (Schwarzer, 2010, April 7). His demeanor was described as fresh 
and dynamic, radiating energy and confidence (BG, 2005, Dec. 31). 
 
4.5.2 Rapid growth and quick successes in early years  
Hans-Martin Rueter and Dieter Ammer had founded CONERGY in December 1998, shortly 
before the German government gave the renewable energies sector the decisive thrust forward. 
The founders initially focused the company on solar technology, particularly photovoltaics; an 
obvious decision considering Rueter’s education and career history. Rueter, graduated with a 
Master’s Degree in mechanical engineering, had been working on solar cells for satellites 
already during his studies at the University of Munich. Since the 1950s, solar cells had been 
used in space exploration for the power supply of satellites and space probes as their lifetime 
by far exceeded that of chemical batteries. In 1993, he began his career as a consultant. Only 
three years later, Rueter entered the field of photovoltaics by founding his first business 
SunTechnics GmbH, providing design and installation services for photovoltaic power plants. 
At that time, Rueter gained hands-on experience in planning and mounting PV systems. 
SunTechnics was merged with CONERGY upon its foundation. Rueter was to head CONERGY 
from 1998 until the end of 2007. 
The economist Dieter Ammer had started his career in 1976 as auditor and tax accountant with 
Arthur Andersen & Co. and became Head of the Hamburg branch office in 1988. In 1992, 
                                                          
15 Personal conversations with analysts. 
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Ammer moved to the Board of Management of Zucker AG Uelzen-Braunschweig and was soon 
promoted to CEO. He also acted as Speaker for Nordzucker AG from 1993 to 1997. Ammer 
changed to Beck & Co. brewery in Bremen in 1997 and became its Commercial Director. Ammer 
acted as Chairman of CONERGY’s supervisory board from the company’s foundation until 2007. 
The relationship between the CEO and the supervisory board was insofar special as Ammer was 
Rueter’s uncle. Andreas Rueter, brother of CEO Hans-Martin Rueter, served as member of the 
supervisory board several years until January 2009.  
In its start-up phase, CONERGY obtained financing from the private equity (PE) 
companies 5r Private Equity KG and Grazia Equity GmbH. Both PE companies had been initially 
founded by so-called business angel and venture capital investor Alec Rauschenbusch in 1998 
respectively 2000. Rauschenbusch studied aerospace engineering at the University of Munich 
at about the same time as Rueter and holds a MBA degree from Harvard Business School. It can 
be assumed that Rauschenbusch did not only possess the necessary resources but furthermore 
the technical and financial knowledge to recognize and assess the great potential of solar 
technology. CONERGY was clearly in the position to fully profit from the benefits of the 
improved promotional conditions for renewable energies and particularly for solar power. 
CONERGY started as project developer for PV installations and wholesaler for solar 
technology without an own production. CONERGY’s corporate vision was to become the leading 
systems provider for renewable systems of energy by offering every energy consumer worldwide 
the best solution appropriate to his needs (CONERGY AG, 2005, p. 53). The strategy aimed at 
enhancing the Group’s flexibility by proactively establishing several pillars in the market in 
order to allow for compensation of fluctuations in regional demand. CEO Rueter pursued this 
“ambitious yet thoroughly realistic vision” (CONERGY AG, 2005, p. 5) through entering new 
regions by both establishing new subsidiaries and acquiring companies as well as diversifying 
the company’s product range. 
“This will help to expand access to customers internationally and supplement the  
 product range of the CONERGY Group through additional complementary technologies. 
 Through the consistent increase in its market share and its growth into the worldwide 
 leadings supplier for renewable energy sources, the CONERGY Group expects synergies, 
 e.g. in production, purchasing and distribution, which will be used for a significant 
 increase in profitability” (CONERGY AG, 2005, p. 53). 
In line with the booming solar sector, CONERGY indeed achieved an impressive growth in its 
first decade after being founded in 1998. Revenues jumped from approximately EUR 1 million 
in 1999 to more than EUR 70 million in 2002. From 2002 to 2005, the year of the company’s 
IPO, revenues grew at a CAGR of 94 percent. For the period 2002 to 2007, CAGR for Group 
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revenues still was 58 percent. The following table 4.1 presents CONERGY AG’s key financial 
figures from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2007. 
Table 4.1: CONERGY AG key financial figures for FY 2002 to FY 200716 
COMPANY 
FINANCIALS  
(in EUR million) 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2002 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2003 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2004 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2005 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2006 
(restated) 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2007 
(restated)  
Total sales 
           
73.20    
         
122.38    
             
284.83    
          
530.17            682.33            719.00    
Gross margin 17.62% 35.05% 15.06% 16.13% 15.82% 14.03% 
EBITDA 0.05 
             
2.08    
               
20.94    
            
50.30                6.73    -163.20    
EBITDA margin 0.07% 1.70% 7.34% 9.49% 0.99% -22.70% 
EBIT - 0.74    
             
0.90    
               
19.20    
            
47.43                2.19    - 213.30    
EBIT margin (ROS) -0.96% 0.74% 6.74% 8.95% 0.32% -29.67% 
Net profit/loss -1.00 
             
0.40    11.00 27.80 -0.64 -213.00 
Earnings per share -0.12 0.05 1.40 0.98 -0.01 -6.5 
Equity Ratio 16%  28% 26% 44% 22% 12% 
 
Company growth was driven crucially by CEO Martin Rueter’s aggressive expansion strategy, 
pursued through the establishment of a large number of subsidiaries throughout the globe as 
well as through numerous acquisitions.  
While the CONERGY Group had twelve national and nine international subsidiaries on 
January 1, 2003, it had expanded by a multiple at the end of 2007, now counting 27 national 
and 56 international subsidiaries. The CAGR from 2002 to 2007 for total staff was 72 percent 
and for international staff nearly threefold with 216 percent. As expected, international sales 
made a significant contribution to total sales from 2006 onwards and exceeded national sales 
by far after 2008. 
Unfortunately, the expansion activities did not contribute to earnings to the same extent. 
Profitability, expressed through the EBIT-margin or return-on-sales (ROS) figure, developed in 
the opposite direction and remained in the red from 2006 onwards. The overly rapid expansion, 
organically and by acquisitions, was not only extremely costly but also increased complexity 
within the Group to an extent which posed a threat to the existence of the Group.  
 
                                                          
16 All financial statement data on CONERGY AG are taken from the annual reports of CONERGY AG as published 
on the company’s website, http://www.CONERGY-group.com/investor-relations.aspx 
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4.5.3 Heightened acquisitiveness and excessive expansion 
Rueter used SunTechnics’ business model, the design and installation of photovoltaic systems, 
as basis for CONERGY. Having secured the necessary liquidity, Rueter started to build up the 
company substantially by acquisitions rather than expanding solely organically, thus enabling 
rapid growth and diversification according to the corporate vision. Already in the first year of 
CONERGY’s existence, Rueter conducted two takeovers and acquired a manufacturer of solar 
installation equipment as well as a wholesaler for solar technology, Alternative-Energie-Technik 
GmbH (AET), both based in Germany. With its voltwerk AG joint venture, CONERGY also 
tapped into the market for project development of professional closed solar investment funds. 
In addition, the young company expanded to Austria. After only twelve months of business 
activity, annual sales in 1999 exceeded EUR 1.0 million. In 2000, CONERGY converted from a 
limited liability company into a stock corporation. This marked a first step towards future access 
to the capital markets. Founder Hans-Martin Rueter became CEO and decided on two further 
acquisitions. The technology portfolio was expanded horizontally by acquiring a German 
manufacturer of rainwater usage systems. The process of internationalization was driven 
forward by purchasing a Spanish solar wholesaler in Madrid, later continued under the brand 
name AET. 
The chosen ambitious way to grow the company can be considered as an indicator for 
Rueter’s optimism and confidence in his capability to successfully position CONERGY as a 
leading player in the dynamically growing renewable energy industry. It cannot be ruled out  
that - based on his education and his practical professional experience with SunTechnics - 
Rueter overrated the probability to experience positive events and overestimated his individual 
skills and managerial competencies. In this case, an optimistic bias as reported by Weinstein 
(1980) could be assumed. Being CONERGY’s founder and CEO, Rueter was certainly highly 
committed to the company’s development and in control of the process, two factors, which -
according to Weinstein - further strengthen the optimistic assessment of the own prospects. 
Moreover, heightened acquisitiveness may be indicative of managerial overconfidence 
(Harford, 1999; Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986). 
The company extended its business into the sector for wind power in 2001. Again, this 
was achieved by an acquisition; the wind power project development company Windcom was 
integrated into voltwerk AG. At the same time, the start of in-house development of electronic 
components for photovoltaics aimed at vertical expansion within the solar sector. Voltwerk’s 
pioneer project in the investment-driven megawatt-class in Markstetten, Bavaria, was connected 
to the public grid. With a maximum output of 1.6 megawatt peak (MWp), it was also Germany’s 
largest solar park to date. After the takeover of Swiss solar project developer Fabrisolar in 2002, 
Case Study: CEO optimism and overconfidence 
 
99 
 
CONERGY covered all three German-speaking countries. Two more solar power plants were 
connected to the grid in the same year, one of them the worldwide largest to date having a 
capacity of 4 MWp. The CONERGY Group achieved annual sales of more than EUR 70 million 
with less than 200 employees worldwide and reported an operating profit for the first time.  
Growth remained moderate in 2003 in accordance with the sector’s still subdued 
development. However, the industry’s prospects were excellent. Expansion was primarily 
pushed forward in the field of solar technology; the business field rainwater usage systems was 
sold off. A production facility for solar energy collectors was opened in Southern Germany. The 
solar product portfolio was further extended by web-based and mobile measuring, 
documentation and monitoring systems for photovoltaic systems. The solar product line was 
now distributed under the CONERGY brand using sanitary and specialist wholesalers as 
channels. Furthermore, CONERGY established a central technical and customer support center 
as well as a central logistic centre for the full solar product line. CONERGY again tapped a new 
market by the acquisition of a systems integrator for solar power plants in France. At the end 
of 2003, the Group had twelve national and nine international subsidiaries and employed a 
staff of 194. Sales reached EUR 122.4 million, EBIT was positive. CEO Rueter was afforded 
respect for his accomplishments. He was elected President of the Association of Undertakings 
in the Solar Industry (Unternehmensvereinigung Solarwirtschaft e.V.) and also received the 
Leadership Award “for outstanding management personalities” (CONERGY AG, 2003, 
November 7) of the Economic Forum Germany. These external recognitions of his successes 
and achievements adding up to his own assessment of successes in recent years may have 
possibly promoted the development of overconfidence (Gervais & Odean, 2001; Malmendier & 
Tate, 2009)17, even though Rueter made it sound modest: 
“This award is the second best in my professional career. However, we receive the best award 
 every day from our clients. Their trust is confirmation and motivation for the passion that  
 my employees and I go to work with” (CONERGY AG, 2003, November 7). 
Customer orientation being the core of CONERGY’s strategy determined the business model’s 
structure, which was focused on solar even though the company had cautiously started to 
expand to adjacent technologies. Four distinct brand worlds were created, according to its own 
accounts in order to satisfy the specific demands of four different target groups (CONERGY AG, 
2005, p. 53). Rueter saw a decisive competitive advantage in this orientation of all distribution 
channels to the specific needs of different targets groups (CONERGY AG 2005, p. 4). From the 
customers’ and business partners’ perspective, however, it is likely that the segmentation diluted 
                                                          
17 See also Malmendier & Tate’s (2009) evaluation “Superstar CEOs” on the (negative) impact of CEOs achieving 
superstar status on the performance of their firms. 
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the profile of the company as it increasingly appeared as a confusing conglomerate. The brand 
CONERGY in the business segment ‘Development, Manufacturing, Sales & Central Services 
(DMS&CS)’ represented an original equipment manufacturer. CONERGY products were 
distributed indirectly via sanitary, heating and electrical wholesalers. These distribution 
channels meant the target groups. The brand AET belonged to the Group’s business segment 
‘Wholesale’. AET was positioned as a leading, manufacturer-independent pan-European 
wholesaler with the target group installers, resellers and sales organizations. CONERGY, being 
a distribution partner for wholesalers but a competitor under the AET brand at the same time, 
possibly meant a trade-off and an obstruction for the Group. It is highly probable that 
wholesalers were reluctant to foster their competitor’s business success through high-volume 
sales in the DMS&CS segment. SunTechnics, the third brand in the ‘Engineering’ segment, 
focused on private and commercial end customers. Engineering and installation represented 
the main services of the solar systems integrator. Finally, voltwerk in the business segment 
‘Projects’ had been designed to attract investment from private and institutional investors for 
closed funds for renewable energies (CONERGY AG, 2005, p. 16f). Voltwerk was renamed 
Epuron GmbH as at January 1, 2007, a brand name better suited for international use. The 
company Epuron for project and development and structured financing developed, financed, 
realized and operates photovoltaic and wind parks (CONERGY AG, 2007, p. 44).  
The following figure 4.2 displays the development of the CONERGY Group’s sales 
between 2002 and 2010. Growth accelerated considerably in 2004. On the basis of reinforced 
government support, newly installed PV capacity in Germany quadrupled from 147 MWp in 
2003 to 660 MW within 2004 (Federal Solar Industry Association, 2016). In line with the 
sector’s suddenly very dynamic development, CONERGY’s sales more than doubled to EUR 284 
million and EBIT jumped up from EUR 1 million to EUR 19 million, leading to a for the first 
time solid net profit of EUR 11 million. The number of employees nearly doubled to 350. M&A 
activities remained at a low level; voltwerk AG became a wholly-owned subsidiary of CONERGY 
and a Greek solar systems integrator was added to the AET subgroup through an acquisition. 
CONERGY emphasized its position as full service supplier for solar electricity and heating and 
promoted its ‘all-inclusive’ package.  
  
Case Study: CEO optimism and overconfidence 
 
101 
 
Figure 4.2: Sales development CONERGY Group 
 
Source: CONERGY AG Annual Reports 2002 - 2010 
 
CONERGY stated in its annual report 2004 that it pursued a strategy that was “unequivocally 
focused on the customer” and aimed at offering “every consumer worldwide the most suitable 
technologies in those markets where renewable energy is an attractive option” (CONERGY AG, 
2005, p. 16). While the focus had remained primarily on solar technology and on expanding to 
promising markets for solar energy throughout the globe so far, CONERGY now intensified its 
horizontal diversification via expansion of its renewable energy technologies portfolio. 
According to its own statements, CONERGY’s broadly-based line-up aimed at identifying 
demand trends and new markets at an early stage to enable the development of suitable 
products and services: 
 “The aim is to firmly establish our evolution into the leading systems provider for  
 renewables on additional levels as well. Diversification and internationalization will  
 shape the company’s orientation in the future, allowing us to remain independent of  
 developments in specific segments or the prevailing climate in individual markets”  
 (CONERGY AG, 2005, p. 17). 
However, reaching new technologies by own means usually means a long-term process with 
uncertain outcomes. CEO Rueter decided that horizontal diversification should be achieved 
through focused acquisitions of companies with expertise in complementary technologies in 
Germany and worldwide (CONERGY AG, 2005). 
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4.5.4 Abundant internal resources 
Rueter was in need of additional funds in order to finance his ambitious growth and 
diversification strategy. From a behavioral finance perspective, CEO Rueter, clearly being a 
optimistic manager, should have preferred internal financing rather than accessing capital 
markets (Harford, 1999; Heaton, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). However, albeit the past 
successful years, CONERGY’s capital cover was too thin and left Rueter little choice. In 2005, 
Rueter opened up new sources of funding by floating the company shares on the stock market. 
Timing was right given the bullish view of several research analysts on solar energy. Titled “the 
rise of a new power generation”, one report judged the political support to enable the industry 
to develop into a “self-sustaining multi-billion euro industry” (Citigroup Equity Research, 2005, 
June 3), Germany leading the field, followed by markets like Italy and Spain, China or the 
United States. The CAGR for the installation of new PV systems was estimated at 20-25 percent 
(Citigroup Equity Research, 2005, June 3) or 25-31 percent (Deutsche Bank Company Research, 
2005, April 27) until 2010 and valuated to be economically sustainable for ten up to 20 years. 
The key objective for the industry – becoming competitive and thereby independent of political 
support – was estimated to be achieved between 2010 and 2020. Analysts named as key risks 
the ongoing silicon supply shortage being the raw material for the major part of PV products, 
second the industry’s dependence on subsidies and therefore thirdly adverse changes in political 
support  (First Berlin Equity Research, 2005, April 6). With respect to CONERGY, leading 
analysts in 2005 expected the company to achieve a top-line compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 50 percent until 2007 (Deutsche Bank Company Research, 2005, April 27). 
The initial public offering (IPO) was an outstanding success. CONERGY listed its shares 
for trading on the Official Market at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange on March 17, 2005. Due to 
a monumental oversubscription by 29 times even at the upper-range issue price of EUR 54.0, 
CONERGY was unable to fully satisfy all allocation requests. The first trading price was EUR 
71.0, up 32 percent. The net issuing proceeds amounted to some EUR 100 million. As the 
company had no net debt at that time, CONERGY intended to invest the IPO proceeds for the 
continuation of its diversification and internationalization strategy, focused on the most 
remunerative international markets for solar power. This stated objective is in line with the 
findings of Harford (1999) as well as Malmendier and Tate (2005) stating that internal funds 
are likely to further stimulate acquisition activities showing that firms with abundant internal 
resources show a greater willingness to attempt acquisitions than other firms and they are more 
inclined to make diversifying acquisitions.  
Already three months after the IPO, the CONERGY share gained a fast entry listing in 
the TecDAX, the index for the 30 largest German technology issues, with a positive effect on 
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the awareness of investors and research analysts for CONERGY. Until the end of the year, the 
share price increased to EUR 80.90. In their initial assessments, analysts consistently made 
positive recommendations: CONERGY received a “strong buy” from First Berlin, a “buy” from 
Deutsche Bank or a “hold” from Citigroup (shortly after upgraded to “buy”). 
The CONERGY flotation in 2005 marked the beginning of a series of further IPOs of 
companies in the renewable energy industry and in particular in the solar industry: twelve solar 
companies entered the capital markets. Until 2011, a total of twenty solar companies had their 
shares listed at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The first stock-listed solar company had been 
Solon SE in 1999, followed by S.A.G. Solarstrom AG and Solarworld in the same year. The large 
companies were soon included in the TecDAX. When founded in 2003, not a single solar 
company had been present in the share index for the 30 largest German technology companies. 
The Solarworld share was the first to be included in 2004. Mid-2006, the TecDAX already 
contained five solar companies with CONERGY, Q-Cells, Solarworld, Ersol and Solon while the 
overall number of stock-listed solar companies from all levels of the value chain had increased 
to 17. Already in 2006, solar shares had the strongest weighting within the index and accounted 
for a substantial share of overall market capitalization, price gains were high (FAZ). The 
TecDAX was therefore also called the “SolarDAX”. In 2007, solar shares accounted for about 30 
percent of the TecDAX market capitalization and were stock market favorites.  
Against the background of the hype about solar on capital markets and the impressive 
increase of the CONERGY share price in the first year after going public, CONERGY was riding 
on a wave of success, possibly further fostering overconfidence on Rueter’s side. At the same 
time, Rueter faced a severe challenge: revenues generated in the German market exceeded 
international sales by far. Moreover, the major share of German revenues was attributable to 
the business area of solar technology: the German PV market grew by 40 percent to 930 MWp 
newly installed capacity in 2005 (Federal Solar Industry Association, 2016). In order to reduce 
its dependency on one product market and one geographic market and potentially spurred on 
by a well-filled cashbox (Harford, 1999; Malmendier & Tate, 2005 and 2008), Rueter further 
enhanced the diversification and internationalization strategy in 2005. The new offensive was 
labeled “50/50/08” and aimed at generating more than 50 percent of revenues abroad and 
more than 50 percent through regenerative products that complement solar technology by 
2008. CONERGY continuously emphasized its aimed strategic positioning: 
 “it is our goal to strengthen our position as the leading systems provider for  
 renewable sources of energy on additional levels” (CONERGY AG, 2006, p. 72).  
Solar cooling and solar heating but also wind energy and bio-energy were mentioned as such 
complementary products “above and beyond photovoltaics”. Strategic goals as stated were to 
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open up new sales and earnings potentials and to increase the company’s flexibility in reaction 
to temporary fluctuations in demand by region and by product (CONERGY AG, 2006, p. 72). 
 
4.5.5 High premia paid in acquisitions 
Research has shown that managerial overconfidence will presumably lead to heightened 
acquisitiveness with no increase in value for both target and bidder (Roll, 1986). Having 
abundant IPO proceeds at his disposal, Rueter conducted several takeovers, five of them in the 
field of solar power (targets located in Switzerland, France, Australia and USA) and one in the 
area of small wind turbines (Germany). Tt is unclear whether targets were unattractive to other 
potential bidders. In addition, Rueter founded eleven subsidiaries in Germany and abroad in 
2005 and was now also present in Italy, Portugal, Mexico, Australia, India and the United States, 
claiming to pursue the 50/50/08 strategy. The CONERGY Group counted 15 national and 23 
international subsidiaries at the end of the year. As a consequence, the number of employees 
had more than doubled to over 700 worldwide. 
The rapid growth also meant a substantial increase in complexity as staff was employed 
at the headquarters in Hamburg but also at 38 subsidiaries, scattered in different regions and 
countries. Besides facing the challenge to harmonize different nationalities, CONERGY’s 
management had to integrate varying corporate cultures into one since the company had 
substantially grown through acquisitions. Although differences in corporate culture generally 
conceal significant synergy potential, a carefully conducted and adequate integration must be 
guaranteed. Finally, the new businesses had to be integrated in the Group’s existing IT, 
controlling and accounting systems. Figure 4.3 illustrates the growth in the number of 
subsidiaries. 
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the number of CONERGY’s fully consolidated subsidiaries 
 
Source: CONERGY AG Annual Reports 2002 - 2010 
In order to „seamlessly and fully“ integrate the new businesses, start-ups as well as acquisitions 
were carefully prepared and executed with close collaboration of the Management Board, the 
M&A department and the Group’s central services such as IT, finance or marketing (CONERGY 
AG 2006, p. 53) – so the company claimed. It was further alleged that new companies were 
fully integrated into CONERGY within three months due to a firmly established process and by 
starting the integration process immediately after the acquisition. This claim appears ambitious 
in view of the high number of new businesses acquired or founded around the globe within a 
very short time and can thus again be taken as an indication of an optimistic bias (Weinstein, 
1980). It may be assumed that presumably overconfident Rueter was convinced to be “better 
than average” and that risks were manageable and controllable (March & Shapira, 1987). The 
diversifying acquisitions of technologies in adjacent fields of the renewable energy industry yet 
posed a serious challenge to the Group. Although familiar with the specific conditions of the 
market for solar power, CONERGY was a newcomer in the markets for bio-energy, geothermal 
and wind power, competing with sophisticated companies with technology expertise and 
experience in the specific requirements of the market.  
Nevertheless, Rueter remained unswervingly on track for further rapid expansion. It is 
a well-established phenomenon in behavioral finance that optimistic managers typically 
overestimate the probability of good firm performance and underestimate the probability of bad 
performance (Heaton, 2002). Summing up the year 2005 in his letter to shareholders, he 
displayed an optimistic attitude and gave reasons for continuing his strategy: 
  
12 12 15 22 22
29 27 23 23
12 10
9 10
23
55 46
54 56
44 44
32
22
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
National subsidiaries International subsidiaries
Case Study: CEO optimism and overconfidence 
 
106 
 
“Market share in the market for renewable energies will be distributed in the next five years. 
 This means that now is the time to establish a presence in promising regions, build up strong
 brand names and offer cutting-edge technologies. Only companies that have reached a critical 
mass in both products and corresponding total sales will be able to remain independent. This 
means we must continue to outperform the market in future as well, using an approach that 
broadly covers all major types of energy with a focus on renewables. […] We are increasing 
investments in research and development  and plan to make further acquisitions of companies 
 that offer uniquely capable system technology to ensure that we remain on this trajectory” 
(CONERGY AG, 2006, pp.11). 
Striving to achieve his vision of becoming world market leader in renewable energies, Rueter 
pressed ahead with unrestrained expansion also in 2006. According to the annual report 2006, 
the number of subsidiaries rose to 77 as a result of additional 26 start-ups and 13 new 
acquisitions. Furthermore, five existing shareholdings were increased (2006 restated figures: 
19 start-ups and 12 new acquisitions). Workforce grew in line with the high pace of expansion: 
staff totaled 1,480 at the end of 2006, one third of it employed at Group companies outside of 
Germany. In terms of the 50/50/08 strategy’s objectives, CONERGY moved forward faster than 
expected. Foreign sales accounted for 37 percent instead of 25 percent as planned and also the 
percentage figure of 26 percent of non-PV products exceeded projections. However, growing by 
acquisitions was costly. EUR 43.5 million were paid in total for the acquired shares, roughly a 
third of it was Goodwill (EUR 13.3 million). The following figure 4.4 shows the amounts of 
cash and future earn-outs paid in takeovers and reports the amount of goodwill separately. 
Figure 4.4: Acquisitions paid with cash and future earn-outs and thereof goodwill (in EUR thousand) 
 
Source: CONERGY AG Annual Reports 2002 - 2010 
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Optimism and overconfidence predict that corporate projects are undertaken quickly, which 
generally is in the interest of shareholders (Gervais et al., 2002). Certainly, quick action applied 
to Rueter. However, this goes along with an underestimation of risk. As shown by Heaton 
(2002) for optimistic managers, it cannot be excluded that Rueter did not only overvalue his 
own expansion strategy but also his ability to manage these projects. It is likely that he was 
prone to invest in his own projects although these might have had a negative net present value. 
With respect to the high number of acquisitions within very short time, it is doubtful whether 
Rueter carefully conducted a due diligence ahead of each acquisition and thorough market 
analyses when founding additional subsidiaries, in particular when considering the large 
number of disposals of subsidiaries that followed soon after the crisis year 2007. Furthermore, 
acquiring managers on average overpay for their targets (Roll, 1986). The paid premiums are 
at least partly attributable to valuation errors and hubris on the part of the bidder. Consistent 
with Roll’s “hubris hypothesis of takeovers”, Rueter, presumably being overly optimistic about 
potential synergies, may have overestimated the increase in value for the combined firm. This 
is supported by the fact that the majority of CONERGY’s at the height of expansion 83 
subsidiaries (both acquired and founded) was either discontinued, divested or liquidated after 
the company’s crisis year of 2007.        
 Furthermore, adjustments on goodwill amounted to EUR -21.8 million in 2007 (restated 
numbers, CONERGY AG 2009, p. 142). Most attributed values at the date of acquisition were 
thus at least not sustainable if not unjustified. 
Complexity within the Group was not only considerably increased by founding 
subsidiaries around the globe and acquiring horizontally and vertically but also by inflating the 
organizational structure through establishing a multitude of project companies as well as 
numerous intermediary holdings. Long-term project development was the core of the EPURON 
business area, including project planning of power plants, technical realization and marketing 
to investors, who at a later stage participated in the project company. As of December 31, 2006, 
the number of project companies had reached 397 (55 thereof consolidated). At the end of 
2007, the number had further increased to 442 (113 thereof consolidated). In addition, the 
Group had 41 intermediary holdings. Financial accounting for these project companies should 
soon become a serious problem for CONERGY. After the crisis year of 2007, these numbers were 
quickly decreased by disposals from the sale of companies and other disposals down to 187 
project companies (14 consolidated) and 14 intermediary holdings at the end of 2010. 
On November 12, 2006, CONERGY positively surprised capital markets with an 
unexpected strategy change. By announcing that it would build the ‘world’s first and only fully 
integrated mass production of wafers, cells and modules’ in Frankfurt/Oder in Eastern 
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Germany, creating more than 1,000 jobs, CONERGY was to transform from a 
wholesaling/distributing and project development company into a fully-integrated solar 
producer. Even though external procurement of solar components from third party suppliers 
was also to be continued, the Group intended to reduce its dependence from suppliers by its 
own production. Total investments for the new production plant were estimated at EUR 250 
million, a significant sum considering CONERGY’s revenues and profitability. Analysts’ take was 
yet that this was “big and positive”, re-iterating their buy-recommendation: 
“This is a well thought-through and well planned decision by CONERGY meant to further 
support its distribution business rather than a complete reversal of strategy. CONERGY has  
been exploring and planning this opportunity for almost a year meaning that all relevant  
people and contracts are in place to have production up and running from mid-2007.” 
 (Citigroup Company Flash, 2006, Nov. 13) 
The CEO, responsible for strategy and marketing, apparently communicated the motivation 
behind and the preparations for its strategic decision with success. The analysts’ positive 
assessment may have resulted partly from Rueter’s communication skills and persuasiveness. 
The strategy change was also appreciated by other brokers as it was to improve CONERGY’s 
positioning in the market: 
 “This change in strategy would make CONERGY comparable to integrated producers such  
 as Solarworld with the advantage of a high quality distribution network with global reach.  
 We regard control over quality and availability and mostly lower sourcing costs by innovative 
 production processes to be the key motivation” (Deutsche Bank Results Review, 2006, Nov. 14) 
 
4.5.6 Failures in procurement and pressure to fully utilize production 
 plant 
In 2006, CONERGY had decided to build its own production plant for wafers, cells and modules 
in Frankfurt/Oder in Eastern Germany. Start of production was scheduled for the second half 
of 2007. The initial capacity of 50 MW in 2007 was to increase fivefold to 250 MW by 2008. 
Securing cost and leadership quality on the global market was the objective, ”thus creating the 
foundation for further dynamic growth in its core business” (CONERGY AG, 2006, Nov. 12). 
Despite the enormous investment of EUR 250 million, a group of analysts assessed the return 
potential as being substantial, even under the assumption of eroding prices and margins 
(Citigroup Company Flash, 2006, Nov. 13). These analysts further reported that “the company 
has been in regular contact with all silicon manufacturers and feels very confident that supply 
will be secured for the entire facility well in advance” (Citigroup Company Flash, 2006, Nov. 
13). They identified as a key risk a delayed ramp-up of production due to technical problems 
but also saw supply shortfalls as critical. 
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In January 2007, CONERGY unexpectedly released in an ad-hoc announcement 
(CONERGY AG, 2007, January 11) that the self-imposed sales goal could not be achieved due 
to delays in delivery of solar modules and wind turbines. Regarding the delayed delivery of 
special photovoltaic modules, CEO Rueter held Asian suppliers responsible. According to 
Rueter, this delay forced CONERGY to postpone bringing two major power plants to grid 
connection until 2007, resulting in a „shifting of revenues“ of about EUR 53 million into the 
following year. Rueter made an attempt to counter this unpleasant situation. He presented the 
issue as a clear confirmation for his former decision to launch an in-house production facility 
in order to free the Group from its dependency on upstream suppliers. The decision for this 
vertical integration was in principle right as the limited availability of solar modules and their 
primary products, which was in turn due to the global shortage of solar silicon, had been the 
key limiting factor for photovoltaic installations in previous years. Moreover and contrary to 
other manufacturers, CONERGY could profit from its own high quality global distribution 
network. However, a sufficient supply of the extremely scarce raw materials for solar products 
was crucial to ensure profitable operation and thus amortization of the production plant.  
At the same time, CONERGY also continued sourcing crystalline and thin-film solar 
modules from third-party suppliers. By securing supply for its construction sites all over the 
world, CONERGY aimed at accomplishing the planned growth and thus fulfil its self-imposed 
sales goal of EUR 1.25 billion for 2007. CONERGY signed several high-volume contracts with 
suppliers during 2007. In February, it closed a contract with China’s largest solar cell and 
module manufacturer Suntech Power for delivery of solar modules worth at least USD 270 
million within 2007 (CONERGY AG, 2007, February 12). The contract volume represented a 
multiplication compared with the previous year. In September, CONERGY doubled the volume 
of thin-film modules to be delivered by US-manufacturer First Solar in the years up to and 
including 2012 from 245 MW to 465 MW. 
The strong volume increases can be seen as indicator of Rueter’s overly optimistic 
expectations regarding the company’s future growth rate, particularly taking into consideration 
the additional 50 megawatts, in perspective 250 megawatts capacity of the Frankfurt/Oder 
production facility. In April 2007, three months prior to the planned production start of the new 
Frankfurt/Oder plant, the Group concluded contracts with suppliers for the delivery of 80 
percent of the required silicon and silicon-based production materials for full utilization of the 
plant’s peak capacity of 50 megawatts – but only for the second half of 2007. CONERGY had 
claimed in an ad-hoc announcement that it could have secured long-term supply also for 2008 
and beyond but had been hesitant as it expected more favourable procurement conditions by 
2008 resulting from the silicon industry’s substantial capacity increase (CONERGY AG, 2007, 
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April 5). Analysts report that CEO Rueter repeatedly assured that CONERGY had principally 
secured the required production materials and could access them if necessary. 
Surprisingly, the Management Board in October signed a long-term contract with US-
based wafer manufacturer MEMC Electronic Materials for the future supply of solar wafers from 
July 2008 onwards up to 2018 with a total value of US$ 7 to 8 billion (CONERGY AG, 2007, 
Oct. 25). Volumes were to increase every twelve months whereas prices were to “decline 
steadily over the period of the agreement” in order to secure a “normal manufacturer’s margin” 
when prices for solar systems would start to erode as expected. The optimism behind the 
decision to conclude a nearly 8-billion-dollars-contract was at conflict with the company’s 
profitability situation and is hence again indicator of overconfidence. Rueter pursued his growth 
plans with total determination. 
Although the decision in general enjoyed a positive market response (Citi, 2007, Oct. 
29), this contract should prove fatal for the company’s fate. Rueter’s decisions on these various 
capital-intense long-term commitments with suppliers but particularly with MEMC amaze in 
view of his awareness of the overall market development. There is reason to presume that it 
was an act of desperation, driven by the fear for insufficient supply for its Frankfurt/Oder plant. 
Price erosion for solar silicon products was expected in the near future due to the global increase 
in silicon capacity - even according to CONERGY’s own statements. International competition 
was becoming fiercer, mainly due to the market entry of low-cost producers from Asia. Solar 
markets worldwide and particularly in Europe were to be flooded with low cost silicon, wafers, 
cells and modules. Back in 2007, there were clear signs for a considerable ramp-up of 
production capacities for solar technology in Asia, although it was unclear when exactly the 
low-cost products would hit the established PV markets worldwide. 
Serious difficulties occurred at CONERGY in 2007, nearly leading to the Group’s 
collapse. The way how they were managed expresses Rueter’s hubris. Only one day after having 
announced it would become a fully-integrated solar producer, CONERGY had confirmed its 
sales and profit forecast for fiscal year 2006 stating that full order books had put CONERGY 
“fully on course” (CONERGY AG, 2006, Nov. 13). The respective ad-hoc announcement was 
later basis for accusing the management of market manipulation. 
In January 2007, CONERGY released a profit warning – a bitter surprise. In contrast to 
its own claims and although revenues had increased by 42 percent to EUR 752.2 million in 
2006, CONERGY missed its sales target and also its net income target of EUR 40 million. Due 
to delays in delivery of solar modules and wind turbines, so the company claimed, CONERGY 
had to postpone the completion of two important projects power plants until 2007, meaning a 
„shifting of revenues“ of about EUR 53 million into the following year. The company now 
guided for a net income of between 2005’s EUR 27.8 million and the originally expected EUR 
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40 million. Analysts showed “only a yellow card for now” (Citigroup Company in-depth, 2007, 
Jan. 15) but stated that CONERGY’s credibility had been “negatively affected” and that their 
confidence was shaken. Table 4.2 presents CONERGY AG’s key financial figures for the years 
2006 to 2011. 
Table 4.2: CONERGY AG key financial figures for FY 2006 to FY 2011 
COMPANY 
FINANCIALS  
(in EUR million) 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2006 
(restated) 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2007 
(restated)  
FISCAL 
YEAR 2008 
(restated) 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2009 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2010 
FISCAL 
YEAR 2011 
Total sales 682.33 719.00 975.30 600.90 913.50 754.10 
Gross margin 15.82% 14.03% 13.52% 19.57% 23.74% 16.88% 
EBITDA 6.73 -163.20 -147.40 -10.70 30.10 -84.10 
EBITDA margin 0.99% -22.70% -15.11% -1.78% 3.30% -11.15% 
EBIT 2.19 -213.30 -181.90 -36.80 -13.80 -182.80 
EBIT margin 0.32% -29.67% -18.65% -6.12% -1.51% -24.24% 
Net profit/loss -0.64 -213.00 -306.60 -79.30 -44.90 -162.10 
Earnings per share -0.01 -6.5 -3.47 -0.2 -0.84 -1.67 
Equity Ratio 22% 12% 44% 18% 12% 6% 
 
Capital markets’ trust in CONERGY further dwindled when in November the same year the 
company announced that its accounts were to be checked by German officials:  
 “The outlook for the current year is subject to a critical examination of the balance sheet 
 valuation principles of CONERGY AG as well as to the results from various working groups,  
 which are currently analyzing the CONERGY’s business areas. In this context, the German 
 Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) has informed CONERGY that it will examine 
 the accounts for 2006 and for the first six months of 2007” (CONERGY AG, 2007, Nov. 7). 
The company’s accounts had to be restated after the FREP had scrutinised the 2006 and 1HY07 
accounts. One accusation was that interim profits of several project companies were unduly 
included in the balance sheet. Another said that revenues with company subsidiaries were 
falsely stated. It was also alleged that a property deal was recognized incorrectly. Among others, 
all three allegations became subject of criminal proceedings against six ex-top-managers 
beginning in 2011. The charges were false accounting, market manipulation and insider trading 
(e.g. Murphy & Reuters, 2011, June 14; Werner, 2011, July 19). 
The sales figure for 2006 was down about 70 million from EUR 752.2 million to now 
EUR 682.3 million. Expenditures had risen in line with Rueter’s excessive expansion. In addition 
to the high acquisition costs of EUR 43.5 million, costs for continued internationalization had 
been EUR 8.7 million. Personnel costs had increased disproportionately from EUR 27.0 million 
(2005) to EUR 55.4 million, other operating expenses had almost tripled to EUR 63.2 million 
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(2005: EUR 22.8 million). Further material items in 2006 had been investments in the 
development of complementary technologies as well as in the set-up of the new production 
plant. 
The EBIT figure for 2006 had to be corrected downward from EUR 52.1 million to EUR 
2.2 million. CONERGY’s 2006 restated EBIT-margin or return-on-sales ratio (ROS) of 0.3 
percent (originally 6.9. percent) indicates poor operational efficiency and profitability, notably 
as it was hugely surpassed by the corresponding double-digit figures of its peers: Q-Cells for 
example achieved a 24 percent EBIT-margin and Solarworld presented 35 percent, both with 
comparable annual revenues above EUR 500 million and rapid organizational growth. Although 
Phoenix Solar remained on a low level with an EBIT-margin between 4 and 8 percent, the 
company at least managed to maintain this level until the industry’s collapse in 2009/2010. The 
comparison of the return-on-sales ratios not surprisingly shows strong analogies to the 
comparison of CONERGY’s share price with the benchmark indices. The following figure 4.5 
shows the development of the return-on-sales figures of CONERGY and selected peers over time. 
Figure 4.5: Return-on-sales ratios of CONERGY AG and selected peers 
 
Source: Companies’ annual reports 2002 - 2010 
Despite all these alarming signals for CONERGY’s negative development and probably not 
corresponding to reality, CEO Rueter in February 2007 experienced the height of his career. He 
received the “Entrepreneur of the Year Award” from the European Business Award. 
Due to the substantial past investments in its expansion, CONERGY’s solid capital base 
had shrunk significantly since the IPO. In order to strengthen the capital base and to finance 
further growth, the company successfully placed 2,999,999 shares in an equity issue without 
subscription rights to German and international investors in March 2007. The placing price had 
been EUR 50 per share. The proceeds of the transaction amounted to approximately EUR 150 
-80.00%
-60.00%
-40.00%
-20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EB
IT
/r
e
ve
n
u
e
s
Q-Cells
Solarworld
Conergy
Phoenix Solar
Case Study: CEO optimism and overconfidence 
 
113 
 
million and thus even exceeded IPO proceeds. Proceeds were to have been used for up-front 
investments to secure supplies of solar grade silicon and to reduce purchasing prices as well as 
for further acquisitions. 
While revenues improved only marginally from EUR 682.3 million to EUR 719.0 million 
in 2007, costs grew considerably. Headcount had increased fourfold from 579 employees in 
2005 to 2,317 in 2007 (CONERGY AG, 2008, April 8). Personnel expenses in 2007 stood at EUR 
-112.3 million. Other operating expenses again almost tripled to EUR 179.3 million (2007), 
which was essentially due to two positions. Within only one year, value adjustments on 
receivables increased from EUR -1.4 million to EUR -28.2 million (mainly related to the MEMC 
contract but also to customers’ lack of creditworthiness) and miscellaneous operating expenses 
rose dramatically from EUR -16.0 million to EUR -44.9 million, encompassing “a multitude of 
numerically minor individual items related to the Group’s 68 consolidated companies” 
(CONERGY 2009, p. 133). 
 
4.5.7 Dramatic increase in working capital 
Working capital had increased more than fivefold within only one year from EUR 46 million in 
2005 to EUR 274 million in 2006. The company had failed to reduce working capital in the 
following year. It stood unchanged at EUR 273 million. Expressed as a percentage to sales, the 
working capital ratio jumped from 8 percent in 2005 to 40 percent in 2006 and came down 
only marginally to 38 percent in 2007. Generally speaking, a targeted ratio should be below 25 
percent in order to increase profitability, reduce tied capital and secure sufficient liquidity. 
CONERGY had assured to strive for a 20 percent ratio but failed to do so. 
A first reason for the working capital increase was a sharp rise in inventories. The value 
of inventory amounted to EUR 55 million in 2005, more than doubled to EUR 135 million in 
2006 and rose to EUR 342 million in 2007. High inventories mean tied capital, high storage 
costs and, as time progresses, a threat of write-downs. Second major reason for the considerable 
increase was the imbalance between a high level of accounts receivables and an inappropriate 
level of accounts payables. This discrepancy resulted from generous payment terms of six 
months for customers, allowed for at the end of Q4/2006 in order to attract new business. At 
the same time, payment terms for CONERGY were very unfavorable. Due to the ongoing 
shortage of silicon, suppliers were in the position to require up-front payment at that time. 
These cash outflows before delivery led to shortfalls in liquidity of some customers, amongst 
them CONERGY, as they had to bridge the interim period until they in turn were repaid for the 
finished products by their customers. The proceeds of the March 2007 capital increase were to 
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be used for up-front investments to secure supplies of solar grade silicon and to reduce 
purchasing prices.  
 
4.5.8 Liquidity Crisis 
CONERGY did admit that it was in a precarious situation only when facing the preliminary 
figures for the first nine months of 2007. On October 25, the company released its second profit 
warning within one year. The announcement came unexpected and left capital markets “shell-
shocked” (Citi Company Focus, 2007, Oct. 29). Analysts now showed the red card and 
responded with downgrades from “buy” to “hold” or “sell”. After the first nine months of 2007, 
consolidated net income was negative at EUR -8.8 million with revenues of EUR 641.1 million 
(CONERGY AG, 2007, Oct. 25). Once again, delays in deliveries of modules allegedly had led 
to revenue losses of EUR 130 million. Furthermore, personnel costs, other operating expenses 
and working capital were given as reasons for the “unsatisfying earnings performance” 
(CONERGY AG, 2007, Oct. 25). The working capital target was no longer regarded as 
achievable. CONERGY now guided for an EBIT of EUR 40 million earnings though set against 
expected risks between EUR 30 and 50 million, resulting in a net loss. Earnings were to be 
affected by consequences from delivery delays as well as “difficult business conditions” in the 
bio-energy sector. Risks were seen in the progress of major projects, currency hedging 
transactions and the expected impact of write-downs of inventories and receivables. In an 
attempt to change course at the last minute, the Board of Management announced that it was  
“launching a comprehensive company-wide programme focussing on profitable  
 growth with the aim of achieving a sustainable improvement of the company’s  
 efficiency and profitability. The core elements of the programme are the strategic  
 focus on profitable areas of business, a stronger alignment towards profitable 
 growth  in the photovoltaic sector together with an improvement in cost and 
 business structures. Initial measures, starting with a comprehensive analysis of 
international activities, the business sectors and the corporate structure, are to be 
implemented during the current business year already” (CONERGY AG, 2007, Oct. 25). 
The response to the alarming development of profitability came too late: “a short-term shortfall 
in liquidity had developed following CONERGY’s strong growth” (CONERGY AG, 2007, Nov. 
7). The liquidity crisis posed a threat to the Group’s existence. CONERGY could only overcome 
this precarious situation through an inflow of funds of EUR 100 million at very short notice, a 
third thereof through an additional credit line and two thirds through a capital increase under 
exclusion of shareholders’ subscription rights. The capital increase was subscribed by members 
of Management and Supervisory Board, family members and by Leemaster Ltd., controlled by 
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Dr. Otto Happel. The critical examination of CONERGY’s accounts by the FREP was also 
announced in the respective ad-hoc. 
Finally, due to obvious and compelling reasons, founder and CEO Rueter was dismissed 
after almost ten years at the head of the Group. He left as a wealthy man: his fortune stems 
from the IPO proceeds and the sale of a share package shortly before the company’s near 
collapse and is estimated at EUR 50 million (Schwarzer, 2010). Rueter was to leave the 
company on November 15 and Dieter Ammer (who had apparently failed in his function as 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board) was to become interim CEO until appointment of a 
successor. In an interview (Waldermann, 2007, Nov. 7), Rueter defended his past diversification 
strategy from photovoltaics to further renewable energies such as wind or biomass by stating 
that CONERGY required several pillars and that it was simply a matter of portfolio composition.  
 
4.6 The aftermath of the crisis 
CONERGY issued a third profit warning in December 2007, now expecting sales below EUR 1 
billion and estimating EBIT to be between EUR -150 and -200 million. Following the 2007 crisis, 
management had to deal with the consequences of Rueter’s excessive growth strategy. 2008 
should become a transition year. In a presentation for capital markets in April 2008, CONERGY 
admitted that its expansion had been “too much, too soon, too ambitious”. The company 
retrospectively specified the reasons for the 2007 crisis: “Excessively fast growth; significant 
increase in cash requirements; rapid growth in organisational structure, high overheads. IT and 
Controlling Systems don’t grow in line with complexity. Delays in deliveries of contracted 
modules” (CONERGY AG, 2008, April 8).  
The new management decided on a change in strategy, thereby focusing on the core PV 
business and on key markets. The new strategy provided for the withdrawal from unprofitable 
markets, countries and the small projects business as well as the divestment of discontinued 
operations, more precisely solar thermal, bio-energy activities and wind activities. Further 
elements of the restructuring strategy were a flexible and lean organization, effective cost 
structures in labor, material costs and processes, the introduction of best practice IT systems 
and the reduction of working capital. The Frankfurt/Oder production plant was seen unchanged 
as “key strategic decision to secure the business model”. CONERGY now targeted profitable 
operation in the second half of 2009. 
CONERGY successfully bargained the total contract volume down to US$ 4 billion mid-
2008 but in return had to accept higher pricing (CONERGY AG, 2008, July 10). Silicon prices 
started to fall from US$ 450 to 500 per kilogram in 2008 down to US$ 60 to 80 during 2009 
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and further down to US$ 50 in 2010 (Rentzing, 2010, June 18) but CONERGY was obliged to 
pay the agreed full price irrespective of the real need for wafers as it had signed a “take-or-pay” 
contract. Furthermore, CONERGY claimed that the contract included clauses that meant 
barriers to competition (Murphy, 2009, Sept.23). As neither quantities nor pricing were 
appropriate to the changed market conditions in CONERGY’s view, CONERGY filed a lawsuit 
against MEMC at a court in New York in April 2009. After 20 months, CONERGY succeeded in 
January 2010 and achieved an adjustment of the contract in an out-of-court settlement 
(CONERGY 2010, January 24). The main responsibility for this situation posing a threat to the 
Group’s existence rests with former CEO Rueter under whose leadership (and hubris) the 
contract had once been negotiated. 
During the years 2008 to 2012, the company experienced multiple changes in the 
composition of the Management Board. It was required to restate its accounts 2007 and 2008, 
performed two further capital increases with significant volumes at the end of 2008 and in July 
2011, received new or prolonged bridging financing and achieved extension of loans from the 
lending banks and twice had to give notice that a loss amounting to half the share capital of 
CONERGY AG had occurred (2011 and 2012). Eventually, CONERGY AG declared insolvency 
in 2013.  
The Hamburg prosecutor had filed suits against Rueter and Ammer as well as against 
other former managers in 2011. Subjects of the suits were insider trading, accounting fraud and 
market manipulation. They were accused of having sold share packages between December 
2006 and April 2007. The actual trial, however, began only in spring 2015. Penalties were 
lenient. Ammer as former Chairman of the Supervisory Board was acquitted in October 2015; 
Rueter and other members of the executive board were also acquitted or sentenced to a fine for 
a regulatory offence.  
CONERGY’s share price had fallen by more than 50 percent during the crisis year of 
2007. On January 12th, the day after the first profit warning, the share price had stood at EUR 
48.69 and some analysts adhered to their “buy”-recommendation with target prices above EUR 
60 respectively EUR 70. After the third profit warning in December, the share price had come 
down to EUR 22.90. Target prices were now below EUR 20. The share price never recovered 
again. Since mid-2008, it has remained below EUR 10 and kept falling. The share price was as 
little as EUR 0.32 on November 7, 2012, and it remained a penny stock until 2013. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
In this paper I analyze the history of CONERGY, an integrated systems supplier in the field of 
renewable energies, over the period from 1998 to 2007. From its beginnings as a private-equity-
financed start-up, CONERGY rapidly grew to a globally operating Group, focusing on the 
lucrative because state-promoted sector of solar technology. The Group expanded to 
international markets and diversified into adjacent renewable energy technologies by both 
numerous acquisitions and foundation of subsidiaries. Since 2002, Group sales had grown at 
an annual rate of 57 percent while the GAGR of staff was even 72 percent. In 2007, CONERGY 
achieved annual sales of EUR 719.0 million with nearly 80 subsidiaries worldwide and 
employed roughly 2.500 people. However, 2007 marked the year of CONERGY’s fall. Due to 
delays in delivery on the suppliers’ side, the Group suffered from revenue losses in the area of 
EUR 130 million. Fixed costs and other operating expenses had risen sharply so that CONERGY’s 
profitability was deep in the red with EUR -210.0 million. Its working capital to sales ratio stood 
at disastrous 38 percent. At the same time, cash requirements were very high. The Group 
experienced a severe liquidity crisis, which nearly led to its insolvency. 
I find that CONERGY’s aggressive expansion was advanced first and foremost by founder 
and CEO Martin Rueter. I refer to key findings of behavioral finance to understand Rueter’s 
strategy and behavior and show how over-optimism and overconfidence likely impacted 
Rueter’s decisions. My analysis yields several insights that may have contributed to CONERGY’s 
severe crisis in 2007 from which it has failed to recover. Firstly, Rueter, presumably subject to 
an optimistic bias, may have overestimated his own prospects for success as well as his 
individual skills and competencies. Consequently, he could have overvalued his own expansion 
strategy and his ability to manage his projects. Second, there are numerous indicators of 
overconfidence. That means that Rueter could have underestimated potential risks or at least 
perceived these to be manageable and controllable. Third, the supervisory board apparently 
failed in its function to monitor and control the CEO’s actions. It lacked the necessary 
professional distance between the CEO and the board with Rueter’s uncle being the Chairman 
and his brother being a board member. Fourth, being cash-rich after the IPO in 2005, Rueter 
advanced with unrestrained expansion, also through heightened acquisitiveness, which is again 
indicative of overconfidence. His overinvestment in company growth led to a sharp rise in costs, 
cash requirements as well as a significant increase in complexity within the Group. Having 
abundant internal resources at his disposal, Rueter conducted a large number of acquisitions 
with doubtful strategic sense and lacking sustainable value, thus decreasing enterprise value.  
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Striving to achieve his vision of becoming world market leader in renewable energies, 
founder and CEO Rueter can be held responsible for both the spectacular rise and fall of the 
CONERGY Group. 
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5. Layoffs and shareholder wealth effects.  
 Evidence from the banking industry18 
5.1 Introduction 
The banking industry in the United States and in Europe has experienced fundamental 
restructuring since the beginning of the millennium, further accelerated by the global financial 
crisis and the ensuing recession. After the millennium change, EU-15 banks’ profitability fell for 
two consecutive years but improved in 2003 (ECB, 2004). Main sources for profit improvement 
were cost-cuttings, non-interest income and reduced provisioning. The positive development, 
attributable to “aggressive restructuring” (ECB, 2004), continued in 2004.  
When banks come under pressure to reduce costs, induced by macroeconomic factors, 
tightened regulation or mismanagement, the most obvious and straightforward solution is a 
reduction in workforce. During the 1999 to 2009 period, the share of personnel expenses in 
operating costs ranged from about 54 percent for banks based in Luxemburg, Germany and 
Ireland up to 61 percent in Spain and even 63 percent for banks based in Switzerland (OECD, 
2010). Through layoffs, banks can save operating costs and potentially improve efficiency. The 
key efficiency figure in banking is the cost-income ratio. Driving down costs improves the ratio. 
The lower the ratio value, the higher the bank’s efficiency (e.g. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 
2009). Moreover, operationally efficient banks are more profitable than banks with a lesser 
degree of operational efficiency (Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011). Banks’ cost-cutting efforts were 
thus, inter alia, concentrated on staff expenditure over the past years. The global financial sector 
has seen massive layoffs during the past decade. The first wave of layoffs in 2008 is closely 
linked to the global financial crisis. The second wave started in 2011 and is related to the 
European sovereign debt crisis.  
The large cross-country differences in the percentage of personnel expenses may 
indicate that banks face various degrees of restriction regarding the adjustment of labor costs 
(Mamatzakis, Tsionas, Kumbhakar & Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, 2015). These restrictions are 
presumably imposed by national labor law. In the past and still today, layoffs could be executed 
quite quickly in the United States due to the employer-friendly labor law (OECD, 2016a). The 
United Kingdom has the least stringent legislation in Europe, followed by Ireland. Banks that 
are headquartered in these countries will most likely realize improvements in efficiency through 
layoffs in the short-term at moderate costs. In other European countries, particularly in 
Portugal, the Netherlands and Italy but also in Germany, execution will presumably be more 
                                                          
18 This chapter is largely based on a joint working paper with Sascha Kolaric and Dirk Schiereck. 
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difficult, lengthier and costly due to relatively strict employment protection regulation (OECD, 
2016a).  
As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, regulatory requirements for banks were tightened 
in order to ensure stability of the financial system. Over recent years, Euro zone banks steadily 
strengthened their balance sheets and improved their resistance to negative shocks (ECB, 
2015). The higher capital requirements and cuts in trading profits partially explain declines in 
bank profitability (IMF, 2015). Bank profitability as measured by return on equity (ROE) has 
fallen in all advanced economies, from an average of about 13 percent during the 2000-06 
period down to 8 percent in 2014 (IMF, 2015). While North-American banks’ profitability had 
reached its lowest point in 2008 and recovered to reasonable levels by 2014, Euro area banks’ 
aggregate ROE reached its trough in 2011 and remained in the low single digits in 2014. Given 
a strengthened regulatory and prudential environment, historically low interest rates and low 
macroeconomic growth prospects, banks today still find it difficult to enhance operating 
performance and thus continuously strive to reduce operating costs (ECB, 2015).  
The question arises whether collective dismissals by exchange-listed financial 
institutions are in the interest of their shareholders. Value-oriented corporate management is a 
central task for leaders of companies active on the international capital markets, whereby value 
means primarily shareholder value. Key objective is the sustainable increase of the company’s 
equity value. The equity’s market value is reflected in the share price. Capital markets evaluate 
management’s decisions and actions based on this premise of an increase in value. Management 
actions may take the form of merger and acquisitions, entry in new markets or areas of business 
as well as staff-related measures. The latter are frequently staff reductions in the course of 
restructuring with the objective of cutting costs. Empirical evidence indicates that changes in 
cost efficiency are associated with changes in the stock price. Cost efficiency is likely to be 
rewarded with outperformance of the stock price relative to inefficient counterparts (Beccalli, 
Casu & Giradone, 2006). 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of layoff announcements by US-
American and European banks on shareholder wealth over the period 2004 to 2014. 
Furthermore, I will examine if these effects differ depending on the strictness of national labor 
law. To my knowledge, no study to date has conducted such an investigation. In addition, I aim 
at addressing the question what factors generally drive investors’ assessment of bank layoffs. 
The findings of investigations into the factors that influence capital markets’ perception of layoff 
announcements and thus direction and magnitude of the share price reaction are of importance 
for both management and shareholders. Moreover, shareholders form only one group of a 
corporations’ stakeholders that comprise customers, suppliers, the public or employees. 
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Focusing solely on the shareholders’ interest regularly conflicts with acting in the interest of 
other stakeholders. With regard to layoffs, one could argue that shareholders benefit at the 
expense of employees (Fraunhoffer, Mietzner, Schiereck & Schneider, 2014). Results are 
significant also in terms of this debate. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 5.2 gives an introduction 
into the specific characteristics of the banking sector. Section 5.3 presents previous research 
findings and develops the research hypotheses. Section 5.4 describes the data set and section 
5.5 explains the methodology, while section 5.6 presents the empirical results and its 
implications. Finally, section 5.7 summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
 
5.2 Background: the banking sector  
5.2.1 Banking sector characteristics 
The banking sector is characterized by a series of specific features that make it a particularly 
interesting subject of study. Firstly, there are major differences in the balance sheet structure of 
banks and nonfinancial firms. The asset structure is fundamentally different. While nonfinancial 
firms hold physical assets such as inventories and machines, financial intermediaries hold 
financial claims as assets (Greenbaum & Thakor, 1995). With regard to liabilities and equity on 
the balance sheet, the essential difference between financial intermediaries and other types of 
business is that the former tend to be more leveraged; equity ratios are particularly low. 
Typically very low levels of equity capitalization and off-balance-sheet liabilities increase banks’ 
(systematic) risks. Second, while non-service providers rather rely on their physical capital, 
firms from the services sector, including financial services providers, primarily depend on their 
human capital (Elayan, Swales, Maris & Scott, 1998). The banking industry is resource-
intensive and dependent on its employees’ qualification like almost no other sector. Large-scale 
staff reductions thus bear the risk of losing valuable human capital. Third, banks are subject to 
a high degree of regulation. In their function as financial intermediaries, they are of crucial 
importance for the overall economic system. Strict bank regulation thus aims at ensuring 
banking sector stability at all times. Fourth, the sector has undergone major crises that led to 
massive layoffs during the past decade. The financial crisis that started in 2007 in the United 
States had a severe impact on the global financial sector. Moreover, it has shown that financial 
markets and institutions are closely linked together internationally and likewise to corporations 
operating in the “real economy”. In the wake of the crisis, bank regulation was further 
tightened.  
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5.2.2 Effects of the global financial crisis on the banking sector 
The crisis adversely affected the financial condition of banks involved at various levels of the 
market by inevitable, considerable write-downs and high bad debt provisions (Marshall, 
McColgan & McLeish, 2012). Financial institutions recorded enormous losses and faced 
immense cost pressure. A large number of institutions was directly threatened with insolvency. 
Several banks went bankrupt; the most famous case is certainly the collapse of US-American 
investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008. Central banks around the globe found themselves 
forced to supply the system with liquidity and made massive amounts of capital available in 
order to prevent the collapse of the financial sector. Banks that were considered “systematically 
relevant” received government aid. In return, the states acquired a stake in the bank concerned 
(e.g. AIG, Allied Irish Banks, Commerzbank, Lloyds Banking Group, UBS). The financial services 
sector subsequently experienced a series of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Troubled banks 
were absorbed completely (e.g. Bear Sterns acquired by J. P. Morgan in March 2008, Merrill 
Lynch acquired by Bank of America in September 2008, Sovereign Bancorp acquired by 
Santander in October 2008) or broken up and partly bought up by healthier institutions. Mass 
layoffs took place throughout the global financial sector.  
Due to the banks’ high complexity, their business activities and close ties with each other 
and various market players around the globe as well as in some cases simply their enormous 
size, the crisis generated spill-over effects to the broad financial and real economy and even 
whole states. Already suffering from severe contagion effects from the US subprime crisis, the 
euro zone ran into a sovereign debt crisis in late 2010. For the time being, the “euro crisis” had 
its peak in 2012. After several policy measures were taken at the European and national levels, 
investor confidence in euro area financial markets gradually returned from mid-2012 on (ECB, 
2014).  
In response to the global financial crisis, the Bank for International Settlements, more 
precisely the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), had decided in December 2010 
on enhanced fiscal governance and strengthened financial sector regulation. The new 
regulations formalized in “Basel III”, replacing the former “Basel II” provisions, aim at 
promoting a more resilient banking sector and at improving its ability to absorb shocks resulting 
from financial and economic stress, thus limiting financial contagion effects on the real economy 
(BCBS, 2010). Basel III was revised in January 2013 and October 2014. According to the 
Committee, lacking high-quality equity and poor liquidity risk management on the part of banks 
substantially contributed towards the development of the crisis. Key reforms of the Committee 
were stricter requirements with regard to banks’ common equity and liquidity. The “Common 
equity Tier 1” ratio was increased from a 2 percent minimum that had been required by Basel 
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II to a 4.5 percent minimum. Adding a “Capital Conservation Buffer” of 2.5 percent (which may 
fall below in times of crisis) results in a required common equity ratio of 7 percent. New 
regulation striving to improve liquidity comprised “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision” and, in addition, two minimum standards for funding liquidity. 
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is short-term oriented securing high-quality liquid assets to 
survive an acute stress scenario of one month whereas the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) has 
a time horizon for one year and shall provide for a sustainable maturity structure of assets and 
liabilities (BSBS, Dec. 2010).  
 
5.2.3 Costs and cost savings potential in the financial services sector 
Since banks were required to accumulate capital reserves, they have remained under strong 
cost pressure also in the years following the crisis. Cutting operating costs - to a great extent 
personnel expenses - continues to be a straightforward solution. The cost-income ratio compares 
overhead costs with gross revenues and is a central indicator of bank efficiency. Higher ratios 
indicate low levels of cost efficiency. Cost-income ratios of banks based in high-income countries 
are typically lower than in poorer countries (Beck et al., 2009). The cost-income ratio of banks 
remained relatively stable during the period 1995 to 2007. Overhead costs of banks, however, 
have been in decline across all income groups.  
In fact, labor costs in financial services differ considerably from those in other industry 
sectors. Labor costs across the whole economy excluding public administration in the European 
Union (EU 28) amounted to 24.12 euros per hour worked (Eurostat, 2015). Labor costs in the 
financial and insurance sector exceeded the average across all industries by 70 percent. Costs 
were only two percent higher in the manufacturing industry. By contrast, they were nine 
percent below the average in the construction industry and even 41 percent lower in the 
accommodation and food service sector. The equivalent average figure for the Eurozone, which 
comprised 18 member states of the European Union in 2012 (EU-18)19, stood at 28.98 euros 
with similar industry-specific variations (Eurostat, 2015). 
Average hourly employer costs per employee compensation in the United States for all 
civilian workers20 were 30.83 US dollars in 2012 (201521: 33.35 US dollars). In the private 
industry, employee compensation costs stood at 28.85 US dollars in 2012 (US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2016a) and 31.52 US dollars in 2015. Industry-specific differences are of 
                                                          
19 Lithuania was the nineteenth country that adopted the euro, effective from January 1, 2015. The Eurozone now 
comprises 19 member states.  
20 Includes workers in the private nonfarm economy excluding households and the public sector excluding the 
Federal government. 
21 Q1-Q3 2015 
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approximately the same magnitude. Average hourly total compensation costs in 2015 in the 
financial and insurance sector were 48.16 US dollars22 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016b). 
Labor costs amounted to 37.24 US dollars in the manufacturing industry (US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2016c), 36.87 US dollars in the construction industry (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2016d) and 13.47 in the leisure and hospitality sector (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016e). 
One could argue that qualification levels, fields of activity and work content in banking 
and financial services differ significantly from other sectors. In contrast to non-service firms, 
there are neither work banks nor assembly lines or packaging stations. Also in comparison with 
other service sectors, the financial sector assumes a special position. Financial services are not 
low-skill but rather sophisticated services. Job opportunities for low-qualified and low-paid 
workers are in fact scarce, thereby giving rise to the average salary level. It could also be argued 
that employees in banking raise, manage and move enormous sums of money and thus bear 
great responsibility. Yet, persisting notably high salary levels in the financial sector remain a 
controversial issue, particularly since investment bankers worldwide played a crucial role in 
causing the recent global financial crisis. 
 
5.3 Literature review and hypotheses development 
5.3.1 Theoretical considerations 
I build upon the pure efficiency hypothesis and the decreased demand hypothesis presented by 
Lin and Rozeff (1993) and empirically supported by Palmon, Sun and Tang (1997). According 
to the efficiency hypothesis, the market response will be neutral or positive for layoffs, which 
investors regard as efficiency-enhancing. Positive changes in utilization and organization, cost 
structures and processes are to be expected. Viewed in isolation, layoffs as a cost-cutting 
measure induced by decreased demand should benefit shareholders and give rise to the share 
price, because this decision improves wealth to reduce costs (Lin & Rozeff, 1993). In 
combination with fallen demand, however, the effect is a reduced level of net cash flows and a 
lower share price, because decreased demand results in lower sales und thus rising costs in the 
short term and subsequently, costs are at best restored to their original level (Lin & Rozeff, 
1993). Therefore, the decreased demand hypothesis predicts a negative market response. Lin 
and Rozeff show that layoff announcements are associated with negative share price reactions, 
which provides support for the decreased demand hypothesis. Palmon, Sun and Tang (1997) 
provide support for both hypotheses as they find negative abnormal returns for firms that 
                                                          
22 Figures refer to Q3/2015. 
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announce dismissals that are motivated by decreased demand and positive abnormal returns 
for firms that announce staff cuts that are motivated by efficiency improvement.  
Elayan et al. (1998) similarly build upon the efficiency hypothesis but compare it with 
the declining investment opportunities hypothesis. The declining investment opportunities 
hypothesis predicts a negative market response if a layoff announcement provides negative 
information about a firm’s future perspectives and shareholders thus view the planned 
redundancies as indicator for a worse-than-expected operating performance and poor 
investment opportunities. Announcement effects of the total sample suggest that 
announcements of staff cuts reveal negative information about a firm, consistent with the 
declining investment opportunities hypothesis (Elayan et al., 1998).  
Overall, previous empirical findings on capital markets’ reaction to announcements of 
planned redundancies show a clear tendency. The majority of 48 publications on layoff 
announcements’ effects using the event study method analyzes announcements across several 
industries and in a particular geographical region. Only very few studies focus on a particular 
industry. On the whole, capital markets respond to layoff announcements with significant 
negative abnormal returns in narrow event windows around the announcement date (e.g. Chen, 
Mehrotra & Sivakumar, 2001; Hallock, 1998; Lee, 1997; Wertheim & Robinson, 2000). When 
focusing on financial institutions, findings are inconsistent. Some older empirical evidence 
suggests that announcing firms experience a negative and significant share price reaction 
(Madura, Akhigbe & Bartunek, 1995; Elayan et al., 1998), hence supporting the decreased 
demand or declining investment opportunities hypothesis. More recent evidence points in the 
opposite direction. By indicating that announcing banks on average experience a positive and 
significant share price reaction, it supports the efficiency hypothesis (Cagle, Sen & 
Pawlukiewicz, 2009). Other findings provide support for both concepts as share price reactions 
differ depending upon the investigation period. In pre-crisis years (2005-06), banks and 
financial services experience a positive but not significant share price reaction whereas returns 
are strongly negative and highly significant in crisis year 2008 (Marshall et al., 2012). 
Empirical evidence further suggests that the layoff size, the stated reason for the planned 
redundancies as well as stock market conditions at the announcement date constitute factors 
that influence direction and magnitude of the share price reaction. Findings suggest that market 
reactions to large layoffs are stronger and more negative than to small layoffs (Elayan et al., 
1998; Hillier, Marshall, McColgan, and Werema, 2007; Worrell, Davidson & Sharma, 1991). 
Numerous studies classify the provided reasons for the planned dismissals into the groups 
“proactive strategies” and “reactive strategies”, whereby the definitions may vary. Mergers and 
acquisitions or restructuring of the organization, for instance, can be considered as proactive 
strategies whereas a fall in demand or poor past financial performance can be classified as 
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reactive strategies. Stock market reaction to reactive strategies tends to be negative and 
statistically significant (e.g. Capelle-Blancard & Tatu, 2012; Elayan et al., 1998; Lee, 1997; Neus 
& Walter, 2009), whereas market reactions to proactive strategies tend to be positive (e.g. 
Fraunhoffer et al., 2014; Hahn & Reyes, 2004; McKnight, Lowrie & Coles, 2002). Moreover, the 
number of layoff announcements closely follows the general business cycle (Farber & Hallock, 
2009). Dismissals during declining markets are likely to be perceived as reactive to economic 
conditions and poor prospects. By contrast, staff cuts during economic expansion and rising 
markets are rather perceived as proactive and efficiency enhancing. Indeed, market reaction 
tends to be positive during rising stock markets and negative in declining markets (Marshall et 
al., 2012).  
 
5.3.2 Shareholder wealth effects of reductions-in-workforce 
 announcements 
Corporate finance research has been dealing intensively with the effect of corporate 
announcements of staff downsizing on shareholder wealth. Since the early 1990s, scholars have 
examined the effects of announcements of large-scale reductions in workforce on the share 
price of stock-listed corporations and potential explanatory factors for the observed stock price 
reactions. 
Gerpott (2007) identifies a total of 37 publications on layoff announcements’ effects 
using the event study method that cover the investigation period January 1978 to August 2001. 
The vast majority of studies (25) focuses on the Anglo-Saxon area (i.e. the United States and 
the United Kingdom). On the whole, capital markets respond to layoff announcements with 
significant negative abnormal returns in narrow event windows around the announcement date. 
The fact that such notifications on average are not followed by positive abnormal returns 
suggests that the potential for economic benefits such as cost reductions and subsequent 
increases in profitability, eventually increasing free cash flows and thus shareholder wealth, is 
not acknowledged by the stock markets. Instead, announcements of planned redundancies in 
their typical pattern are likely to reduce shareholder value (Gerpott, 2007). Past studies 
investigate the influence of numerous factors on variations in the magnitude of the reaction. 
Most examined factors are the stated reasons for the dismissals and/or the purposes specified 
in the announcement. Findings indicate that certain contents, such as diminishing demand as a 
rationale for layoffs or the number of redundancies relative to the total workforce, are 
associated with a stronger negative market reaction. 
The present paper builds on Gerpott’s survey. I review empirical evidence from eleven 
publications on the effects of layoff announcements on shareholder wealth in the period 
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January 2007 to December 2015. These publications cover the investigation period 1970 to 
2012. Empirical evidence is mixed, showing negative and positive share price reactions to layoff 
announcements.  
Similarly to the publications reviewed by Gerpott, the majority of subsequent studies 
from the period 2007 to 2015 analyzes announcements across several industries during a 
certain period and in a particular geographical region. Only few studies focus on a certain 
industry. Goins and Gruca (2008), for instance, examine layoff announcements in the US oil 
and gas industry from 1989 to 1996. Fraunhoffer et al. (2014) concentrate on announcements 
of workforce reductions in the global aviation industry during the period from 2003 to 2012.  
The dominance of cross-sectional studies is surprising as there is evidence showing 
variations between industries in the stock price reaction to layoff announcements (e.g. Elayan 
et al., 1998; Hallock, 1998). Variations between industries are confirmed, for instance, by 
Hallock (1998) who points out that certain industries stand out against the average having 
rather large negative abnormal  returns on the announcement date, including general 
merchandise stores (-1.8 percent) and business services (-4.3 percent). Likewise, the results of 
Elayan et al. (1998) vary notably for different industries. While positive average abnormal 
returns are observed for industries such as “manufacturing process product”, “mining and 
extraction” or “transportation and utility”, other industries on average experience negative and 
significant stock price reactions, e.g. “consumer products” or “hotel, business, health and 
educational services”. The authors note that an alteration of a firm’s human capital is likely to 
have a greater impact on companies in the service industry than on those in manufacturing 
industries since the former are highly dependent on their human capital. Manufacturing or 
transportation and utilities, by contrast, rely more on physical capital and are thus less sensitive 
to measures in the field of human resources. The impact is expected to be particularly high in 
the personnel-intensive financial services sector. 
The following table 5.1 compliments the overview in Gerpott (2007). It presents event 
studies concerned with layoff announcements and published between 2007 and 2014. Two 
prior studies are additionally considered because they focus on the financial sector.  
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In light of their special importance for the present paper, I present investigations that relate to the 
financial sector in more detail even if they were published earlier than 2007. I identify four relevant 
studies. 
The first analysis specifically concerning the banking sector was conducted by Madura et 
al. (1995). The timeframe for their event study is 1984 to 1992, research subject are 48 layoff 
announcements by US banks that are listed on the ASE or NYSE at the time of the event. Assuming 
that banks share many similar features due to high regulation within the sector, the authors expect 
intra-industry effects of bank layoff announcements. General sector conditions such as falling 
demand for bank services eventually leading to restructuring measures including layoffs should 
apply for all institutions. Provided that the underlying causes for layoffs are industry wide, a layoff 
announcement may have a signal function for competitors’ future performance and thus lead to a 
revaluation of the rivals’ shares (Madura et al., 1995). Announcing firms experience a negative and 
significant share price reduction on the announcement day. The analysis further yields positive and 
significant intra-industry effects. Share price reactions for rival banks are positive on the 
announcement day. The authors see support for the theory that competitive effects dominate over 
contagion effects. Announcements of staff cuts may signal an opportunity for rival banks to gain 
market share or valuable human capital23. These spill-over effects are more advantageous if 
announcing and rival banks are established in the same region and also in time periods 
characterized by high banking industry earnings. 
Elayan et al. (1998) investigate 646 layoff announcements in the United States from 1979 
to 1991 in a cross-sector analysis. The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for the total 
sample is -0.64 percent during the [-1;+0] event window and significant. The subsample “financial 
institutions” comprises 87 announcements with a stronger negative and highly significant CAAR 
of -1.60 percent. The findings indicate that announcements of planned redundancies convey 
negative information about a firm’s current status and possibly also its prospects including poor 
investment or growth opportunities or uncertain future cash flows and are thus consistent with the 
declining investment opportunities hypothesis. The negative market reaction results from a 
downwards revaluation by shareholders induced by the unexpected bad news.  
                                                          
23 Goldman Sachs, for instance, is believed to dismiss employees “in order to pick the best talent available at some of its 
rivals. Even though the company is planning to cut its workforce soon, it is believed that the group is expecting its overall 
headcount to increase this year”(Global Banking News, 2008, June 16). 
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Cagle et al. (2009) analyze notifications of US financial institutions during the period 1994 
to 2003. Their sample is divided by firm type into three sub-groups, namely banks and bank holding 
companies (42 announcements), security brokers and dealers (21) and others, including non-
depositary financial institutions (15). Contrary to Madura et al. (1995), banks in their sample on 
average experience a positive and significant CAAR of 1.31 percent during the [-1;+1] event 
window. Stock price reaction for the second group of brokers and dealers is negative but only 
weakly significant. No significant share price reaction can be observed for the third group 
comprising other financial institutions. The favorable returns for banks remain after controlling for 
firm and layoff size, stated reason and governance structure. Thus, evidence is provided for inter-
financial-services-industry differences in share price reaction to layoff announcements (Cagle et al., 
2009). Furthermore, the results support the idea that strict regulation affecting banks reduces 
asymmetric information associated with layoff announcements while that is not the case for brokers 
and dealers and other financial institutions. Capital markets may thus perceive bank notifications 
on staff cuts as being in the interest of shareholders rather than announcements of the other 
subgroups (Cagle et al., 2009). 
Marshall et al. (2012) examine announcements of UK listed stock corporations including 
financial institutions from 2005 to 2006 and in 2008. Their total sample consists of 143 
announcements, thereof 19 by banks and financial services providers. By consideration of two 
distinct time periods, namely pre-crisis years versus the year of the global financial crisis, the study 
aims at determining differences in the reaction in dependency on general financial market 
conditions. Marshall et al. refer to Farber and Hallock (2009) who note that the frequency of 
redundancies is closely associated with the general business cycle. The number of dismissals will 
thus most likely increase during the crisis. In reference to the efficiency hypothesis, market reaction 
to layoffs assessed as efficiency-enhancing is expected to be neutral or positive. According to the 
declining investment hypothesis, market reaction to layoffs indicating poor investment 
opportunities is expected to be negative. Whereas the pre-crisis cross-sector analysis reveals a 
positive market reaction during the three-day event window around the announcement, the market 
response in crisis year 2008 is clearly negative. Concentrating on banks and financial service 
providers, pre-crisis average return is positive in the three-day event window and in the five-day 
event window (0.78 percent) but not significant. In the year of the crisis, however, the negative 
impact on financial institutions is notably stronger than that on other industry sectors. Banks and 
financial services experience a highly significant and negative CAAR of -6.99 percent in the [-1;+1] 
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day event window and -10.58 percent in the [-2;+2] event window. Evidence indicates that share 
price reaction in fact varies with stock market conditions (Marshall et al., 2012). 
 
5.3.3 Explanatory factors for effect variations 
5.3.3.1 Reasons for layoffs 
Layoff announcements serve as a signal for a company’s financial situation and capital markets 
seem to be sensitive to the reasoning behind the planned redundancies (Worrell et al., 1991). The 
firm’s motivation for the layoffs is thus found to have a crucial impact on the share price reaction 
following such announcements.  
The substantive reasons for reductions in staff provided by the announcing firm are the 
most researched subject in 32 publications analyzed by Gerpott (2007) and also in those 11 
reviewed in the present paper. 30 studies investigate the strategic thrust behind the planned layoffs, 
20 of them operationalize it (solely or in addition to a more detailed distinction) as a dichotomous 
variable.  
These studies distinguish between only two main types of motivation, for instance efficiency 
enhancement versus declining demand (Palmon et al., 1997), similarly restructuring versus low 
demand (Hahn & Reyes, 2004) or improved efficiency versus other reasons (Cagle et al., 2009). 
Five studies in Gerpott and four recent studies published after 2006 (Capelle-Blancard & Tatu, 
2012; Fraunhoffer et al., 2014; Knauer & Lachmann, 2011; Neus & Walter, 2009) use a 
dichotomous variable to differentiate between “proactive” and “reactive” strategic corporate 
behavior.  
Proactive vs. reactive strategy 
One possible distinction is to define a proactive strategy as realizing hidden efficiency reserves and 
a reactive strategy as reducing overcapacities given declining markets (Neus & Walter, 2009). 
Proactive layoffs can be defined as an element of an overriding strategy, reactive layoffs as reaction 
to poor financial performance (Lee, 1997). Several studies group reasons together and label the 
newly created categories “proactive” and “reactive” strategy. The logic behind this categorization 
is that given reasons such as efficiency increase, cost reduction or implementation of new 
technologies are viewed as proactive strategies whereas layoffs in response to a fall in demand, 
weak market/sector conditions and poor past financial performance are seen as reactive strategies 
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(Capelle-Blancard & Tatu, 2012; Lee, 1997). Other studies strive to objectify this assessment by 
clear criteria, e.g. sales growth (proactive) versus sales decline (reactive) during the year prior to 
the announcement (Fraunhoffer et al., 2014).  
Proactive layoffs are likely to have a positive impact on future cash flows. Moreover, they may be 
an indication for a prudent, strategically acting management team, which anticipates changes in 
the environment (McKnight, Lowrie & Coles, 2002). Investors should thus consider proactive 
layoffs as a positive sign. Reactive layoffs, in contrast, convey new information on potentially 
critical market conditions and a firm’s difficult financial situation. They can be perceived as a sign 
for management’s poor assessment of market development and its inability to cope with 
uncertainties. Shareholders will likely view reactive layoffs as a negative sign.  
Empirical evidence indeed points to a different assessment of both strategies by capital 
markets. Stock market reaction to reactive strategies tends to be negative and statistically 
significant (Capelle-Blancard & Tatu, 2012; Elayan, 1997; Hahn & Reyes, 2004; Lee, 1997; 
McKnight et al., 2002; Neus & Walter, 2009). Market reactions to proactive strategies tend to be 
positive (Capelle-Blancard & Tatu, 2012; Fraunhoffer et al., 2014; Hahn & Reyes, 2004; McKnight 
et al., 2002) or at least less negative (Lee, 1997), although in some cases statistically insignificant 
(McKnight et al., 2002; Lee, 1997). 
Hypothesis 1: Stock price reaction will be positive to proactive layoffs and negative to  
   reactive layoffs. 
Gerpott (2007) points out the methodological weaknesses in operationalizing strategic thrusts or 
reasons. Problems may occur due to a significant amount of imprecision in announcements and 
most likely a high degree of overlap. Layoffs defined as proactive often contain elements that 
theoretically indicate a reactive layoff. The need for cost reduction and improvements in efficiency, 
for instance, is closely, if not inseparably, linked with most other reasons (e.g. Iqbal & Shetty, 
1995).  
Farber and Hallock (2009) define three categories of reasons for layoffs, namely 
reorganization, plant closing and cost issues. Other scholars extend the range of stated reasons up 
to four, such as non-profitable operations, restructuring, labor-management dispute and 
discontinued operations/products (Elayan et al., 1998). Hillier et al. (2007) classify stated reasons 
for layoffs into six major categories: reorganization, plant/branch closure, poor performance, fall 
in demand, cost cutting and merger or acquisition. Additional redundancy reasons of relevance 
may be technological innovation (Madura et al., 1995), increased competition (Brookman, Chang 
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& Rennie, 2007b) or offshoring/outsourcing (Marshall et al., 2012). It should be further noted that 
some announcing firms cite a variety of reasons thus preventing an unambiguous classification, 
while other firms do not provide any specific reasons for the planned layoffs.  
Reorganization/cost reduction 
Reorganization efforts and cost reductions are likely to produce benefits and increase efficiency. 
Empirical evidence shows that investors react less negatively (Elayan et al., 1998) or even positively 
to layoff announcements related to restructuring efforts (Hahn & Reyes, 2004) and also positively 
when the reason given is an efficiency gain (Palmon et al., 1997). Stock price reaction tends to be 
less negative given the stated reason is cutting costs instead of unprofitable operations (Elayan et 
al., 1998).  
Plant/branch closure 
Research on plant closures has shown that respective announcements allow for conclusions 
regarding the firm’s financial and competitive position as problems causing the closing may affect 
the firm’s entire operations (Gombola & Tsetsekos, 1992). Diminishing demand or production costs 
as underlying causes support the declining investment hypothesis. Shareholders may be driven to 
revise their expectation for future cash flows downwards. Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992) show 
that firm-wide problems become apparent in reduced profitability in conjunction with a drop in 
employment, asset acquisition and dividend growth in the announcement year and the following 
year. Poor financial performance is consistent with an observed negative stock price reaction to the 
notification. Negative reactions are more pronounced if the closings concern large-size plants.  
The situation is different with regard to the financial services sector as there are no 
production sites but only branches. Branch closures in the banking sector are often part of internal 
restructuring strategies or a result from mergers and acquisitions (Madura et al., 1995), a 
consequence from the withdrawal from particular markets and business areas or lacking efficiency 
of the branches concerned. Moreover, jobs in banking may become superfluous due to technological 
innovation (Madura et al., 1995). During the past years, the change from “analog” banking with 
direct customer contact at the branch towards internet-based “digital” banking has picked up pace. 
Hence, branch networks are being continually downsized while online banking services are further 
expanded with the aim to prepare the banks’ structures for the future (ECB, 2015). Withdrawals 
from unprofitable markets, elimination of overlapping capacities and closures of loss-making 
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branches should generally serve to enhance efficiency and are likely to be assessed positively by 
capital markets. 
Mergers and acquisitions 
Redundancies usually occur following mergers and acquisitions. Reduction of these redundancies 
is necessary in order to ensure cost and efficiency optimization. Synergy costs savings may be 
obtained. It can be assumed that market participants expect layoffs as a consequence of mergers 
and that effects have thus already been largely factored into market prices (Fraunhoffer et al., 
2014; Knauer & Lachmann, 2011) at the time of the merger or acquisition announcement.  
Poor performance 
Poor financial performance may be given as a reason for layoffs by the announcing firm itself. Poor 
financial performance can also be defined based on financial performance measures, for example, 
by either a significant decrease in earnings per share (EPS) or negative EPS (Worrell et al., 1991), 
below-industry average ROE, net income or sales per employee (Elayan et al., 1998) or negative 
ROE in conjunction with a recent bond downgrade (Iqbal & Shetty, 1995). All definitions usually 
refer to one or two years prior to the announcement date.  
Empirical evidence regarding the influence of a firm’s financial position on investors’ 
perception of layoffs is contradictory. Hillier et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2001) show that layoff 
announcing firms significantly underperformed the market during the three-year period prior to 
the announcement. It seems as if investors were at least partly aware of the firm’s poor financial 
condition. Elayan et al. (1998) find negative abnormal returns for their total sample. The results 
support the declining investment hypothesis. Firms with a performance24 below the industry 
average in the two years prior to the announcement experience no significant market reaction 
suggesting that poor performance was already factored in and staff cuts were anticipated. Negative 
market reactions to notifications from firms with a prior performance above the industry average 
indicate that capital markets were taken by surprise and had to revise their forecasts downwards 
(Elayan et al., 1998). Iqbal and Shetty’s (1995) findings, in contrast, indicate that financially weak 
firms experience a positive market reaction whereas stock returns of financially healthy firms are 
negative and lower. Their interpretation is that from the investors’ perspective, the potential 
benefits of staff cuts are less for financially sound firms. The authors conclude that those firms 
                                                          
24 Measured by Return on Equity (ROE), reflecting the firm’s performance and efficiency and by Net Income per Employee 
(NI/EM) and Sales per Employee (SL/EM), both reflecting the efficiency of the firm’s labor force. 
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should consider alternative solutions to dismissals such as pay cuts, working time reduction or job 
sharing (Iqbal & Shetty, 1995). Worrell et al. (1991) show that both groups of firms experience 
negative share price reactions, whereby the layoffs related to financial distress are significantly 
more negative.  
Fall in demand 
Declining demand for the bank’s products and services may make it necessary to reduce staff and 
costs (Madura et al., 1995). Decreasing demand may be caused by poor product quality, reduced 
competitiveness, weakened brand reputation or general shifts in demand.  It may also be initiated 
by a recession with declining stock markets. In the case of US banks, for instance, the subprime 
crisis and the collapse of the US housing market led to an extreme fall in demand for mortgage 
loans. Layoffs occurred as a result of mortgage banks, specialized branches and bank business units 
or special-purpose entities responsible for securitization of loans. Layoffs in response to a fall in 
demand can be classified as a reactive measure. Market reaction to layoffs justified with a slump in 
demand is rather negative (Hahn & Reyes, 2004; Palmon et al., 1997). 
Hypothesis 2: Market reactions to layoff announcements will differ depending   
   on the stated reason. 
Hypothesis 2a: Market reaction will be positive for the stated reasons reorganization,  
   cost cutting and branch closure. 
Hypothesis 2b: Market reaction will be neutral for stated reason mergers and   
   acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 2c: Market reaction will be negative for stated reasons fall in demand and  
   poor past performance. 
 
5.3.3.2 Business cycle/stock market conditions 
Farber and Hallock (2009) find that the number of layoff announcements closely follows the 
general business cycle. From the investors’ viewpoint, layoffs during recession and declining 
markets are likely to be perceived as reactive to economic conditions and poor future prospects 
(Marshall et al., 2012). The financial sector was severely impacted by the financial crisis that began 
in late 2007, thus the stock price reaction to layoff announcements is expected to be materially 
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different from that of other industries. Layoffs during economic expansion and rising markets, 
however, are being considered rather as proactive and efficiency enhancing. 
Marshall et al. (2012) find that capital markets respond positively to layoffs during 
prosperous markets in the period from 2005 to 2006. Market reaction to layoffs undertaken during 
the 2008 financial crisis lead to negative capital market reactions. The price effects are consistent 
regardless of the reason for the staff reduction and the industry of the announcing firm.  
Hypothesis 3:  Market reactions to layoff announcements will be zero or positive   
   during rising financial markets and negative during the period   
   of the financial crisis. 
 
5.3.3.3 Influence of employment protection legislation 
Comparing the United States with member states of the European Union, the two countries from 
the Anglo-Saxon area have the least stringent employment protection legislation (OECD, 2016a). 
In 2004, legislation on individual and collective dismissals was by far least strict in the United 
States, followed by the United Kingdom. Ireland came third. By contrast, OECD data shows that 
strictness was highest in Portugal, followed by the Czech Republic, the Netherlands ranking third. 
In 2013, the situation was nearly identical, only Latvia replaced Greece on rank four (OECD, 
2016a). The indicator of strictness of employment protection with respect to collective dismissals 
“measures additional costs and procedures involved in dismissing more than one worker at a time 
(compared with the cost of individual dismissal)” (OECD, 2016b) and incorporates four data items. 
The OECD recommends that this data should not be used in isolation from the indicators that refer 
to individual dismissals.  
The following figure 5.1 depicts variations in strictness of employment protection for the United 
States and European OECD member states. 
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Figure 5.1: Strictness of employment protection – individual and collective dismissals 
 
Source: own diagram/OECD, 2016a25 
It can be deduced that layoffs can be executed faster and at relatively lower costs in countries with 
less stringent employment protection legislation. In countries with strict legislation, on the other 
hand, dismissals are likely to extend over a long period of time, they will most likely cause 
significantly higher costs, and resistance from employees and unions is to be expected.  
Hypothesis 4:  Market reactions to layoff announcements will differ depending   
   on the strictness of employment protection legislation. 
Hypothesis 4a: Market reaction to layoff announcements will be positive in    
   countries with less stringent employment protection legislation. 
Hypothesis 4b: Market reaction to layoff announcements will be negative in    
   countries with strict employment protection legislation. 
  
                                                          
25 “The OECD indicators of employment protection are synthetic indicators of the strictness of regulation on dismissals 
and the use of temporary contracts. For each year, indicators refer to regulation in force on the 1st of January. The OECD 
indicators of employment protection legislation measure the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or 
groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts. The 
indicators have been compiled using the Secretariat’s own reading of statutory laws, collective bargaining agreements 
and case law as well as contributions from officials from OECD member countries and advice from country experts” 
(OECD, 2016b). 
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5.3.3.4 Absolute and relative layoff size 
According to Gerpott (2007), the magnitude of staff cuts is the second most frequently investigated 
characteristic of reductions in workforce programs in studies up to and including 2006 and it 
remains a variable frequently examined in subsequent studies (e.g. Brookman et al., 2007b; Cagle 
et al., 2009; Hillier et al. 2007). The relative layoff size is determined as the ratio of the number of 
workers to be released to total staff at the beginning of the year of the announcement. 
The size of a firm’s planned job cuts is one important signal to the market as it is an 
indication for the gravity of the company’s financial situation (Lee, 1997). Very low downsizing 
ratios are not likely to induce a noticeable market reaction. Empirical evidence shows that market 
reactions to large layoffs are stronger and more negative than to small layoffs (Elayan et al., 1998; 
Hillier et al., 2007; Worrell et al., 1991).  
However, there is no established definition of a threshold. As Gerpott (2007) points out, 
the threshold value varies between 0.5 percent (Nixon, Hitt, Lee & Jeong, 2004) and 5.0 percent 
(Iqbal & Akhige, 1997) whereas Hahn and Reyes (2004) use the absolute figure of 1,000 employees 
to be released. Hillier et al. (2007), for example, report clearly stronger negative CAARs for layoff 
sizes above their sample’s median relative layoff size of 4.10 percent. The median relative layoff 
sizes in analyses of the financial sector vary considerably. The average percentage of employees 
released by banks in Cagle et al.’s (2009) analysis is 8.14 percent for the period of 1994 to 2003, 
Marshall et al. (2012) report an average of 2.5 percent for banks and financial services for the time 
period 2005 to 2006 and an average percentage of 4.7 percent for the crisis year 2008. 
Large-scale staff cuts create the highest risk of losing valuable human capital with a 
probable negative impact on future cash flows (Nixon et al., 2004). This is particularly relevant for 
the labor intensive services industry including the financial sector (Elayan et al., 1998). The relative 
share of highly qualified and valuable employees is higher in large-scale dismissals than in selective 
layoffs (Worrell et al., 1991). Layoffs by banks are thus expected to induce a strong negative stock 
price reaction. 
In Marshall et al.’s (2012) sample, the relative size of layoffs increases in almost all surveyed 
industries from 2005-2006 to 2008. Unsurprisingly, these increases are strongest for banks and 
financial services but also for the media as well as the consumer products and the mining industry. 
The largest layoffs in relation to the total sample during the financial crisis period can be observed 
in the sectors financial services, services as well as mining and telecoms and utilities. Firms from 
these industries appear to be the most adversely affected by the crisis. 
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Hypothesis 5:  Market reaction to large bank layoff announcements will be    
   negative and increase with layoff size.  
 
5.4 Data  
I build my sample from the lists of the largest US and European banks provided by BankScope. 
During my investigation period 2004 to 2014, the banking sector saw a large number of 
insolvencies, mergers and acquisitions. In order to capture all banks of relevance during the 
investigation period, I search for the largest banks at two different points in time: December 31, 
2004 and December 31, 2014. I restrict my sample to banks with total assets of no less than 100 
billion US dollar at the end of 2004 and/or at the end of 2014. I search Lexis-Nexis and the Reuters 
database for layoff announcements by the selected stock-listed banks from January 1, 2004 to 
December 31, 2014. The initial sample consists of 495 announcements by 20 US banks and 42 
European banks. I collect stock data from Datastream. I exclude the two largest Russian banks as 
the search does not yield reliable data. This reduces the number observations to 491. Controlling 
for confounding events in the [-5;+5] event window around the announcement date such as 
simultaneously reported losses, recent poor financial performance, a profit warning or a merger 
announcement further reduces the number to 301 announcements. I further exclude 
announcements of less than 100 redundancies as I consider this information as being irrelevant to 
firm financial performance and thus also to stock prices. In case the number of redundancies is 
given in form of a range, I use the figure at the upper end of the range. Given that only the first 
announcement on a planned workforce reduction conveys new information to the market (Hallock, 
1998; Hillier et al., 2007), follow-up messages are thus not taken into consideration. After applying 
these additional filters, the sample comprises 210 layoff announcements by 18 US banks and 31 
European banks. 
The 49 banks in my sample announced a total of 554,158 redundancies during the 
investigation period 2004 to 2014. US banks account for 52.6 percent with 291,531 planned 
layoffs. Banks headquartered in Europe announced 262,627 layoffs. In terms of the number of 
employees to be laid off, I observe two peaks, namely in 2007/2008, the years of the global 
financial crisis, and in 2013, during the European sovereign debt crisis. This result is in line with 
previous findings showing that the frequency of redundancies is closely associated with the general 
business cycle (Farber & Hallock, 2009; Fraunhoffer et al., 2014; Marshall et al., 2012). The banks 
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under review announced an average of 2,800 redundancies. This corresponds to almost 3 percent 
of their total workforce. The following table 5.2 shows the temporal distribution of announcements 
on planned staff cuts during the investigation period. 
Table 5.2: Temporal distribution of announcements on planned layoffs by banks 
Year No. of 
Announcements 
Percent Layoffs Layoffs 
(mean) 
Layoff ratio 
(mean) 
2004 8 3.81 34,850 4,356 3.9% 
2005 8 3.81 22,600 2,825 4.1% 
2006 4 1.90 10,740 2,685 3.3% 
2007 24 11.43 101,544 4,231 3.5% 
2008 28 13.33 96,605 3,450 4.1% 
2009 31 14.76 43,509 1,389 2.1% 
2010 18 8.57 32,030 1,779 2.3% 
2011 28 13.33 40,842 1,459 1.8% 
2012 20 9.52 33,238 1,662 4.6% 
2013 25 11.90 94,528 3,781 3.5% 
2014 16 7.62 43,671 2,729 2.0% 
Total 210 100 554,157 2,639 2.9% 
This table shows the temporal distribution of announcements on planned reductions in workforce by banks 
in absolute values and percentages. Column "Layoffs" displays the total number of planned layoffs per year, 
whereas column "Layoffs (mean)" presents the mean value for the number of employees to be made 
redundant. The mean value for the planned staff reduction as a percentage of total staff is displayed in 
column "Layoff ratio (mean)". 
 
The announcements are further analyzed regarding the rationale behind the layoffs and affected 
divisions. Special consideration is firstly given to the stated reason for the planned redundancies. 
The stated reasons are in fact not mutually exclusive. Classification is performed based on the 
primary reason for the reduction in workforce. The main given reasons for staff cuts are mergers 
and acquisitions, general restructuring of the organization, efforts to reduce costs, declining 
demand or poor past financial performance. Further arguments are recognized under “other 
reasons”.  
Derived from the provided arguments, the staff cuts can be classified as proactive or reactive 
measures. The procedure largely follows that of Lee (1997), Capelle-Blancard and Tatu (2012) and 
Fraunhoffer et al. (2014). A layoff is categorized as proactive if it is carried out on the bank's own 
initiative, typically aiming at reducing costs or increasing efficiency. However, cost reductions and 
reorganization can also be reactive measures if undertaken in response to a crisis situation. Layoffs 
in response to a fall in demand or poor past financial performance are always categorized as 
reactive layoffs. Moreover, I examine whether investment banking is affected. I am particularly 
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interested in the capital market reactions to dismissals of employees from this division as salary 
levels are notably high within this division but its employees are valuable human capital from the 
bank’s perspective. In a third of all cases, banks announce that employees from this division are to 
be released. I also analyze whether the redundancies resulted from branch closures. Almost a fifth 
of announcements provides branch closures as the major reason for the planned layoffs. The 
respective country's strictness of employment protection legislation is determined according to 
OECD data covering the years 2004 to 2013 (2016a). The OECD indicator takes into account 
legislation on individual and collective dismissals.  
The most mentioned reasons for staff cuts are cost cutting (60) and reorganization (57). 
Declining demand (22) is the least mentioned reason apart from “other reasons” (14). In the pre-
crisis years 2004 to 2006, a period of rising stock markets, cost reduction (7) and reorganization 
(7) are the main reasons for staff cuts whereas no references are made to a fall in demand or poor 
past performance. The picture changes considerably during the crisis years 2007 to 2009; reactive 
reasons dominate this period. While cost cutting and restructuring remain major reasons (17 each), 
16 announced layoffs are attributable to poor past financial performance and ten have their source 
in declining demand. In post-crisis years 2010 to 2014, proactive strategies clearly dominate. Cost 
cutting and reorganization are named three times more frequently than all other reasons.  
I further consider firm-specific financial figures such as return on equity (ROE), the cost-
income ratio or personnel expenses per employee as control variables in my analysis. The following 
table 5.3 presents descriptive sample statistics.  
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Table 5.3: Descriptive sample statistics 
  n Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Q25 Q75 Max 
Event-specific variables 
       
Number of 
people affected 
210 2,637 1,000 5,514 100 425 2,300 45,000 
Percentage layoff 210 0.031 0.014 0.040 0.000 0.004 0.042 0.287 
Pre-crisis 44 0.210 0 0.408 0 0 1 1 
Crisis 49 0.233 0 0.424 0 0 1 1 
Post-crisis 117 0.557 0 0.498 0 0 1 1 
Strict labor law 59 0.281 0 0.451 0 0 1 1 
Investment 
banking 
68 0.324 0 0.470 0 0 1 1 
Branches 39 0.186 0 0.390 0 0 1 1 
Reasons for layoffs        
M&A 30 0.143 0 0.351 0 0 1 1 
Reorganization 57 0.271 0 0.446 0 0 1 1 
Cost Cutting 60 0.286 0 0.453 0 0 1 1 
Fall in Demand 22 0.105 0 0.307 0 0 1 1 
Poor past 
performance 
27 0.129 0 0.336 0 0 1 1 
Other reasons 14 0.067 0 0.250 0 0 1 1 
Layoff strategy          
Proactive 109 0.519 0 0.501 0 0 1 1 
reactive  101 0.481 0 0.501 0 0 1 1 
Firm-specific control variables 
Total assets 
(USD) 
210 1,347,908 1,188,749 886,934 97,411 625,709 2,127,539 3,777,312 
Assets/Employee  210 15 14 10 2 7 19 62 
Sales/Employee  210 700 480 495 155 391 796 3,576 
Personnel 
Exp./Employee  
210 133 93 121 16 63 133 663 
Return on equity 
(in %) 
210 8.88 9.58 12.47 -43.14 3.68 16 49.76 
Cost-income ratio 
(in %) 
210 66.86 64.2 15.94 43.03 57.02 73.12 151.89 
Employees 210 120,179 97,125 96,525 5,456 33,988 170,961 375,000 
United States 79 0.376 0 0.486 0 0 1 1 
Europe 131 0.624 1 0.486 0 0 1 1 
This table presents the descriptive sample statistic of my final sample comprising 210 layoff 
announcements by banks, split by event-specific variables, reasons for layoffs, layoff strategy and firm-
specific variables. Number of people affected is the number of employees to be made redundant. 
Percentage layoff indicates the number of redundancies relative to the total workforce. Pre-Crisis 
comprises events in the timeframe before the financial crisis that is January 2004 to November 2007. 
Crisis is the number of events that occurred during the recent global financial crisis and is defined as 
the time period from December 2007 to June 2009 (see also National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2010). 
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
Post-Crisis covers events during the period after the financial crisis, defined as July 2009 to December 
2014. Strict labor law is a country's strictness of employment protection legislation according to OECD 
data (2016a). Countries with a value of below 2 are coded "non-strict", countries with a value of 2 or 
above are coded "strict". Investment banking indicates if employees from this division are to be made 
redundant. Branches indicates if layoffs occur in the course of branch closures. M&A are layoff 
announcements linked to merger and acquisition activities whereas Reorganization comprises 
announcements related to restructuring efforts. Cost Cutting indicates that cost reduction is the primary 
layoff reason. Fall in Demand indicates that the announced layoffs are response to a decline in demand 
for the bank's products and Poor Past Performance indicates that staff cuts are attributable to poor 
recent financial performance. Other reasons includes reasons that cannot be assigned to one of the 
other categories. Proactive is a reduction in workforce carried out on the bank's own initiative. Reactive 
is a reduction in workforce in response to a crisis situation that has already occured. Total assets 
(WC02999) are the total assets of the firm in thousands of US dollars (USD) on the last trading day in 
the year prior to the layoff announcement. Assets/Employee (WC08406) is total assets in thousands of 
USD divided by the total number of employees on the last trading day in the year prior to the layoff 
announcement. Sales/Employee (WC08351) is net sales per employee in thousands of USD. Personnel 
Exp./Employee is personnel expenses in thousands of US divided by the total number of employees on 
the last trading day in the year prior to the layoff announcement. Return on equity (WC08301) is (Net 
Income – Bottom Line - Preferred Dividend Requirement) / Average of Last Year's and Current Year’s 
Common Equity * 100. Cost-income ratio is: total non-interest expenses/(total non-interest operating 
income + equity-accounted profit/loss operating + net interest income). Employees (WC07011) is the 
number of employees on the last trading day in the year prior to the layoff announcement. United States 
are layoffs by banks headquartered in the United States of America. Europe are layoffs by banks 
headquartered in Western Europe. 
 
5.5 Methodology 
The event study methodology goes back to Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) and is still 
employed today very frequently. The event study measures the impact of new, unexpected 
information on a company’s share price. Assuming information efficiency on capital markets, it is 
to determine whether the disclosure of new information leads to excess returns on the 
announcement date or within an event window. The excess or abnormal return 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 of a layoff 
announcement i represents the difference between the actual return 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 on the event day t and the 
expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡).  
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) (1) 
 
The expected return is composed of two parts: the market return and the stock-specific return. 
Several options for estimating the market return are available, including the market model, the 
market-adjusted model and the constant mean return model (Neus & Walter, 2009). The present 
study uses the market model. I use the value-weighted market index for each relevant country 
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(Total Return Index) provided by Thomson Financial Datastream as market return. The Total 
Return Indices represent country-specific price indices, adjusted for changes in capital structure 
and dividend payments. The two components market return and stock-specific return can be 
displayed using a linear regression model from historical return data. The share of the expected 
return that is driven by overall stock market performance is expressed by the product 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡. The 
share that reflects the average stock-specific return independent of market movements is measured 
by 𝛼𝑖.  
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖  +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
Parameters 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽1 can be estimated for every event by an ordinary-least-squares-model (OLS-
model) using an interval of 250 trading days prior to the event window (Fraunhoffer et al., 2014; 
Hillier et al., 2007; Knauer & Lachmann, 2011; Nixon et al., 2004). This interval comprises 
approximately a full calendar year. The exact definition of the event date is crucial but often 
difficult (Farber & Hallock, 2009). I use the first announcement or report on a planned reduction 
in workforce by a bank from my predefined group. However, it is possible that information on the 
planned layoffs leaked through at an earlier point in time. In this case, the analysis will not capture 
the full impact of the staff cut announcements on share prices (Farber & Hallock, 2009).  
The average abnormal return (AAR) in my sample with “N” observations is calculated for a 
event day τ using the following formula: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝜏 =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (3) 
 
 In order to calculate the cumulative abnormal return, the daily abnormal returns of an event i are 
summed up over the event window [τ1; τ2]. This calculation reflects the change in asset value within 
the event period (Gerpott & Jakopin, 2006; Fraunhoffer et al., 2014).  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝜏1;𝜏2] =   ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
 (4) 
 
Eventually, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over all N announcements is 
calculated on the basis of the CARs of each announcement. 
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𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅[𝜏1;𝜏2] =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝜏1;𝜏2]
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (5) 
 
For evaluation of statistical significance, I initially apply a t-test as a parametric method. In 
addition, I adopt the parametric test method presented by Boehmer, Masumeci and Poulsen (1991) 
in order to control for higher variances of stock returns in the event window induced by the layoff 
announcements. Furthermore, I apply the non-parametric rank test set out by Corrado (1989) and 
the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. The influence of announcement- and company-specific factors on 
the direction and magnitude of the stock price reaction is examined by means of an OLS regression.  
 
5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Univariate analysis of the announcement effect 
The first interest is directed at the question if an announcement of planned job cuts conveys 
information, which is new to shareholders and relevant to the valuation. I strive to determine 
direction and magnitude of the stock price reaction as previous findings for layoff announcements 
by financial institutions are inconsistent.  
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the total sample are clearly negative. 
This result supports the declining investment opportunities hypothesis: the announcements convey 
negative information on the issuers’ current status and perspectives. Shareholders are pessimistic 
about the banks’ future prospects and anticipate a negative impact on cash flows. They perform a 
downwards revaluation in response to the unexpected bad news. My results are in line with the 
findings of Madura et al. (1995) and Elayan et al. (1998) and in contradiction to the results of 
Cagle et al. (2009). 
Hypothesis 1 states that stock price reactions will be positive to proactive layoffs and 
negative to reactive layoffs. Contrary to my expectations, returns are negative for both subsamples 
albeit insignificant for proactive layoffs. Thus, the results do not support hypothesis 1. The negative 
stock price reaction is most pronounced for reactive layoff strategies and least negative for proactive 
layoff strategies. The results suggest that layoff announcements by banks generally have a 
decreasing effect on shareholder value. It seems reasonable to conclude that capital markets 
recognize and assess the risk associated with the loss of human capital. Through releasing 
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employees, banks risk losing both their key source of earnings and their main links to the customers. 
Reductions in equity value are likely to be highest if stock markets perceive the reasoning behind 
the planned staff cuts as reactive. Moreover, I observe that the stock price reaction occurs prior to 
the actual event day. This observation is in line with previous findings and indicates leakage of 
information (Lin & Rozeff, 1993). Table 5.4 presents the stock price reactions by underlying 
strategy for different event windows.  
Table 5.4: Event study: Banks’ abnormal stock returns by underlying strategy 
  (Cumulative)   
abnormal return  
t-test Boehmer  Corrado Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank  
N 
Event 
window 
mean median t-value z-score   z-score   
Panel A: total sample             
[0;0] -0.25% -0.16% -1.561 -1.280 -2.096** -2.167** 210 
[-1;0] -0.45% -0.50% -2.008** -1.726* -2.741*** -2.552** 210 
[0;+1] -0.45% -0.27% -1.952* -1.732* -2.243** -2.236** 210 
[-1;+1] -0.65% -0.55% -2.368** -2.137** -2.859*** -2.857*** 210 
[-5;-1] -0.69% -0.44% -2.250** -2.131** -2.348** -2.424** 210 
[-5;+5] -1.39% -1.17% -2.724*** -2.521** -3.384*** -3.474*** 210 
Panel B: proactive layoff strategies           
[0;0] -0.05% -0.09% -0.229 -0.419 -0.966 -0.945 109 
[-1;0] -0.06% -0.30% -0.193 -0.510 -0.823 -0.579 109 
[0;+1] -0.05% -0.26% -0.155 -0.518 -1.169 -1.338 109 
[-1;+1] -0.06% -0.26% -0.156 -0.603 -1.069 -1.002 109 
[-5;-1] -0.37% -0.11% -0.982 -0.750 -0.049 -0.540 109 
[-5;+5] -0.16% -0.33% -0.250 -0.309 -0.451 -1.054 109 
Panel C: reactive layoff strategies           
[0;0] -0.48% -0.17% -1.878* -1.373 -2.120** -2.119** 101 
[-1;0] -0.88% -0.90% -2.577** -1.941* -3.240*** -2.952*** 101 
[0;+1] -0.89% -0.29% -2.499** -1.931* -2.124** -1.875* 101 
[-1;+1] -1.30% -0.85% -3.108*** -2.479** -3.156*** -3.034*** 101 
[-5;-1] -1.03% -0.95% -2.111** -2.166** -3.578*** -2.617*** 101 
[-5;+5] -2.73% -2.21% -3.402*** -3.107*** -4.601*** -3.633*** c 
   Difference  
Panel B - Panel C 
t-test   Difference  
Panel B - Panel C 
Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum 
test 
Event window mean t-value   median z-score 
[0;0] 0.43% 1.322  0.08% 1.068 
[-1;0] 0.82% 1.834*  0.60% -2.166** 
[0;+1] 0.85% 1.832*  0.03% -0.600 
[-1;+1] 1.24% 2.273**  0.59% -1.796* 
[-5;-1] 0.66% 1.080  0.84% -1.943* 
[-5;+5] 0.0257 2.544**   0.0188 -2.482** 
This table presents (cumulative) abnormal stock returns of banks over several event windows around 
the layoff announcement date. Abnormal stock returns are computed using the market model. Panel A 
reports (cumulative) abnormal stock returns for the total sample. Panel B reports (cumulative) 
abnormal stock returns for proactive layoff strategies. Panel C reports (cumulative) abnormal stock  
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
returns for reactive layoff strategies. T-test and Boehmer test are applied as parametric tests. Corrado 
and Wilcoxon signed rank test are applied as non-parametric tests. Statistical significance of differences 
in mean and median values between Panel B and C is tested with parametric standard t-test and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Results for the total sample are statistically significant for all event windows (Panel A in Table 5.4). 
Yet, the separate consideration of the two layoff strategies shows that the observed CAARs for 
proactive layoffs are not statistically significant (Panel C in Table 5.4). These findings contradict 
evidence from previous studies suggesting that stock price reactions to proactive layoffs are positive 
and significant (Capelle-Blancard & Tatu, 2012; Fraunhoffer et al.; 2014). The analyses of Knauer 
and Lachmann (2011) as well as Neus and Walter (2009), however, similarly yielded no significant 
results for proactive layoffs.  
The observed CAARs for reactive layoffs in my analysis are negative and statistically highly 
significant, consistent with the findings of Capelle-Blancard & Tatu (2012) and also Neus and 
Walter (2009). Capital markets assess job cuts by banks in response to adverse conditions or poor 
past performance as value-decreasing measures. I observe the strongest share price decline of -2.73 
percent in the 11-days event window [-5;+5] (Panel C in Table 5.4). The magnitude of the reaction 
is far greater in comparison with prior findings but still substantially below the level for crisis year 
2008 shown by Marshall et al. (2012), when bank shares fell up to -10.58% in reaction to layoff 
announcements.  
Figure 5.2 displays the stock price reaction to layoff announcements by banks in the United 
States and Western Europe. The graphs show the share price reaction in an event window of eleven 
days around the announcement day for the total sample as well as for layoffs that are a proactive 
measure and for layoffs that are a reactive measure. 
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Figure 5.2: Stock price reactions to bank layoff announcements by underlying strategy 
  
 
Hypothesis 3 states that stock price reactions will be zero or positive during rising financial markets 
and negative during the financial crisis. Capital markets’ reactions in fact differ notably depending 
on the period observed. Stock price reactions are positive yet not significant during the pre-crisis 
years (January 2004 to November 2007) and negative and significant during the crisis years 
(December 2007 to June 2009), in line with my hypothesis and consistent with the findings of 
Marshall et al. (2012). The negative reaction is most pronounced in the eleven-days event window 
[-5;+5] with a CAAR of -2.35 percent. The following table 5.5 shows the stock price reaction during 
pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. 
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Table 5.5: Event study: Banks’ abnormal stock returns in different periods 
  Cumulative   abnormal 
return 
t-test Boehmer  Corrado Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank  
N 
Event 
window 
mean median t-value z-score   z-score   
Panel A: Pre-Crisis             
[0;0] -0.03% -0.30% -0.160 -0.293 -0.856 -1.109 44 
[-1;0] 0.08% -0.35% 0.305 0.162 -0.407 -0.140 44 
[0;+1] 0.09% -0.22% 0.250 0.113 -0.330 -0.654 44 
[-1;+1] 0.20% -0.20% 0.559 0.389 -0.108 -0.163 44 
[-5;-1] 0.24% -0.21% 0.566 0.365 0.203 -0.397 44 
[-5;+5] 0.27% -0.07% 0.491 0.388 -0.257 -0.140 44 
Panel B: Crisis             
[0;0] -0.86% -0.89% -1.697 -1.532 -2.703*** -1.845* 49 
[-1;0] -1.06% -1.42% -1.418* -1.076 -2.588*** -1.845* 49 
[0;+1] -1.59% -0.98% -2.360* -2.196** -3.485*** -2.144** 49 
[-1;+1] -1.78% -0.77% -2.092** -1.798* -3.398*** -2.313** 49 
[-5;-1] -0.58% -1.21% -0.596 -0.492 -1.610 -0.562 49 
[-5;+5] -2.35% -2.16% -1.294 -1.065 -2.612*** -1.706* 49 
Panel C: Post-Crisis             
[0;0] -0.08% -0.05% -0.443 -0.258 -0.728 -0.948 117 
[-1;0] -0.40% -0.40% -1.689* -1.635 -2.066** -1.960* 117 
[0;+1] -0.18% -0.20% -0.673 -0.631 -0.787 -1.285 117 
[-1;+1] -0.50% -0.56% -1.626 -1.769* -1.909* -2.174** 117 
[-5;-1] -1.08% -0.57% -3.268*** -3.328*** -2.549** -2.664*** 117 
[-5;+5] -1.62% -1.19% -3.453*** -3.505*** -3.104*** -3.638*** 117 
                
  Difference          
Panel A - Panel C 
t-test   Difference                 
Panel A - Panel C 
Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum 
test 
Event window mean t-value   median z-score 
[0;0] 0.04% 0.137  -0.25% -0.044 
[-1;0] 0.48% 1.147  0.05% 1.060 
[0;+1] 0.27% 0.547  0.27% 0.248 
[-1;+1] 0.70% 1.278  0.36% 1.125 
[-5;-1] 1.32% 2.205**  0.36% 1.477 
[-5;+5] 1.89% 2.258**   1.12% 2.282** 
This table presents (cumulative) abnormal stock returns of banks over several event windows around 
the layoff announcement date. Abnormal stock returns are computed using the market model. Panel A 
reports (cumulative) abnormal stock returns for announcements during the pre-crisis period (Jan. 2004 
to Nov. 2007). Panel B reports (cumulative) abnormal stock returns for announcements during the 
period of the financial crisis (Dec. 2007 to June 2009). Panel C reports (cumulative) abnormal stock 
returns for announcements during the post-crisis period (July 2009 to Dec. 2014). T-test and Boehmer 
test are applied as parametric tests. Corrado and Wilcoxon signed rank test are applied as non-
parametric tests. Statistical significance of differences in mean and median values between Panel A and 
C is tested with parametric standard t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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The findings for the pre-crisis and the crisis period are in accordance with the observed variations 
in the reasons for the layoffs over time. In pre-crisis times, proactive strategies aiming at achieving 
cost reduction or efficiency increases clearly dominate. Capital markets consider these as positive. 
By contrast, they consider layoffs in times of crisis - when undertaken for the most part as a 
response to distress - as negative. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, stock price reaction 
continues to remain negative and highly significant. Again, the negative reaction is strongest in the 
largest event window [-5;+5] with an average -1.62 percent price loss. The difference between 
pre- and post-crisis is statistically significant in the larger event windows that include five days 
prior to the announcement. The observed price effect could be a sign for a nervous sentiment in 
financial markets. It could also indicate that the crisis still persists as the real underlying problems 
of the European debt crisis are not resolved yet. Hypothesis 3 holds under the assumption that 
financial markets have been rather stagnating than rising since 2009. The following figure 5.3 
displays the stock price reaction during pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods graphically. 
Figure 5.3: Stock price reactions to bank layoff announcements in different periods 
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The influence of the country-specific strictness of employment protection law is tested through 
univariate and multivariate analyses. According to OECD data (OECD, 2016a), the level of 
strictness is by far lowest in the United States, which means that individual and collective dismissals 
can be undertaken quickly and easily. The difference to the United Kingdom, the European State 
with the least stringent legislation is great: the OECD-figure for the UK is more than four times 
higher. For the univariate analysis, I thus distinguish between US banks and Non-US banks.  
The univariate analysis of abnormal returns following announcements of US-based banks 
versus those of Europe-based banks presents an unambiguous picture. Although shareholders in 
both cases assess staff cuts as value-decreasing measures, I find distinctly more negative returns for 
layoff announcements made by non-US banks. However, the differences between both subsamples 
are statistically insignificant. Results from the univariate analysis do not provide support for 
hypothesis 4, predicting that market reactions to layoff announcements will differ depending on 
the strictness of employment protection legislation. Therefore, it has to be rejected. The following 
table 5.6 shows the stock price reaction by the banks’ headquarter. 
Table 5.6: Stock price reactions to bank layoff announcements by bank location 
  Cumulative abnormal 
return 
t-test Boehmer  Corrado Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank  
N 
Event 
window 
mean median t-value z-score   z-score   
Panel A: US banks only           
[0;0] -0.20% -0.09% -0.690 -0.483 -0.896 -1.095 79 
[-1;0] -0.25% -0.29% -0.705 -0.282 -0.815 -0.870 79 
[0;+1] -0.18% -0.03% -0.519 -0.266 -0.329 -0.694 79 
[-1;+1] -0.24% -0.26% -0.598 -0.147 -0.416 -0.767 79 
[-5;-1] -0.23% -0.18% -0.464 -0.251 -0.987 -0.523 79 
[-5;+5] -1.28% -0.89% -1.528 -1.361 -1.995** -1.745* 79 
Panel B: Non-US banks only 
    131 
[0;0] -0.29% -0.17% -1.464 -1.274 -1.999** -1.971** 131 
[-1;0] -0.57% -0.67% -1.976* -1.989** -2.891*** -2.518** 131 
[0;+1] -0.62% -0.45% -2.020** -1.944* -2.627*** -2.224** 131 
[-1;+1] -0.90% -0.80% -2.446** -2.530** -3.351*** -2.970*** 131 
[-5;-1] -0.97% -0.62% -2.467** -2.465** -2.252** -2.646*** 131 
[-5;+5] -1.46% -1.27% -2.255** -2.140** -2.803*** -3.053*** 131 
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Table 5.6 (continued) 
  Difference  
Panel A - Panel B 
t-test   Difference  
Panel A - Panel 
B 
Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum 
test 
Event 
window 
mean t-value   median z-score 
[0;0] 0.09% 0.274  0.07% 0.363 
[-1;0] 0.32% 0.686  0.38% 1.118 
[0;+1] 0.43% 0.900  0.41% 0.905 
[-1;+1] 0.66% 1.161  0.54% 1.421 
[-5;-1] 0.74% 1.173  0.44% 1.224 
[-5;+5] 0.17% 0.165   0.38% 0.602 
This table presents (cumulative) abnormal stock returns of banks over several event windows around 
the layoff announcement date. Abnormal stock returns are computed using the market model. Panel A 
reports (cumulative) abnormal stock returns for announcements by banks headquartered in the United 
States. Panel B reports (cumulative) abnormal stock returns for announcements by banks 
headquartered in Western Europe. T-test and Boehmer test are applied as parametric tests. Corrado 
and Wilcoxon signed rank test are applied as non-parametric tests. Statistical significance of differences 
in mean and median values between Panel A and B is tested with parametric two-sample-test and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Figure 5.4 displays the stock price reaction to layoff announcements by banks in the United States 
and by banks headquartered in Western Europe in an event window of eleven days around the 
announcement day.  
Figure 5.4: Stock price reaction to bank layoff announcements by bank location 
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5.6.2 Multivariate analysis of the announcement effect 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the stock price reaction to large bank layoff announcements will be 
negative and increase with layoff size. This effect has been shown in several studies (Elayan et al., 
1998; Hillier et al., 2007; Nixon et al., 2004; Worrell et al., 1991). I test the impact of layoff size 
on CAAR through a multivariate regression. The negative coefficient indicates that capital markets 
do not consider large-scale dismissals as a value-enhancing measure. It is reasonable to assume a 
negative effect of absolute and relative layoff size on shareholder value. Consequently, large-scale 
staff cuts lead to lower positive abnormal returns respectively stronger negative abnormal returns. 
While the natural logarithm of the number of employees affected has no effect on the 
announcement day [0;0] and only marginal negative impact in the larger event windows, the effect 
of the percentage is more pronounced and largest in the eleven-days-window with a value of -0.214 
(Model V). However, none of the observed effects of layoff size on returns is statistically significant. 
Thus, hypothesis 5 has to be rejected. 
With respect to the variable investment banking, I observe a positive effect on abnormal 
returns, in line with my expectations. The effects are statistically significant at the 10-percent level 
(Model III) on the announcement day and at the 5-percent-level (Model II and III) in the three-
days-event window. From the shareholders’ perspective, the assumed positive effects of releasing 
employees from the investment banking division dominate the potential negative effects. Expected 
positive effects are most likely the substantial cost savings due to the high salary levels in 
investment banking. An expected reduction of risks associated with the release of employees 
involved in investment banking might also play a role here.  
I also observe a positive effect of proactive layoff strategies on CAAR suggesting that capital 
markets expect higher future cash flows to result from the planned cuts in personnel expenses. In 
contrast to the results of the univariate analysis, results are statistically significant. In the three-
days-event window [-1;+1], I find statistical significance on the 10-percent-level (Model II, V and 
VI). In the eleven-days-window [-5;+5], coefficients for all relevant models are stronger positive 
and statistically significant at the 5-percent-level. The multivariate analysis’ results therefore 
provide support for hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2 states that market reactions to layoff announcements will differ depending on 
the stated reason. At first glance, results meet my expectations with regard to the coefficients sign. 
In case the announcing bank provides cost cutting (hypothesis 2a) as main rationale for the 
dismissals, capital markets assess the measure as value-enhancing. In case given reasons are a fall 
in demand or poor past performance (hypothesis 2c), shareholders perceive the layoffs as a value-
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decreasing measure. M&A (hypothesis 2b) and reorganization (hypothesis 2a) as given reasons 
lead to varying results: coefficients have positive and negative signs in different event-windows. 
Similarly, the analysis of the stated reason branch closure (branches, hypothesis 2a) yields an 
inconsistent picture. While coefficients are negative in all models on the announcement day and 
the three-days-event window, their sign changes to positive for all models in the eleven days 
window. Yet, all findings are statistically insignificant. Consequently, I reject hypotheses 2, 2a, 2b 
and 2c. 
I further examine the influence of employment protection legislation through multivariate 
analysis. I use an alternative model to the univariate analysis of US versus all non-US countries. 
Strict labor law is a country's strictness of employment protection legislation according to OECD 
data (2016a). I consider the values in 2004 and 201326. The minimum value in both years is 0.25 
for the United States, maximum values are 4.4 in 2004 and 3.2 in 2013, in each case for Portugal. 
I determine mean values. Countries with a value of below 2 (the sample’s mean) are coded "non-
strict", including the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland and Belgium. The 
remaining countries with a value of 2 or above are coded "strict". The following table 5.7 presents 
the determinants of the abnormal stock return on the announcement day [0;0]. 
The coefficients are small and statistically insignificant across all event windows and do 
therefore neither provide support for hypothesis 4 nor for 4a and 4b. The negative sign may be an 
indicator that in case the announcing bank is subject to strict employment protection legislation, 
abnormal returns will be lower or stronger negative. As the univariate analysis has already shown 
for US versus non-US banks, capital markets are aware of legal barriers and anticipate associated 
costs. This results in a downwards revaluation of future cash flows.  
 
  
                                                          
26 Figures for 2014 were not available at the time of creation of this paper. 
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Table 5.7: Determinants of the abnormal stock return on the announcement day 
AR [0;0] Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Event-specific variables 
     
Constant 
0.000 
(0.07) 
-0.007 
(-0.71) 
-0.001 
(-0.60) 
0.006 
(1.09) 
0.005 
(0.79) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
Employees affected 
(LN) 
- 
0.001 
(0.41) 
- - - 
0.000 
(0.09) 
Percentage layoff 
-0.016 
(-0.31) 
- 
-0.008 
(-0.15) 
- 
0.041 
(0.62) 
- 
Crisis 
-0.008 
(-1.47) 
-0.008 
(-1.52) 
-0.008 
(-1.49) 
-  - 
Strict labor law 
-0.003 
(-0.86) 
- 
0.001 
(0.17) 
- 
-0.000 
(-0.82) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
Investment banking 
0.005 
(1.33) 
0.005 
(1.48) 
0.007* 
(1.93) 
- 
0.004 
(1.06) 
0.006 
(1.46) 
Branches 
-0.006 
(-1.43) 
-0.006 
(-1.48) 
-0.004 
(-1.00) 
- 
-0.01 
(-1.3) 
-0.004 
(-0.86) 
M&A 
0.001 
(0.02) 
- - - - - 
Reorganization 
0.000 
(0.06) 
- - - - - 
Cost Cutting 
0.004 
(0.53) 
- - - - - 
Fall in Demand 
-0.009 
(-1.33) 
- - - - - 
Poor past 
performance 
-0.003 
(-0.42) 
- - - - - 
proactive - 
0.003 
(0.84) 
- - 
0.003 
(0.79) 
0.003 
(0.84) 
Firm-Specific control variables 
∆ Assets/Employee - - 
-0.029* 
(-1.83) 
-0.029 
(-1.6) 
- 
-0.029 
(-1.58) 
∆ Sales/Employee - - 
0.008 
(0.86) 
0.005 
(0.53) 
- 
0.006 
(0.64) 
∆ Personnel 
expenses/Employee 
- - 
0.006 
(1.58) 
0.006* 
(1.91) 
- 
0.007*** 
(3.07) 
∆ ROE - - 
0.001 
(0.74) 
0.001 
(0.87) 
- 
0.001 
(0.90) 
∆ Cost/income   - - 
0.014 
(1.41) 
0.016 
(1.55) 
- 
0.016 
(1.41) 
Year-fixed effects - - - yes yes yes 
Obs. 210 210 210 210 210 210 
Adj. R^2 0.022 0.0261 0.068 0.045 0.004 0.043 
  2.20% 2.61% 6.80% 4.49% 0.36% 4.26% 
F-statistic F(10, 199) F(5, 204) F(10, 199) F(15, 194) F(15, 194) F(20, 189) 
  1.66 1.53 1.19 1.58 0.99 1.16 
Prob > F 0.094 0.183 0.298 0.083 0.471 0.289 
 
Event Study: Layoffs and shareholder wealth 
 
158 
 
Furthermore, I find statistically significant results for various financial performance figures. The 
positive effects of personnel expenses per employee may be interpreted as meaning that capital 
markets perceive the announced layoffs as a necessary adjustment of increased personnel expenses. 
My findings are consistent with the results of Knauer and Lachmann (2011) regarding the 
personnel expenses ratio but in contrast with the results of Nixon et al. (2004). The variable can 
also be seen as a proxy for investment banking.  
Similarly, positive effects are observed for the variable cost-income ratio. Increasing cost-
income ratios indicate decreasing efficiency of the organization. A reduction in workforce is likely 
to be perceived as a measure which is liable to improve the cost-income ratio and hence the bank’s 
efficiency. In both cases, staff cuts may be considered as long overdue.  
The negative effects of the variable assets per employee indicate that capital markets assess 
the planned dismissals by a solidly capitalized bank as a negative sign. Releasing employees that 
generated these assets in the past likely means a loss of valuable human capital. I find no significant 
results for changes in return on equity and (net) sales27 per employee. 
The following table 5.8 presents the determinants of the abnormal stock return in the three-
days-event window [-1;+1]. Results for the eleven-days-window can be found in the appendix (A4) 
of this dissertation. 
  
                                                          
27 “Net Sales” represent specifically for banks: interest and fees on loans, interest on federal funds, interest on bank 
deposits, interest on state, county and municipality funds, interest on U.S. government and federal agencies securities, 
federal funds sold and securities purchased under resale agreements, lease financing, net leasing revenue, income from 
trading accounts, foreign exchange income, investment securities gains/losses, service charges on deposits, other service 
fees, trust income, commissions and fees.  
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Table 5.8: Determinants of the cumulative abnormal stock returns [-1;+1] 
CAAR [-1;+1] Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Event-specific variables 
Constant 
0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.004 
(-0.27) 
-0.05 
(-1.04) 
0.007 
(1.22) 
0.004 
(0.54) 
0.017 
(1.05) 
Employees affected 
(LN) 
- 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
- - - 
-0.003 
(-1.19) 
Percentage layoff 
-0.045 
(-0.61) 
- 
-0.048 
(-0.62) 
- 
-0.068 
(-0.8) 
- 
Crisis 
-0.015 
(-1.56) 
-0.013 
(-1.46) 
-0.156* 
(-1.82) 
- - - 
Strict labor law 
-0.007 
(-1.08) 
 0.000 
(-0.03) 
- 
-0.008 
(-1.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
Investment banking 
0.012* 
(1.89) 
0.013** 
(2.21) 
0.015** 
(2.40) 
- 
0.009 
(1.48) 
0.012* 
(1.91) 
Branches 
-0.007 
(-0.89) 
-0.007 
(-0.94) 
-0.005 
(-0.70) 
- 
-0.007 
(-0.98) 
-0.005 
(-0.67) 
M&A 
-0.008 
(-0.63) 
- - - - - 
Reorganization 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
- - - - - 
Cost Cutting 
0.003 
(0.24) 
- - - - - 
Fall in Demand 
-0.008 
(-0.68) 
- - - - - 
Poor past 
performance 
-0.013 
(-1.01) 
- - - - - 
proactive - 
0.011* 
(1.87) 
- - 
0.014* 
(2.06) 
0.012* 
(1.92) 
Firm-Specific control variables 
∆ Assets/Employee - - 
-0.055* 
(-1.73) 
-0.067* 
(-1.86) 
- 
-0.069* 
(-1.86) 
∆ Sales/Employee - - 
0.028 
(1.47) 
0.019 
(1.07) 
- 
0.022 
(1.18) 
∆ Personnel 
expenses/Employee 
- - 
0.008 
(0.48) 
0.008 
(0.62) 
- 
0.009 
(0.68) 
∆ ROE - - 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
- 
0.001 
(0.65) 
∆ Cost/income   - - 
0.037* 
(1.79) 
0.041* 
(1.92) 
- 
0.041* 
(1.87) 
Year-fixed effects - - 
- 
 
yes yes yes 
Obs.  210 210 210 210 210 210 
Adj. R^2 0.029  0.0458 0.093 0.073 0.0244 0.0912 
  2.90% 4.58%  9.30% 7.30% 2.44% 9.13% 
F-Statistic F(10, 199)  F(5, 204) F(10, 199) F(15, 194) F(15, 194)  F(20, 189) 
  2.22 2.68  1.58 1.5 1.24 1.23 
Prob >  F 0.018 0.023 0.116 0.1096 0.244 0.232 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The present paper analyzes the effect of layoff announcements by banks headquartered in the 
United States and Western Europe on shareholder wealth. On the whole, capital markets do 
respond to layoff announcements with significant negative abnormal returns in event windows up 
to eleven days around the announcement date. The observed negative market response supports 
the declining investment opportunities hypothesis. From the capital markets’ perspective, the 
announcements of planned redundancies convey negative information about a bank’s current status 
and also its future prospects including poor investment or growth opportunities or uncertain future 
cash flows. Capital markets seem to recognize and assess the risk associated with the loss of human 
capital. Through releasing employees, banks risk losing both their key source of earnings and their 
main links to the customers. Hence, the detriments associated with the staff cuts weigh more 
heavily compared with the potential benefits from cost savings.  
One exception to this is investment banking: shareholders consider dismissals of employees 
from this division as positive. Results are significant in the three-days-event window. Expected 
positive effects are most likely the substantial cost savings due to the high salary levels in 
investment banking as well as a reduction of risks associated with the shrinking of the division. 
Furthermore, capital markets seem to be sensitive to the reasoning behind the planned 
redundancies. Indeed, the negative share price reaction is less pronounced if the planned layoffs 
are perceived as a proactive measure aiming at reducing costs or increasing efficiency. The negative 
market response is more pronounced if the underlying strategy is perceived as reactive to adverse 
market conditions or poor past financial performance. Shareholders might perceive large-scale 
dismissals rather as an act of desperation than as a chance for a turnaround.  
Surprisingly, the layoff size does not have a significant impact on direction and magnitude 
of the abnormal stock return.  
Contrary to my expectations, the country-specific strictness of employment protection 
legislation appears to be no relevant factor to valuation. I analyze abnormal returns following 
announcements of US-based banks known to have the least stringent employment protection 
legislation versus those of Europe-based banks. This univariate analysis yields as a result that 
returns for layoffs announcements made by non-US banks are notably stronger negative. However, 
the differences between both subsamples are statistically insignificant. The multivariate analysis 
uses an alternative model and considers additional countries besides the US as having strict 
employment protection laws. It produces similar results. I also find no statistically significant effect 
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of the strictness of national employment protection law on abnormal stock returns.  
 In summary, the results suggest that layoff announcements by banks generally have a 
decreasing effect on shareholder value. The owners of the firm do not benefit from collective 
dismissals at the expense of employees – at least in the short term. Contrary to popular opinion, 
capital markets do not perceive a reduction in workforce as a value-enhancing measure.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
The present dissertation focuses on selected corporate governance and personnel management 
issues of topical importance and offers an in-depth analysis of capital market perceptions and 
associated effects on shareholder wealth. The issues under investigation are the role and effects of 
gender diversity on corporate boards, female leadership, CEO overconfidence and layoff decisions.  
The promotion of increased female representation on corporate boards and of women in 
leadership positions are topics of current social and political relevance in Germany but also on the 
European level today. In German-speaking Europe, the promotion of women in such positions has 
been formalized as a recommendation in corporate governance codes and as a self-imposed 
objective in voluntary commitments of the industry. It is only recently that firms are obliged by law 
to have a certain share of female board members in the form of statutory gender quotas for 
supervisory boards. The present dissertation offers valuable insights into the economic relevance of 
this often controversially discussed topic.  
The role of corporate governance for the management of CEO overconfidence is an 
important research subject as extreme overconfidence can have serious economic consequences for 
the firm when board vigilance is weak. In the case of insolvency, the shareholders may even face a 
total loss of the capital invested. The recent case of CONERGY AG and its former CEO Hans-Martin 
Rueter, which is examined in this study, shows that this is an issue of topical importance.  
Finally, the effects of corporate layoff decisions on shareholder wealth are a topic of current 
relevance as several industries experienced waves of layoffs in recent years in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. The banking sector is naturally often at the center of corporate finance research but 
furthermore of high relevance as it was affected particularly badly. The examination of the capital 
market reactions to announcements of large-scale layoffs by banks allows for conclusions to be 
drawn with respect to the economic advantageousness of this personnel measure for the banks’ 
shareholders. By including the years preceding and following the crisis into the investigation, the 
study controls for potential effect variations owed to the crisis. 
 
Section 2 reviews the findings of 44 empirical studies published between 1996 and 2014 on the 
effects of increased female representation on corporate boards and stronger participation of women 
in leadership positions on firm performance and shareholder wealth. The guiding question of the 
review is if previous research does provide empirical evidence for economic benefits of increased 
female representation in top management positions.  
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The findings of almost 20 years of research on a direct link between the variables of interest 
are ambiguous. Regression models in a great variety are the most frequently used methodologies, 
followed by event study methodology and interaction analyses. 15 studies find empirical evidence 
for a positive relationship between gender diversity and financial performance, 13 studies report 
mixed evidence regarding the relationship. 14 studies cannot establish any link and five studies 
report evidence for a negative relationship. Thus, the research question cannot be answered 
categorically. Evidence suggests that the relationship between female representation in top 
management positions and financial firm performance or shareholder wealth appears to be more 
complex than originally assumed. Rather, certain boundary conditions and moderating factors have 
to be taken into consideration.  
To begin with, performance effects vary between different business sectors. Firms which 
benefit from increased female representation with respect to performance are from the technology 
or telecommunications sectors or generally operating in complex business environments. 
Furthermore, organizational strategic orientation is of vital importance. A strategic focus on 
innovation or a strong growth orientation are most advantageous. Another relevant factor is the 
degree of women’s education with positive and stronger performance effects for female CEOs with 
a university degree. Moreover, the quality of corporate governance is decisive. Gender diversity on 
the board has a positive impact on the performance of firms that otherwise have weak governance 
and shareholder rights as intensified monitoring can enhance firm value. Finally, according to 
critical mass theory, it needs a critical mass of women between 30 and 40 percent to realize the 
potential benefits from increased gender diversity. The relationship between gender diversity and 
firm performance appears to be curvilinear instead of simple and linear. This evidence could be 
one explanation for the ambiguous findings in previous research. Critical mass theory also gives an 
indication for the “right” level of gender diversity and lends support to the statutory gender quotas 
for supervisory boards at levels between 30 and 40 percent.  
Against the background of the statutory gender quotas for supervisory boards, section 3 
analyzes the acceptance level of the quota in firms in German-speaking Europe. It further examines 
compliance with corporate governance codes’ recommendations and industry’s objectives for the 
promotion of female leadership. Areas under investigation also include capital markets’ perception 
of corporate gender diversity initiatives, the major drivers for the development of programs and 
the perspective on the subject of diversity. For this purpose, an anonymous survey among investor 
relations professionals in Germany, Switzerland and Austria is conducted, which yields almost 100 
analyzable data sets. Findings suggest that staff diversity remains a niche topic for capital markets. 
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Primarily specialized investors and rating agencies with a focus on sustainability, CSR or ESG make 
inquiries relating to workforce diversity. Accordingly, corporate initiatives for increased gender 
diversity in executive positions are believed to have no impact on external company valuation by 
capital market participants. The vast majority of companies does not consider diversity issues under 
economic aspects but predominantly under aspects of fairness and equality. Most influential 
external stakeholders driving diversity initiatives are government authorities and regulators, 
women’s and interest associations and the media. The general acceptance of the quota from 
investor relations is rather low. Half of the companies have not implemented specific promotion 
programs for women in leadership and almost two thirds of all surveyed companies have not set 
any planning targets.  
Section 4 shows the potential adverse effects of failures in corporate governance by the 
example of CEO overconfidence. Within the scope of a case study, it traces the development of 
(male) overconfidence on the part of CEO Hans-Martin Rueter with fatal consequences for the firm 
CONERGY AG, eventually leading to its insolvency. The comprehensive content analysis of press 
reports, official company documents and analyst reports yields several indicators of optimism and 
overconfidence. The content analysis of press reports clearly shows that Rueter is portrayed as 
optimistic and confident. Furthermore, he is described as charismatic, eloquent and persuasive 
while credible and trustworthy at the same time. Media praise both indicates and will foster 
overconfidence. Moreover, heightened acquisitiveness in conjunction with large amounts of paid 
goodwill can be observed. The paid premiums are at least partly attributable to valuation errors 
and hubris on the part of the bidder. Rueter was presumably overly optimistic about potential 
synergies and overestimated increases in value. This is supported by the fact that the majority of 
CONERGY’s at the height of expansion 83 subsidiaries (both acquired and founded) was either 
discontinued, divested or liquidated after the company’s crisis year of 2007. Adjustments on 
goodwill amounted to EUR -21.8 million in 2007, which equals roughly two thirds of total goodwill 
accumulated since 2004. 
In addition, there are several promoting factors for optimism and overconfidence. The state-
funded boom of the German and European solar sector in the first decade of the new millennium 
led to very successful years for CONERGY. It is most likely that Rueter himself claimed full credit 
for the organizational successes and it was also credited to him externally, for instance by research 
analysts. This attribution encourages CEO overconfidence and inter-organizational prestige.  
A very important source of overconfidence, however, is weak board vigilance. The 
supervisory board has the decisive duty to monitor and control management’s actions. It should be 
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aware of the potentially serious risks of extreme managerial overconfidence and it must exercise 
control. The supervisory board, with Rueter’s uncle being Chairman and his brother being a board 
member, did not effectively constrain the CEO’s excessive expansion. Four major effects of this 
expansion in combination caused CONERGY’s existential crisis in 2007 and 2008. First, personnel 
and infrastructure costs rose rapidly due to the newly founded subsidiaries as well as poorly 
targeted acquisitions. Second, the growing complexity on the organizational level as well as on the 
technology and product level became hardly manageable. Third, increasing cash requirements and 
poor working capital management caused precarious shortfalls in liquidity, nearly resulting in 
insolvency. Finally, CONERGY failed repeatedly in procurement. CONERGY did not recover from 
the crisis and filed for insolvency in 2013.  
Section 5 provides an analysis of the wealth effects of layoff decisions by banks. Large-scale 
layoffs are personnel measures that are executed proactively or reactively for various reasons. The 
effect on stock prices and thus on the shareholders’ equity is examined by applying event study 
methodology to a sample of 210 layoff announcements issued by banks in Western Europe and the 
United States between 2004 and 2014. Results refute the thesis of a stakeholder conflict in which 
several stakeholders are affected, but only shareholders benefit from the staff cuts at the expense 
of employees. Capital markets on the whole respond to layoff announcements with significant 
negative abnormal returns in event windows up to eleven days around the announcement date, 
supporting the declining investment opportunities hypothesis. From the capital markets’ 
perspective, the announcements of planned redundancies convey negative information about a 
bank’s current status and also its future prospects including poor investment or growth 
opportunities or uncertain future cash flows. Banks belong to the financial services industry, their 
employees are their key source of earnings and their main links to the customers. Capital markets 
appear to realize and assess the risk associated with the loss of human capital. The detriments 
associated with the mass layoffs hence weigh more heavily compared with the potential benefits 
from cost savings. Solely dismissals of employees from the investment banking division are 
considered as positive by capital markets, most likely owed to the associated reduction of risks and 
the substantial cost savings due to the high salaries in this division. Furthermore, the negative share 
price reaction is less pronounced if the planned layoffs are perceived as a proactive measure aiming 
at reducing costs or increasing efficiency but more pronounced if they are perceived as reactive to 
adverse market conditions or poor past financial performance. In summary, the results suggest that 
layoff announcements by banks generally have a decreasing effect on shareholder value. Hence, 
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the owners of the firm in the short term do not benefit from collective dismissals at the expense of 
employees. 
In summary, corporate governance and strategic personnel management can impact firm 
value substantially. This is supported by the evidence provided across the four sections of this 
dissertation. The effects can be positive or negative. This dissertation shows under which boundary 
conditions increased gender diversity on corporate boards and in top management teams can but 
does not necessarily have positive effects on firm value. It also outlines associated potentials for 
improvement of quality and effectiveness of corporate governance. In contrast, the present work 
discusses the risks of weak board vigilance, thereby emphasizing the relevance of corporate 
governance. Failures in monitoring and control through the supervisory board can severely affect 
firm value. Finally, this dissertation focuses on the personnel measure of layoffs and provides 
evidence for negative effects on firm value and thus shareholder wealth.  
I recommend several areas for future research. Additional research is required regarding the 
boundary conditions and moderating variables that influence the relationship between increased 
gender diversity on corporate boards and firm performance. This includes research with respect to 
the critical mass approach and the assumption of a curvilinear relationship. From the academic 
aspect, a thorough understanding of this complex relationship is mandatory prerequisite for 
resolving evidence contradictions, for drawing correct conclusions and also for issuing 
recommendations for action to policy makers. In practical terms, it is highly relevant for the 
development and design of appropriate measures for the promotion of gender diversity by 
companies.  
With respect to the survey on the status quo of and the attitudes towards diversity 
promotion in firms, further research efforts may be invested in surveying other target groups. The 
survey presented in this dissertation was directed at investor relations professionals. They were 
asked for their experiences and estimations how diversity issues are perceived by investors, 
research analysts and rating agencies. Scholars of finance or related disciplines could consult 
capital market participants directly and survey them regarding their valuation of diversity 
promotion initiatives in general and women on boards and in leadership positions in particular. 
Scholars might also investigate on possible changes in the assessment in the recent past in view of 
the increased awareness of the topic. Qualitative individual interviews instead of or supplementing 
an online-survey would enable direct communication and open-ended questioning. This format 
would also allow for adjustments or intervention by the interviewer. Thereby, greater depth may 
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be achieved. A comparison of these results with those of the present dissertation would be 
insightful.  
A third starting point for future research is the event study methodology applied in this 
dissertation. The method could be advanced in several respects. First, the sample size could be 
extended by integrating Asian, South-American and Eastern European banks. Second, the analysis 
could be extended to other sectors from the services industry that also rely heavily on their human 
capital. Third, as the present event study does only report short-term effects, deeper research is 
needed into the long-term effects of layoff decisions on shareholder wealth. While a buy-and-hold 
strategy would be one conceivable approach, research could also consider changes in key 
performance and efficiency figures. Fourth, future research could focus on the identification of 
further determinants of the stock price reaction to layoff announcements other than those 
considered in the present analysis as well as of early signals for large-scale layoffs in the bank’s 
accounting ratios. 
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Appendix 
A1: Questionnaire (original version, in German language) 
1   Page 1 
Sehr geehrtes DIRK-Mitglied, 
sehr geehrte C.I.R.A.- und IR club-Mitglieder, 
 
die Technische Universität Darmstadt, Fachgebiet Unternehmensfinanzierung, führt 
gemeinsam mit dem DIRK - Deutscher Investor Relations Verband, dem C.I.R.A - Cercle 
Investor Relations Austria - sowie dem IR club - Schweizerische Investor Relations 
Vereinigung - eine Befragung unter IR-Professionals zum Thema "Diversity" durch. Die 
Befragung soll Antworten auf die Frage liefern, welchen Stellenwert "Diversity" für 
börsennotierte Unternehmen in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz hat und welche 
Zielsetzungen mit Diversity-Maßnahmen verfolgt werden. Weiterhin soll untersucht werden, 
welche internen und externen Einflüsse dieses Thema vorantreiben und ob die deutschen 
Unternehmen auf die ab 2016 geltende verpflichtende Frauenquote vorbereitet sind. 
Die Befragung dient wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und ist anonym. Die Beantwortung nimmt 
weniger als 10 Minuten in Anspruch.  
 
Für Rückfragen steht Ihnen Frau Anna Hinrichsen gerne zur Verfügung (E-Mail-Adresse: 
hinrichsen@bwl.tu-darmstadt.de/Telefon: +49 -(0)6151-16-4489. 
 
Anlässlich der DIRK-Konferenz am 1. und 2. Juni 2015 werden die Ergebnisse präsentiert. 
Die Ergebnisse werden Ihnen auf Wunsch nach Auswertung gern auch zugesandt; bitte 
senden Sie hierfür eine formlose E-Mail an hinrichsen@bwl.tu-darmstadt.de.  
 
Herzlichen Dank im Voraus für Ihre Mitwirkung! 
 
Prof. Dr. Dirk Schiereck                 Kay Bommer                  Anna Hinrichsen 
Leiter Fachgebiet                             Geschäftsführer          Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin 
Unternehmensfinanzierung          DIRK e.V.                       Fachgebiet Unternehmensfinanzierung 
TU Darmstadt                                                                             TU Darmstadt 
2   Standardseite 
"Diversität" ist ein Konzept für die Unterscheidung von Gruppen- und individuellen 
Merkmalen, etwa nach Geschlecht oder Nationalität. Der entsprechende englische Terminus 
lautet "Diversity". Häufig wird alternativ auch der Begriff "Vielfalt" verwendet. 
 
Die nachfolgende Befragung befasst sich im ersten Teil allgemein mit "Diversity", also der 
Vielfalt nach Kriterien wie Alter, Nationalität oder Geschlecht. 
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Im deutschsprachigen Raum ist derzeit vor allem die geschlechtsspezifische Diversität - also 
die Vielfalt der Geschlechter - der Gesamtbelegschaft wie auch auf unterschiedlichen 
Führungsebenen eines Unternehmens ein wiederkehrendes Thema. 
 
Daher konzentriert sich der zweite Teil der Befragung auf diese Ausprägung von Diversität 
und insbesondere auf die Beteiligung von Frauen an Führungsverantwortung. 
3   Standardseite 
Haben Sie in Ihrer beruflichen Tätigkeit mit dem Themengebiet „Diversity/Vielfalt“ (in 
jeglicher Ausprägung) zu tun? 
 
nie 
 
selten 
 
öfters 
 
häufig 
 
 
4   Standardseite 
Wie häufig ist das Thema „Diversity/Vielfalt“ Gegenstand von Gesprächen mit 
Investoren? 
 
nie 
 
selten 
 
öfters 
 
häufig 
 
weiß nicht 
 
 
5.1   Diversity Investorengespräche 
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Welche Investoren zeigen besonderes Interesse am Thema "Diversity"?  
Bitte geben Sie Anlegertypen (z.B. Pensionsfonds, Nachhaltigkeitsinvestoren) und/oder 
Unternehmenssitz (z.B. USA) an.  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
Was fordern diese Investoren konkret? 
Bitte nennen Sie die Forderungen (z.B. die Formulierung von Planungszielen oder 
Fördermaßnahmen).  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
 
6   Standardseite 
Welche anderen externen Anspruchsgruppen (außer Investoren) treiben das Thema "Diversity" 
voran? 
Bitte führen Sie die wichtigsten Anspruchsgruppen auf. 
(Antwort als Freitext) 
 
7   Standardseite 
Nachfolgend fokussieren wir auf die Vielfalt der Geschlechter (englisch: "Gender Diversity"). 
Unser besonderes Interesse gilt der Beteiligung von Frauen an Führungsverantwortung in Ihrem 
Unternehmen. 
 
8   Standardseite 
Beeinflusst es die Bewertung eines Unternehmens seitens des Kapitalmarktes, wenn sich dieses 
für die Erhöhung des Frauenanteils in Führungspositionen einsetzt?  
 
ja, Bewertung wird positiv beeinflusst. 
 
ja, Bewertung wird negativ beeinflusst. 
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nein, dieser Aspekt spielt für die Bewertung keine Rolle. 
 
weiß nicht. 
 
 
9   Standardseite 
Beeinflusst es das Unternehmensrating durch Rating Agenturen, wenn sich das betreffende 
Unternehmen für die Erhöhung des Frauenanteils in Führungspositionen einsetzt? 
 
ja, das Unternehmensrating wird positiv beeinflusst. 
 
ja, das Unternehmensrating wird negativ beeinflusst. 
 
nein, dieser Aspekt spielt für das Unternehmensrating keine Rolle. 
 
weiß nicht 
 
 
10   Standardseite 
Was glauben Sie: wird das Thema "Diversity" in Ihrer Investor-Relations-Arbeit zukünftig mehr 
Raum einnehmen?  
 
ja  
 
nein 
 
weiß nicht 
 
 
11   Standardseite 
Durch welche Maßnahmen fördert Ihr Unternehmen die Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf?  
Mehrfachnennung möglich.  
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Flexible Arbeitszeiten  
 
Betriebseigene Kindertagesstätte  
 
Teilzeitmodelle  
 
Jahres-/Lebenszeitarbeitskonto  
 
Home Office  
 
Jobsharing  
 
Führungstandems (Jobsharing auf Führungsebene)  
 
Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf explizit für Männer  
 
Sonstige:    
 
 
12   Standardseite 
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Hat Ihr Unternehmen interne Programme zur Förderung der Beteiligung von Frauen an 
Führungsverantwortung und in Aufsichtsräten (z.B.Mentoring, Netzwerkbildung) aufgelegt?  
 
ja 
 
nein 
 
weiß nicht 
 
 
13.1   Interne Förderprogramme 
Wie lauten diese Förderprogramme konkret?  
Bitte nennen Sie die wichtigsten Projekte.  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
 
 
14   Standardseite 
Welche Aspekte waren maßgebliche Treiber für die Erarbeitung von Diversity-Maßnahmen in 
Ihrem Unternehmen?  
Mehrfachnennung möglich.  
 
Interne ökonomische Zielsetzungen (z.B. Verbesserung des Unternehmenserfolgs)  
 
Interne ethisch-moralische Zielsetzungen (z.B. Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau)  
 
Externe regulatorische Einflüsse (z.B. beschlossene Frauenquote für Aufsichtsräte)  
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Weiß nicht  
 
In unserem Unternehmen wurden bisher keine Diversity-Maßnahmen erarbeitet.   
 
Sonstige    
 
 
15   Standardseite 
Wurde für geplante oder bereits umgesetzte Diversity-Maßnahmen in Ihrem Unternehmen eine 
Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse durchgeführt? 
 
ja 
 
nein  
 
weiß nicht 
 
 
16.1   Kosten-Nutzen 
Wie lautet das Ergebnis dieser Kosten-Nutzen-
Analyse?  
 
Der Nutzen ist größer als die Kosten. 
 
Der Nutzen entspricht den Kosten. 
 
Die Kosten sind größer als der Nutzen. 
 
Weiß nicht 
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17   Standardseite 
Besteht ein allgemeines Planungsziel für Frauen in Führungspositionen in Ihrem 
Unternehmen?  
Falls ja: Bitte nennen Sie dieses.  
 
Ja, dieses Planungsziel für den Frauenanteil in Führungspositionen lautet:
   
 
Nein, es besteht derzeit kein Planungsziel für den Frauenanteil in 
Führungspositionen. 
 
Es bestehen Planungsziele, die wir derzeit jedoch nicht veröffentlichen. 
 
 
18   Standardseite 
Bestehen derzeit interne Planungsziele für den Frauenanteil in Vorstand und 
Aufsichtsrat?                       
Mehrfachnennung möglich.  
 
Es besteht ein internes Planungsziel für den Frauenanteil im Vorstand.  
 
Es besteht ein internes Planungsziel für den Frauenanteil im Aufsichtsrat.  
 
Es bestehen Planungsziele, die wir derzeit jedoch nicht veröffentlichen.  
 
Es bestehen keine Planungsziele für den Frauenanteil in Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat.  
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Weiß nicht  
 
 
19.1   Planungsziel Frauen VS und AR 
Wie lauten die Planungsziele für den Frauenanteil in Vorstand und 
Aufsichtsrat?  
Bitte quantifizieren Sie diese wenn möglich.  
Planungsziel 
für 
Frauenanteil 
im 
Vorstand:   
 
 
Planungsziel 
für 
Frauenanteil 
im 
Aufsichtsrat:   
 
 
 
 
20   Standardseite 
Welche Vorteile sehen Sie aus Unternehmenssicht mit der Veröffentlichung solcher Zielquoten 
verbunden?  
Bitte nennen Sie diese.  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
 
21   Standardseite 
Welche Nachteile sehen Sie aus Unternehmenssicht mit der Veröffentlichung solcher 
Zielquoten verbunden?  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
 
22   Standardseite 
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Haben Sie bereits Maßnahmen ergriffen, um die ab 2016 geltende, verpflichtende Frauenquote 
für Ihren Aufsichtsrat zu erfüllen?  
 
ja 
 
Maßnahmen werden derzeit erarbeitet 
 
nein  
 
weiß nicht 
 
für unser Unternehmen gilt keine Quote 
 
 
23.1   Maßnahmen zur Erfüllung der Quote 
Wie lauten die bereits ergriffenen bzw. geplanten Maßnahmen zur Erfüllung der ab 2016 
vorgeschriebenen Frauenquote?  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
 
24   Standardseite 
Im Folgenden interessiert uns Ihre persönliche Einstellung.  
 
Bitte geben Sie an, ob Sie den folgenden Aussagen eher zustimmen oder diese eher ablehnen. 
25   Standardseite 
Inwieweit stimmen Sie den 
folgenden Aussagen zu?  
Antwortmöglichkeiten:  
- Stimme voll und 
ganz zu 
- Stimme eher zu 
- Stimme eher nicht 
zu 
- Stimme gar nicht 
zu 
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- Keine Angabe 
Aufgrund früherer familienbedingter Unterbrechungen ihrer Karriere besitzen Frauen meist 
nicht die nötige Erfahrung für eine Vorstandsposition. 
Im Aufsichtsrat üben Frauen die Kontrollfunktion strenger aus als Männer. 
Eine verpflichtende Frauenquote ist zwingend notwendig, um den Frauenanteil in 
Aufsichtsräten zu steigern. 
Dem Thema Diversity wird in deutschen Unternehmen noch viel zu wenig Beachtung 
geschenkt. 
Wenn die Kosten von Diversity-Aktivitäten größer sind als ihr Nutzen, sollte das 
Unternehmen folgerichtig Abstand davon nehmen. 
In homogenen Führungsgremien ist die Bereitschaft zum Informations- und Wissensaustausch 
unter den Führungskräften größer als in heterogenen Führungsgremien. 
Bei der Besetzung von Posten in den höchsten Führungsgremien sollten Diversity-Aspekte 
keine Rolle spielen. 
Für die Besetzung von Aufsichtsratsposten unter Berücksichtigung der ab 2016 geltenden 
Frauenquote stehen nicht ausreichend geeignete Kandidatinnen zur Verfügung.
 
 
26   Standardseite 
Abschließend bitten wir Sie um Beantwortung einiger demografischer Fragen. 
27   Standardseite 
Emittiert Ihr Unternehmen Aktien, die öffentlich an einer Wertpapierbörse gehandelt 
werden?  
ja 
nein 
Emittiert Ihr Unternehmen Anleihen, die öffentlich an einer Wertpapierbörse 
gehandelt werden?  
ja 
nein 
 
Appendix 
 
193 
 
 
28   Standardseite 
In welcher Branche ist Ihr Unternehmen hauptsächlich tätig? 
(Antwort als Freitext)  
In welchem Land haben Sie Ihren Unternehmenssitz?  
 
Deutschland 
 
Österreich 
 
Schweiz  
 
anderes Land 
 
 
29   Standardseite 
Wie viele Mitarbeiter sind weltweit in Ihrem Unternehmen 
beschäftigt?  
 
bis 5.000 
 
>5.000 bis 25.000 
 
>25.000 bis 50.000 
 
>50.000 bis 100.000 
 
>100.000 
Wie hoch ist der 
Frauenanteil an 
Ihrer 
Gesamtbelegschaft 
in Prozent? 
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Bitte geben Sie 
eine Zahl an.  
(Antwort als 
Freitext) 
 
30   Standardseite 
Aus wie vielen Mitgliedern besteht Ihr Vorstand?  
Bitte geben Sie eine ganze Zahl an.  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
Wie viele Vorstandsmitglieder sind weiblich?  
Bitte geben Sie eine ganze Zahl an.  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
 
31   Standardseite 
Aus wie vielen Mitgliedern besteht Ihr Aufsichtsrat? 
Bitte geben Sie eine ganze Zahl an.  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
Wie viele Aufsichtsratsmitglieder auf Seiten der Anteilseigner sind weiblich? 
Bitte geben Sie eine ganze Zahl an.  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
Wie viele Aufsichtsratsmitglieder auf Seiten der Arbeitnehmervertreter sind weiblich?  
Bitte geben Sie eine ganze Zahl an.  
(Antwort als Freitext) 
 
32   Standardseite 
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Gehören Sie der Investor Relations Abteilung Ihres Unternehmens an?  
 
ja  
 
nein, sondern:    
 
 
33   Standardseite 
Bitte wählen Sie Ihr Geschlecht aus.  
 
männlich 
 
weiblich 
 
 
34   Endseite 
Wir danken Ihnen herzlich für Ihre Mitwirkung. 
 
Prof. Dr. Dirk Schiereck                         Kay Bommer                       Anna Hinrichsen 
 
 
 
Gerne lassen wir Ihnen die Ergebnisse nach Auswertung zukommen. 
Bitte senden Sie hierfür eine formlose E-Mail an: hinrichsen@bwl.tu-darmstadt.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A2: Examples for proactive layoff decisions 
 
United Press International 
June 17, 2004 Thursday 
Appendix 
 
196 
 
 
HSBC to cut 3,500 jobs in Britain 
 
LENGTH: 130 words 
 
DATELINE: LONDON, June 17 (UPI) 
 
Banking giant HSBC plans to eliminate up to 3,500 jobs in Britain to cut bureaucracy and streamline costs. 
The company said it wants to "refocus the retail bank on the changing needs of the customer." . 
The company said most of the cuts would be at its Canary Wharf head office in London or in the support 
and processing areas, CNN reported Thursday. 
The bank also said it plans to create up to 1,000 "customer-facing jobs" at its branches across Britain. 
"We must make decisions now, however difficult, to manage for the future." HSBC CEO Michael 
Geoghegan said in a written statement. 
HSBC said its British operations represent 25 percent of its profits worldwide and 25 percent of its staff -- 
but 33 percent of its costs and 30 percent of its salary expenses. 
 
LOAD-DATE: June 18, 2004 
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 
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AFX International Focus 
July 13, 2005 Wednesday 6:12 PM GMT  
 
ING to cut 450 jobs in IT division, to save 39 mln eur/yr 
 
LENGTH: 135 words 
 
AMSTERDAM (AFX) - ING Groep NV is to cut 450 staff in its Dutch and Belgian Operations & IT 
Division in order to save 39 mln eur in annual costs, and plans to finish the operation before the end of 
2005. 
ING will book 57 mln eur in Q3 in one-off costs for the reorganisation.  
Of the job cuts, 400 will hit the Dutch operations and 50 the IT division in Belgium. 
ING also reiterated its earlier statement that it will be looking to outsource more of its IT operations. 
amsterdam@afxnews.com 
kel/lam 
 
LOAD-DATE: July 14, 2005 
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 
PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newswire 
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A3: Examples for reactive layoff decisions 
Associated Press Financial Wire 
January 13, 2009 Tuesday 10:14 PM GMT 
 
ING Group cutting 750 US jobs 
 
BYLINE: By DAVID PITT, AP Personal Finance Writer 
SECTION: BUSINESS NEWS 
LENGTH: 277 words 
DATELINE: DES MOINES Iowa 
 
Dutch bank and insurance company ING Group NV said it will cut 750 jobs in the United States, about 
7 percent of the company's U.S. work force.  
Affected employees are being told this week of the layoffs, which will be completed by the end of the 
first quarter, ING spokesman Dana Ripley said. 
"ING regrets having to make these difficult decisions but unfortunately, the current weak environment 
has required us to align the size of our business with the expected business activity for 2009," Ripley 
said. "We remain confident in the future direction of our U.S. business." 
In addition to the layoffs, about 170 vacant positions will not be filled. 
The company employs about 11,000 workers in the United States. 
The job reductions span all U.S. business units and locations, Ripley said. 
ING Group is based in Amsterdam. It's U.S. headquarters is in New York. Other locations include 
Atlanta, Denver, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Washington and Des Moines, Iowa. 
The company's banking, insurance and financial services segments offer annuities, retirement plans, 
life insurance, mutual funds, banking, financial planning and reinsurance. 
ING was among the top 20 financial services companies globally in terms of market capitalization as 
recent as last March, but its stock has lost nearly three quarters of its value since then. 
ING shares fell 49 cents, or 4.4 percent, to close at $10.74. They've traded between $6.37 and $40.67 
in the past 52 weeks. 
In November European Union regulators approved a 10 billion euro ($12.5 billion) emergency capital 
injection into ING Group. The Dutch government's infusion of cash was intended to prevent a run on 
the bank and insurance giant. 
 
LOAD-DATE: January 14, 2009 
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 
PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newswire 
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Evening News (Edinburgh) 
     January 16, 2008, Wednesday   
1 Edition 
 
Citigroup to axe 4200 jobs 
 
SECTION: Pg. 25 
 
LENGTH: 69 words 
 
BANKING giant Citigroup is to axe 4200 jobs after unveiling a GBP 5 billion loss for the fourth quarter 
of 2007. 
The company, which employs around 300 staff in Edinburgh's Calton Square and Holyrood Road, also 
revealed GBP 11.3bn of provisions, some linked to US sub-prime mortgages, and has been forced to 
raise GBP 7.4bn of fresh capital to shore up its balance sheet. 
The company employs 375,000 people worldwide.  
 
LOAD-DATE: January 16, 2008 
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 
PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newspaper 
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A4: Table XY: Determinants of the cumulative abnormal stock returns [-5;+5] 
CAAR [-5;+5] Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Event-specific variables 
Constant 
-0.004 
(-0.10) 
-0.023 
(-1.00) 
-0.012 
(-1.53) 
-0.003 
(-0.4) 
-0.016 
(-1.4) 
0.006 
(0.26) 
Employees affected 
(LN) 
- 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
- -  
-0.004 
(-1.23) 
Percentage layoff 
-0.141 
(-1.00) 
- 
-0.149 
(-0.97) 
- 
-0.214 
(-1.3) 
- 
Crisis 
-0.008 
(-0.40) 
-0.005 
(-0.28) 
-0.014 
(-0.72) 
-  - 
Strict labor law 
-0.009 
(-0.90) 
- 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
- 
-0.006 
(-0.5) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
Investment banking 
0.01 
(0.74) 
0.011 
(0.85) 
0.012 
(1.93) 
- 
0.004 
(0.35) 
- 
Branches 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.007 
(0.58) 
-0.007 
(0.57) 
- 
0.004 
(0.35) 
0.009 
(0.68) 
M&A 
-0.011 
(-0.40) 
- - - - - 
Reorganization 
0.008 
(0.29) 
- - - - - 
Cost Cutting 
0.007 
(0.28) 
- - - - - 
Fall in Demand 
-0.042 
(-1.2) 
- - - - - 
Poor past 
performance 
-0.027 
(-0.9) 
- - - - - 
proactive - 
0.026** 
(2.28) 
- - 
0.029** 
(2.11) 
0.025** 
(2.01) 
Firm-specific control variables 
∆ Assets/Employee 
- - 
-0.019 
(-0.32) 
-0.046 
(-0.67) 
- 
-0.056 
(-0.77) 
∆ Sales/Employee 
- - 
0.005 
(0.19) 
-0.020 
(-0.72) 
- 
-0.014 
(-0.49) 
∆ Personnel 
expenses/Employee - - 
0.006 
(0.84) 
0.008* 
(1.86) 
- 
0.008** 
(2.14) 
∆ ROE 
- - 
0.000 
(0.18) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
- 
0.001 
(0.40) 
∆ Cost/income 
- - 
0.024 
(0.47) 
0.035 
(0.65) 
- 
0.036 
(0.67) 
Year-fixed effects 
- - - yes yes yes 
Obs.  210 210 210 210 210 210 
Adj. R^2 0.02 0.013 -0.026 -0.02 -0.001 -0.015 
  2.00% 1.30% -2.60% -2.00% -0.10% -1.50% 
F-Statistic F(10, 199) F(5, 204) F(10, 199) F(15, 194) F(15, 194) F(20, 189) 
F-stat - value 1.23 1.6 0.47 1.77 1.17 1.15 
Prob >  F 0.274 0.163 0.910 0.041 0.297 0.302 
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